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Rituals of Diagnosis argues that nineteenth-century America’s literary 
representations of madness and its diagnosis respond to interdisciplinary efforts at 
cultivating a national psychology. Uniting theological and philosophical traditions with 
medical speculation, mental health reformers from Benjamin Rush to Dorothea Dix 
linked the expansion of democracy with new vulnerabilities for madness. Theories about 
insanity thus hypothesized relationships between freedom and responsibility. I examine 
how America’s first psychological fictions contributed to this rich field of discussion.  
Taking up novels by Charles Brockden Brown, Robert Montgomery Bird, and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes that pivot around the investigation of madness, I examine how literary 
works from the Revolutionary Era to the Civil War dramatize interpretive processes that 
classify transgressive behavior. I argue that the grotesque subjects at the center of these 
investigations—Anglo-Americans who are likened to demons, animals, and “savage” 
racial others—indicate the provisionality of the period’s theories of mental illness and 
register anxieties about affiliation and responsibility that accompanied their 
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development. 
This inquiry contributes to contemporary conversations about authority, desire, and 
the role of violence in the American imaginary, and argues that scientific speculation 
and literary experimentation collaborated in constructing this imaginary. While many 
have acknowledged that discourses of mental health participated in codifying social and 
political norms, I draw explicit attention to literary form as a site for examining the 
motivations that fuel these discourses by showing how their narrative trajectories put 
medical knowledge into conversation with sentimental ideologies.  Examining how these 
novels conjoin problems of interpretive confusion with affective confusion, I explore 
how these mysteries destabilize the disembodied rationality central to the perch of 
objectivity that sustained white supremacist interrogations of racial and gendered 
others. The struggle to situate the locus of social unrest into psychological and ethnic 
others betrays an archive of fears and fantasies contained by diagnostic procedures. 
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Introduction: Diagnostic Dillemmas 
Who in the rainbow can draw the line where the violet tint ends and the orange 
tint begins? Distinctly we see the difference in the colors, but where exactly does 
the one first blendingly enter into the other? So with insanity and sanity. In 
pronounced cases there is no question about them. But in some supposed cases, 
in various degrees supposedly less pronounced, to draw the exact line of 
demarcation few will undertake, though for a fee becoming considerate some 
professional experts will. There is nothing nameable but that some men will, or 
undertake to, do it for pay.                  
—Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor1  
 
Melville’s narrator raises the question: how do we distinguish sanity from madness? 
And who is authorized to do it?  We may also consider whether the “who” he invokes 
refers to someone observing sanity’s gradient from outside or within the spectrum. In 
revolving these thoughts, Melville’s narrator raises a problematic that underwrites this 
dissertation’s inquiry: while his line of questioning presupposes the possibility that such 
distinctions may be real in an objective sense, they are drawn imperfectly by human 
beings with limited insight and steeped in worldly affairs.  
                                                          
1 Herman Mellvile, Billy Budd, Sailor. Edited by Harrison Hayford and Merton M. Sealts, Jr. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), 102. 
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Rituals of Diagnosis examines how American novels from the Revolutionary Era to 
the Civil War chart out political, theological, and authoritative investments in drawing 
these lines. By doing so, I put antebellum literature into conversation with the period’s 
interdisciplinary efforts at cultivating a national psychology and rhetorical strategies 
deployed by reformers, politicians, and literary writers to forge communal bonds, test 
the legitimacy of social hierarchies, and interrogate policies of social exclusion and 
territorial aggression. Moreover, I examine literary conventions that frame, critique, and 
refract these efforts. 
Focusing on novels by Charles Brockden Brown (1771-1810), Robert Montgomery 
Bird (1806-1854), and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. (1809-1894), I examine America’s first 
psychiatric mysteries. Set against the backdrop of frontier violence and the cloistered 
villages of antebellum New England, these novels put insanity at the center of conflicts 
that pit Anglo-Americans against racial others. The figures represented at the heart of 
these investigations—white and Anglo-Irish Americans who are likened to demons, 
animals, and “savages”—are what I call psychological grotesques. These violent men 
and women blur boundaries between savagery and civilization even as they mediate 
contradictory feelings of affection and repulsion, sympathy and disgust. Looking at how 
these bizarre figures become diagnosed as insane with medical and quasi-medical 
terms, I examine how these narratives read large-scale conflicts through etiologies of 
moral dysfunction.  Moreover, I examine how these diagnostic procedures link the 
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identification of moral and social boundaries with the maintenance of American 
providence.  
 Priscilla Wald argues that medical discourses participate in cultivating national 
imaginaries by projecting “a narrative logic” onto illnesses and producing stories of 
“detection with predictive value.”2 In charting out sources of maladies and articulating 
methods of containment and cure, such narratives identify vectors of disease and 
reinforce social and territorial boundaries. Moreover, by identifying existential threats, 
they foster a sense of an imagined community that needs defending and “worthy 
representatives” of national protection. Through their literariness, and their significance 
for public safety, they construct a communal mythos and participate in a “national 
theology.”3 
Though Wald’s argument reflects specifically upon the workings of modern medicine 
in the age of globalization, perhaps no species of medical theorization more aptly fits 
her claims about medicine’s role in national mythmaking than nineteenth-century 
America’s discourse of mental illness. While the study of diseases of the mind was a 
transatlantic endeavor, religious and civic reformers elevated the significance of mental 
health sciences in America at a time when the medical profession was a long way from 
                                                          
2 Priscilla Wald, Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2008), 23. 
3 Ibid, 33-58. 
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attaining the “professional sovereignty” it would achieve in the late-nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.4 
For many of the most prominent advocates of mental health reform, such as 
Benjamin Rush (in the eighteenth century) and Dorothea Dix (in the nineteenth), the 
project of identifying and treating insanity was instrumental to refining America’s sacred 
mission. Hypothesizing that expanded freedoms exposed Americans to new pressures 
and responsibilities, reformers and asylum directors linked the expansion of freedom to 
increased vulnerabilities to insanity.5 For these reasons, discourses on insanity were 
dialectically connected to concepts of American exceptionalism, liberty and providence; 
they fueled the jeremiads of reformers who advocated an array of tactics for identifying, 
removing, and alleviating sources for madness and, along with pamphlets and sermons 
on public morality, these discourses catalyzed institutional reform. Moreover, hosts of 
politicians and reformers promoted the development of state and private asylums as a 
means of unifying communities, states, and the nation through public benevolence. 
Thus, the project of identifying causes for madness cultivated a “sanative culture” 
devoted to the joint effort of restoring the reason of individuals and ensuring the 
“purification and rationalization of culture.”6 
                                                          
4 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 24-25. 
5 David Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (New York: 
Adine de Gruyter, 2002), Xxiv. Brown, Thomas J. Dorothea Dix: New England Reformer (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998). 
6 Benjamin Reiss, Theaters of Madness: Insane Asylums and Nineteenth-Century American Culture 
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But as the insane became recognized as important objects of compassion and 
containment in the new republic, physicians, theologians, and the public debated the 
criteria that distinguished whether a subject should be held responsible for lawless 
deeds or alienated from the rights and privileges of citizenship and exempted from 
culpability. This crisis of distinction arose particularly with cases of controversial forms 
of madness such as moral insanity—a mercurial and controversial category of madness 
that entailed dysfunction of the affective or moral capacities of individuals without 
delimiting intellectual capacities.7    
The diagnosis of moral competence was especially problematic because medical 
science’s access to knowledge of the mind faced epistemological limits. While theorists 
of mental disease widely hypothesized that the brain was a crucial organ involved in 
madness,8 the capacity to determine causes for insanity satisfactorily was deeply 
muddled.9  Thus, Gerald Grob has likened the (ongoing) search for such principles to the 
                                                          
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 8. 
7 Ruth B. Caplan, Psychiatry and the Community in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Basic Books, 
1969), 119-124. 
8 Writing of the period in question, historian of psychiatry Gerald Grob argues that “Virtually all 
psychiatrists agreed that insanity was a disease of the brain, which in turn was the organ of the mind.” 
Gerald Grob, Mental Illness and American Society, 1875-1940 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1983), 35. 
9 Pliny Earle, a founding member of the American Association of Asylum superintendents, explained the 
impasse thus: “In the present state of our knowledge…no classification of insanity can be erected upon a 
pathological basis, for the simple reason that, with but slight exceptions, the pathology of the disease is 
unknown.” Thus “we are forced to fall back upon the symptomatology of the disease—the apparent 
mental condition, as judged from the outward manifestation.” Quoted by Gerald Grob in Ibid, 35. Offering 
his own Melvillean sigh, Earle, who, had submitted poetry of his own once to Edgar Allan Poe, expounded: 
“The longer I live, the more I am impressed with a belief in the all-controlling supremacy of mind over 
matter, of the far-reaching, mysterious power of the divine intelligence within, and of the limited bounds 
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quest for “psychology’s holy grail.”10 The challenges of pinning down mental properties 
that determined freedom of the will, such as intention and moral capability, were thus 
inaccessible to medicine even as medicine was being brought to bear upon principles of 
adjudication based on notions of free will and moral responsibility.  
Michel Foucault argues that the juridical and discursive mechanisms that 
traversed these limits, in fact, were important for producing modern concepts of 
authority and discipline. He argues that medico-legal discourses displaced the question 
of whether a subject was responsible for an act or not by producing case history 
narratives that allowed subjects to be typed as guilty or innocent and judged 
accordingly. This “grotesque discourse,” as Foucault calls it, became politically powerful 
because it paved over the gaps between medicine and law through forms of 
storytelling.11 By these means, “political power” Foucault continues, “has actually given 
                                                          
of the present knowledge, compared with that is to be known when mind shall have thrown off its fetters 
of clay. Science is proud, even presumptuous; but how much cause for humility in the fact that it cannot 
trace one particle of its knowledge upward, through effects, to the original cause and centre of all things! 
Science is lost at once in the mazes of uncertainty and ignorance, whenever it attempts to fathom mind 
itself.” Quoted in Franklin Benjamin Sanborne, ed. Memoirs of Pliny Earle, M.D. (Boston: Damrell & 
Upham, 1898), 151. 
10 Gerald Grob, “Psychiatry’s Holy Grail: The Search for the Mechanisms of Mental Diseases.” Bulletin of 
the History of Medicine. 72.2 (1998) 189-219. 
11 “Where the institution appointed to govern justice and the institutions qualified to express the truth 
encounter each other, or more concisely, where the court and the expert encounter each other, where 
judicial institutions and medical knowledge, or scientific knowledge in general, intersect, statements are 
formulated having the status of true discourses with considerable judicial effects. However, these 
statements also have the curious property of being foreign to all, even the most elementary, rules for the 
formation of scientific discourse, as well as being foreign to the rules of law and of being, in the strict 
sense, grotesque.” Michel Foucault, Abnormal. Translated by Graham Burchell. (New York: Picador, 2003), 
11. 
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itself…the possibility of conveying its effects and, even more, of finding their source, in a 
place that is manifestly, explicitly, and readily discredited as odious, despicable, or 
ridiculous.”12 
Responding to criticism of the ahistorical dimensions of literary critiques rooted 
in psychoanalytic and mythic reading,13 Joel Pfister has called for literary criticism to 
“rethink historically in the framework of the social construction of psychological 
codes.”14 Justine S. Murison, in particular, has argued for historically situating 
psychological terms and exploring how novels extend antebellum America’s scientific 
speculation.15  One of the challenges such projects face, however, rests in the 
provisionality of the period’s diagnostic terminologies and symptomatologies.  By 
examining the novel as a site for iterating and refiguring the process Foucault describes 
and the civic mandate that warrants it, I suggest we can get a glimpse into literature’s 
role in producing concepts of the psychological and their political significance. 
Moreover, by examining how these narratives reach their readers through direct and 
indirect address and find sources of aggression incubating within foundational 
narratives of moral instruction, I argue that they ask readers to participate in such acts 
                                                          
12 Ibid, 12. 
13 For example, Leslie Fiedler’s Love and Death in the American Novel (first published in 1966) and Richard 
Slotkin’s Regeneration Through Violence (1973). 
14 Joel Pfister, The Production of Personal Life: Class, Gender, and the Psychological in Hawthorne’s Fiction 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 17. 
15 Justine S. Murison, The Politics of Anxiety in Nineteenth-Century American Literature (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6. 
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of divination and political refiguration. 
One of the unifying features that drives these diagnostic tales is their 
destabilization of the objective gaze that Dana Nelson calls instrumental to the 
“disembodied, objective, and universalized standpoint offered by Enlightenment 
science.” This perch of objectivity, Nelson argues, facilitated white supremacist 
discourses by measuring the conspicuous corporeality of racial and gendered others, 
whom she calls “democracy’s others,” from a default frame of reference. As Nelson 
argues, this obfuscation of self-interest is imaginary, susceptible to failure, and 
productive of much anxiety.16  These novels’ psychological grotesques17 radically 
overthrow this objectivity by telegraphing uncanny qualities that compel empathy and 
aversion and lead their diagnostic avatars—all white men, with either claims to having 
arrived at a position of authority, or aspirations attaining one—to panic. 
Because the tidal forces of attraction and repulsion that these figures elicit bring 
to the surface whole constellations of violent desires, and trace abject elements within 
                                                          
16 Dana D. Nelson, National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 10-11. 
17 The grotesque is a transhistorical aesthetic mode that is commonly characterized by the juxtaposition 
or melding together of incongruent images--frequently humans and animals, forms of animate life with 
the inanimate objects. Expanding upon the manner in which M.M. Bakhtin finds political critique in 
carnivelesque motifs of François Rabelais, Peter Stallybrass and Allon White argue that the  grotesque 
facilitates cultural critique by drawing upon culturally situated distinctions between the  "high" and "low," 
and thus unsettles social positions and interrogates “the rules of inclusion, exclusion, and domination 
which structure the social ensemble." (43) By doing so, the grotesque can force an "audience to 
acknowledge what it has repressed in order to become what it is" (58). Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, 
The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
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American society, I examine how they play upon and subvert discourses of sympathy 
and provide a perverse supplement to discourses of sentimental consolidation, which 
Elizabeth Barnes calls one of the “principal modes by which eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century readers are taught to see themselves as part of a unified political body.”18 
However, whereas “sympathy converts otherness into sameness,” these interrogations 
find something disturbing and violent within the field of sameness that needs to be 
exorcised. In other words, these processes of investigation and diagnosis not only 
subject the grotesque other to the authority of the all-knowing observer, they raise 
attention to repulsive elements and forms of madness within the fabric of American 
civilization that must be recognized, cast out, or otherwise contained.  
 In the process of examining how these narratives link medical metaphors with 
concepts of political containment, I suggest that they expand upon Christopher 
Castiglia’s observations that antebellum reform discourses figuratively cleansed “the 
agency of partisan negotiation through the supposedly ‘impartial’ operations of the 
institutionalized state.”19  These diagnostic tales resolve violence internal to the 
American community by sequestering it into two spaces: onto the mad subject, who 
cannot control his or her violence, and onto an authority (professional, institutional, 
divine) that either controls or justifies violence. In other words, the assignment of 
                                                          
18 Elizabeth Barnes, States of Sympathy (New York: Columbia University, 1997), 115. 
19 Christopher Castiglia, Interior States: Institutional Consciousness and the Inner Life of Democracy in the 
Antebellum United States (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 6. 
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responsibility for violence goes hand in hand with forms of diffusing responsibility for 
violence. 
While there is a certain consistency to the diagnostic enterprises I examine, I follow 
a gradually evolving problematic that expands as the problem of social division within 
the nation continually reasserts itself. By examining how these diagnostic enterprises 
address emergent political concerns, I explore how these texts’ portrayals of the need to 
contain violence bear witness to persistent instabilities within a public sphere filled with 
competing interests.  
My first chapter, “I Kill Therefore I Am,” puts one of America’s first novelists into 
conversation with concepts of madness and state authority that informed Benjamin 
Rush’s attempt to unite mental health and social responsibility under a banner of 
providence. The Quaker protagonist of Charles Brockden Brown’s Edgar Huntly, or 
Memoirs of a Sleepwalker (1799), excuses his “savage” participation in frontier warfare 
by combining the insanity defense with assertions of republican duty and divine 
necessity.  Reading this text in conversation with Rush’s sanitary prescriptions, I suggest 
that Huntly’s strategies for deflecting responsibility for his actions expose a perverse 
side to rhetorics of civic abstraction that moralists such as Rush promoted to foster 
collaboration in a rational public sphere. By exploring how Edgar’s rampage intersects 
with an attempt to play doctor for an incurable Irish madman, I contend that Edgar’s 
efforts at self-absolution and self-edification reveal constitutive tensions that remain in 
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play during the subsequent chapters.   
If Edgar Huntly highlights the possibility that self-interest poses a challenge to civic 
abstraction, my second chapter, “Republic of Disgust,” traces how Robert Montgomery 
Bird’s portrayal of Nathan Slaughter, the mad Indian-killer of Nick of the Woods; or, the 
Jibbenainosay (1837), positions national government as a prophylaxis and refuge for 
violent desires. Following Christopher Looby’s appraisal of how the Philadelphia 
physician’s intensive emphasis upon corporeal determinism defies the kind of civic 
abstraction discussed in the previous chapter, I turn my focus to Bird’s engagement with 
popular culture’s fascination with Indian-killing. By making Nathan empathetic and 
disgusting, I argue, Bird’s novel encourages readers to take solace in federal unity by 
portraying a national military’s salvative intervention in a postlapsarian frontier.  I 
suggest that Nathan’s pathological ravings, and the frontier community’s blood thirst, 
speak to Bird’s Whiggish anxieties about “blood and thunder” literature and the unruly 
desires of Jacksonian “mobocracy.”  
Chapter three, “A Grave Scientific Doctrine,” explores how Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
Elsie Venner; a Romance of Destiny (serialized 1860-1861), a pioneer text in the tradition 
of American literary realism, serves as a referendum on the theologically-influenced 
forms of demonization found in the former novels. The ostensible subject of Holmes’s 
novel is the mesmeric and frightening Elsie Venner—a mysterious specimen of New 
England womanhood whose unique qualities (we eventually learn) originate in a 
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prenatal snake bite. The bulk of Holmes’s novel, however, focuses on the anxious 
deliberations of the community of Massachusetts physicians, theologians, and 
instructors who ponder their visceral reaction to Elsie’s existence and revise their 
opinions on the doctrine of original sin. By making these men’s reactions a site of 
narrative dynamism, Holmes imagines a revised notion of community organized and 
bounded by biologically inscribed limits, which are linked with sentimental bonds. By 
exploring how this novel treats Elsie as an object of medically sanctified compassion, I 
examine how the novel imagines the sanitization of New England’s exclusionary 
measures and fixes communal law and sentiment to local jurisdictions. 
This project does not excavate an archive of democratic or radical modes of 
resistance suppressed by diagnostic politics.  Rather, the fictive investigations I study 
here present an archive of practices and narratives that divest responsibility for violence 
through acts of rationalization, critical distancing, and the retelling of history. The fact 
that they constantly do so should give pause to those who would too quickly dismiss 
these novels. I suggest they are worth engaging, not simply because of the canonical 
significance of Charles Brockden Brown’s Edgar Huntly or the popularity and influence of 
Robert Montgomery Bird’s Nick of the Woods and Oliver Wendell’s Holmes’s Elsie 
Venner, but because they constantly direct our gaze toward ways in which rhetorics of 
containing and sequestering violence onto abnormal subjects go hand in hand with its 
perpetuation in forms that rationalize and methodize violence.  
13 
 
Chapter One: I Kill Therefore I Am: Diagnosing Edgar Huntly’s Necessary Madness 
 
Halfway through Charles Brockden Brown’s Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a Sleep-
Walker (1799), the novel’s eponymous narrator takes a moment to prepare his reader 
for the sudden onset of sleepwalking—a transformation that catalyzes an improbable 
chain of events which culminate in the professed pacifist’s brutal confrontation with a 
band of Delaware Indians. In doing so, he draws attention to his encounter’s novelty and 
the difficulty of recounting such an occurrence accurately: 
Here, my friend, thou must permit me to pause. The following incidents are of a 
kind to which the most ardent invention has never conceived a parallel. Fortune, in 
her most wayward mood, could scarcely be suspected of an influence like this. The 
scene was pregnant with astonishment and horror. I cannot, even now, recall it 
without reviving the dismay and confusion which I then experienced.20  
In these lines, Edgar sets the stage for an unprecedented attempt to narrate the onset 
of somnambulism, which Charles Brockden Brown calls “one of the most common and 
most wonderful diseases or affections of the human frame” (EH, 3). However, he also 
raises attention to the difficulty of assigning causality to (and responsibility for) the 
events he is about to describe. Though he suggests the unparalleled events he is about 
                                                          
20 Charles Brockden Brown, Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a Sleepwalker, Ed. Philip Barnard and Stephen 
Shapiro (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2006), 106. Subsequent in-text references will appear as EH. 
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to relate testify to his tale’s authenticity, he also suggests that the act of telling the tale 
itself undermines narrative coherence. In other words, his attempt to contain madness 
linguistically is also a vehicle for its perpetuation.21  
After conveying a loss of consciousness that is marked by a break in the text, 
Edgar finds himself in a narrative crisis. Awakening in a cave that is far away from home, 
he recalls that he “endeavored to recall the past; but the past was too much in 
contradiction to the present, and my intellect was too much shattered by external 
violence, to allow me accurately to review it” (EH, 107).  In the episode which follows, 
however, Edgar’s impulse to commit violence becomes associated with a return to the 
temporal order as “Fate” plays its hand.22 He reaches in the darkness to find a 
tomahawk, which he quickly uses to kill and feast upon a “savage” panther, only to 
stumble on a camp of Native Americans holding a young female captive. In his attempt 
to save the girl, who is otherwise a token presence in the book, Edgar becomes a 
brutally efficient killer. Initially, he portrays himself as a reluctant actor in the conflict 
                                                          
21 The contradiction between the reliability and coherence of Huntly’s story is broached in the first page of 
Edgar’s fictive memoir. Stating that he is only now capable of holding his pen, Huntly wonders: “am I sure 
that even now my perturbations are sufficiently stilled for an employment like this? That the incidents I 
am going to relate can be recalled and arranged without indistinctness and confusion? That emotions will 
not be reawakened by my narrative, incompatible with order and coherence? Yet when I shall be better 
qualified for this task I know not. Time may take away these headlong energies, and give me back my 
ancient sobriety; but this change will only be effected by weakening my remembrance of these events. In 
proportion as I gain power over words, shall I lose dominion over sentiments; in proportion as my tale is 
deliberate and slow, the incidents and motives which it is designed to exhibit will be imperfectly revived 
and obscurely portrayed” (EH, 5). 
22 Although Edgar states that the events “baffle foresight” and “outstrip belief,” he invokes the word 
“fate” twelve times when recounting the ensuing encounter. 
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and emphasizes his “religious scruples,” which presumably refer to his Quaker roots. He 
claims that his “aversion to bloodshed was not to be subdued but by the direst 
necessity” (EH, 119).  
But as the “necessity” presents itself, his moral restraint increasingly gives way 
and he resorts to diverging explanations for this change. First, he likens his deeds to 
madness and a spiritual unmooring: moving with the “misguided fury of a maniac” (EH, 
124), he claims that he “was not governed by the soul which usually regulates [his] 
conduct” (EH, 128). As the violence builds to a climax, however, he begins to assert 
himself as an instrument of divine justice, proclaiming his desire for “bloody retribution” 
and “atonement” for the Delaware’s victims. Finally, after wounding the last member of 
the band, he finishes the man off in an exercise in “compassion and duty.” He is 
“prescribed by pity” (EH, 134) to kill him—after all, as he reasons just before wounding 
the man, “Fate has reserved for him a bloody and violent death” (EH, 133). 
Owing to Edgar Huntly’s sensational portrayal of Indian-settler conflict through 
the eyes of a European-American victor, Charles Brockden Brown’s third novel has been 
recognized as a foundational text of American literary nationalism. However, the bizarre 
manner in which Edgar rationalizes his behavior presents an interpretive conundrum 
that has produced a wide range of interpretations about Edgar’s behavior and Charles 
Brockden Brown’s motivations. Moreover, recent critiques of Edgar Huntly have also 
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been a forum for criticizing the interpretive assumptions of readers who continue to 
pick up Brown’s “maddeningly disorganized” book.23  
Critics working along the lines of what Robert S. Levine calls the “demystifying 
school” of criticism have read Brown as a writer working within a “coherent and shared 
national ideology” of American Imperialism—an ideology that is presumably reified by 
reading practices that overemphasize the significance of Edgar’s “internal struggle.”24 In 
Jared Gardner’s words, readers who project the Indians as a “‘dark’ (uncivilized, savage) 
nature with which Edgar must do violent battle in order to claim his civilized self” 
ultimately avoid confronting the politics of exclusion described in Brown’s novel by 
psychologizing it.25 Taking Gardner’s cue, John Carlos Rowe argues that this tendency is 
encouraged by Brown’s practice of framing the frontier encounter through a tortured 
mindset that blots out the historical and political significance of Huntly’s violence. By 
bringing Huntly’s mental state to the fore, Rowe argues, Brown personalizes territorial 
conflict and thereby shifts “the historical conflicts between the Lenni-Lenape and 
settlers into the universal conflicts between good and evil, reason and madness, within 
                                                          
23 Leslie Fiedler, Love and Death in the American Novel (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2003), 157. 
24 Robert S. Levine, Dislocating Race and Nation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 18, 
20. Jared Gardner, Master Plots: Race and the Founding of American Literature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), 52. 
25 Gardner’s argument is that the treatment of “Brown’s Indians as representations of an essentially 
internal personal struggle—whether between father and son or between civilized man and his “dark 
side”—universalizes a conflict that Brown himself understood as local and psychologizes a project that 
Brown understood as essentially political.” (53). Gardner’s argument that Huntly depicts an effort to 
“meet single-handedly the crisis of identity facing the nation as a whole,” (54, my italics) however, hinges 
upon a manner of reading the national through the psychological that deserves further scrutiny.  
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the hearts of men.”26 Within this context, Rowe views the penumbra of madness that 
frames Huntly’s narrative as an aesthetic device that deflects Brown’s complicity in 
making a sensational tale about violence—a machination which betrays an “obsessive” 
attempt by Brown and others to disavow literature’s role as “an institution in the new 
nation’s colonial imaginary.”27 
Following Robert S. Levine’s suggestion that we not consider Brown working 
within the tropes of a preexisting “coherent and shared” American ideology, I examine 
how the tenuousness of Edgar’s mental state reflects upon the goals, challenges, and 
contradictions that accompanied contemporary attempts to construct such an ideology 
through the theorization of insanity and diagnostic metaphors.  In addition to exploring 
how the etiology of Huntly’s malady reflects emerging reform-oriented psychiatric 
theories, I will examine how his maddened narrative brings attention to jarring 
similarities between the contradictory terms he uses to establish moral distance from 
his violent acts; for the omnibus of alibis that Edgar uses to explain his behavior—
insanity, automatism, divine authorization, and, finally, pity and compassion—blurs 
distinctions between a rhetoric of communal necessity and an insanity defense.  
Brown’s novel further invests diagnostic interpretation with political significance 
in a dilemma that bookends Edgar’s frontier journey. Edgar’s frontier battle, in fact, 
                                                          
26 Rowe, John Carlos. Literary Culture and US Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 47 
27 Rowe, 28. 
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interrupts the main plotline of the novel, which involves the Quaker’s attempt to 
investigate the strange case of the Irish sleepwalker, Clithero Edny, who, Huntly 
believes, may have murdered his best friend, Waldegrave.  For Edgar, who is not aware 
that he himself is a sleepwalker, the fact that Clithero is sleepwalking seems to be 
sufficient evidence of guilt; moreover, his strange behavior reinforces his otherness. 28 
When Huntly takes on Clithero’s malady as a problem that is curable, and listens to the 
Irishman’s sad story—he, in fact, has committed no murder—he recognizes their 
common humanity, but fails disastrously in his mission to restore the man’s sanity. 
Because of the Irishman’s resistance to reform, Gardner argues that Brown’s novel 
implicitly illustrates the logic of 1798’s Alien and Sedition Acts by making, as Jared 
Gardner states, “exorcizing the alien,” foreigner and “Indian” alike, the “precondition of 
a national identity.”29   
This reading relies upon the presumption that Edgar’s mentor, the soldier-
surgeon Sarsefield, has an authorially sanctioned perspective. Sarsefield disparages 
Edgar’s attempt to cure the Irishman in a letter which, notably, is the only part of Edgar 
                                                          
28 At various points in the narrative, Clithero, resembles the “savages” in the wilderness. And, early on, it 
is even hinted that he may be a man-animal hybrid when Huntly sees Clithero enter the mouth of a cave 
and an animal leaps forth afterward (EH, 16). As Edgar surmises soon after spotting Clithero, “The 
incapacity of sound sleep denotes a mind sorely wounded. It is thus that atrocious criminals denote the 
possession of some dreadful secret. The thoughts, which considerations of safety enable them to 
suppress or disguise during wakefulness, operate without impediment, and exhibit their genuine effects, 
when the notices of sense are partly excluded and they are shut out from a knowledge of their entire 
condition” (EH, 11). 
29 Gardner, 53. 
19 
 
Huntly that stands outside of the penumbra of Huntly’s unreliable narrative.  While 
Huntly recognizes that Clithero is in fact a sick man, Sarsefield, the novel’s avatar of 
“reason,” uses labels that are interchangeably spiritual, medical, and legal. Believing 
that Clithero is “a madman whose liberty is dangerous, and who requires to be fettered 
and imprisoned as the most atrocious criminal” (193), he labels the Irishman a “maniac,” 
“apostate,” and “unnatural; develish; [sic] a thing for which no language has yet 
provided a name!” (EH, 175), Sarsefield’s juxtaposition of medical and religious terms 
anticipate a certain exchangeability among these terminologies for labelling existential 
threats and providing mandates for authority that we will further explore.   
I suggest that these intertwined narratives and conflicting perspectives present 
different facets of a common ritual that makes the identification and treatment of 
insanity central to the question of who can be initiated into the league of responsible 
citizens in the new American republic. But if the novel illustrates “preconditions” for a 
“national identity,” the acts of diagnosis mediated through Huntly’s erratic narrative 
suggest instabilities at the foundation of such conditions. For while Edgar’s brutal 
destruction of the Native American band, and Clithero’s eventual capture and suicide, 
reinforce an exclusionary hierarchy, the rhetoric that authorizes such exclusionary 
practices is laden with elements of perversion.  
 Recent literary scholarship concerning literatures of the Post-Revolutionary era 
has read relationships among discourses of national consolidation through literary 
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representations of interiority—broadly understood as representations of emotion, 
spirituality, and mentality.  While Charles Brockden Brown’s work has been understood 
as a productive site for discussing anxieties about authority, masculinity, and national 
stability,30 I suggest that the significance of Brown’s depiction of mental anguish can be 
further illuminated by putting Brown’s work into relation with a contemporary attempt 
to unify medical, religious, and institutional discourses. In particular, by putting the 
novel’s diagnostic scenes into close conversation with locally developing theories of 
mental illness disseminated by Benjamin Rush, the Philadelphia physician and reformer, 
I suggest we can better flesh out the interpretive and civic tensions that Brown’s novel 
highlights. 
Regarded by many as the “father of American psychiatry,” Benjamin Rush was 
the most famous American physician before the Civil War.31 He was also a prolific and 
influential pamphleteer who sought to revise governmental institutions, promote free 
education and abolish slavery. Like Brown, Rush was concerned with tracing the origins 
of personal anguish. As Robert Abzug notes, Rush inspired political action in a variety of 
                                                          
30 Most notably, Julia Stern’s The Plight of Feeling discusses Brown’s thoroughgoing articulation of 
American anxiety about identity—apprehension over the validity of national origin and the legitimacy of 
republican political processes unleashed in the aftermath of the post-Revolutionary settlement. Julia 
Stern, The Plight of Feeling: Sympathy and Dissent in the Early American Novel (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), 154.  Julie Ellison’s Cato’s Tears, meanwhile, investigates Huntly as an illustration of 
a “paranoid” masculinity produced by anxieties of the Post-Revolutionary Era.  Julie Ellison, Cato’s Tears 
and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 152-160. 
31 Half a century later, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. proclaimed that Rush “gave a direction to the medical 
mind of the country more than any other one man; perhaps he typifies it better than any other.” Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Sr., “Currents and Counter-Currents in Medical Science.” Medical Essays, 1842-1882 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1895), 193.  
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arenas by rhetorically situating reform efforts within an unfolding “sacred drama” that 
linked a variety of reform efforts with America’s divine destiny.32 Looking to the mind 
and its dysfunctions as a locus for understanding and addressing threats to America’s 
constitution, Rush argued for the physician’s position as a guardian of republicanism, 
advocate of sanative reform, and shepherd of providence. Working as a medical 
practitioner and professor of medicine before the explosion of specialized subfields that 
would emerge in the following century, Rush approached mental health through lenses 
that were philosophical, metaphysical and empirical. And by viewing diseases of the 
mind as disruptions at the confluence of mind, body, brain, and society, he saw an 
opportunity to suggest causal relationships among personal behaviors, cultural norms, 
and socio-economic realities.33  
Accordingly, diseases of the mind provided a basis for considering how the 
individual could do harm to society and, reciprocally, how society could harm the 
individual. By considering moral derangement as a condition “When the will becomes 
the involuntary vehicle of vicious actions, through the instrumentality of the passions,”34  
                                                          
32 Robert Abzug, Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform and the Religious Imagination (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 17. 
33 As Jason Frank describes the coherent thread which unites Rush’s project: “it was in the divinely 
secured association between realms that true, scientific meaning was disclosed and the grounds of 
reformative intervention secured. The mutual derangements of mind, body, and polity demonstrated this 
truth, and the reform of one realm could never succeed without corresponding reform of one of the 
others. Consequently, Rush’s diagnosis of pathology in one often pointed to causes arising from another” 
(Jason Frank. Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 112. 
34 Benjamin Rush. Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind (Philadelphia: Grigg 
and Elliot, 1835), 262. 
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he positioned the physician as a key agent in restoring moral order through medical and 
institutional means. These efforts outlined the role of medicine in leading humanity on a 
path to perpetual peace, but also when violence was necessary for the purpose of 
national and personal health. 
Taken as a whole, Rush’s attempt at fusing discourses of mind and nation was as 
much a narrative endeavor as it was a scientific, or theological one. “The American war 
is over,” Rush declared in 1787, “but this is far from being the case with the American 
Revolution. On the contrary, nothing but the first act of the drama is closed. It remains 
yet to establish and perfect our new forms of government, and to prepare the 
principles, morals, and manners of our citizens for these forms of government after they 
are established and brought to perfection.”35 Likening the fulfillment of the American 
Revolution to a theatrical performance, Rush implies eventual success, but his emphasis 
upon the need to “prepare” citizens for the government after its “perfection” suggests a 
drama of indefinite length.  
If the focal point of this unfolding drama’s final act lay within the mentalities of 
the nation’s citizens, I will examine how Brown’s novel explores the uncertainties 
accompanying this drama and puts pressure on the question of who, ultimately, can 
play a role in authoring it. Before exploring how Brown illustrates the etiology of 
                                                          
35 Benjamin Rush. “On the Defects of the Confederation.” The Selected Writings of Benjamin Rush, Ed. 
Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), 26. 
23 
 
Huntly’s somnambulistic wanderings and his failed attempt to cure Clithero, I will 
examine how Rush—who served as an apothecary, surgeon, and moralist—sought to 
synthesize a program of virtuous government and citizens by drawing upon religious, 
political, and medical concepts. As I do so, I will relate how Brown’s fiction and Rush’s 
theories drew from a rhetorical tradition that deployed pathological terms to reign in 
religious and political dissent and theorized medicine as an instrument of providence 
and national health.  
 
From the Worldly Bedlam to the Republican Machine  
Benjamin Rush and Charles Brockden Brown inherited a network of concepts 
that read erring individuals and illegitimate governments through pathological 
terminologies. Long before the Age of Revolution, Thomas Hobbes turned to madness 
as a structuring metaphor for civil unrest, distinguishing the passions and fervor of 
dissent from the “right reason” which guided people to “true religion” and legitimate 
government.  Broadly stating that madness comprises all unguided passions that 
produce “strange and unusual behavior,” Hobbes argues in Leviathan that all deviant 
feeling should be understood, to some degree, as a form of madness. In a section 
entitled “Of the Virtues Commonly Called Intellectual, and their Contrary Defects,” 
which discusses the manifold “passions” that cause madness, he pays special attention 
to subjects who deviated from the state-sponsored religion. Wary that such people 
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harbor a “private spirit” that threatens the public good, Hobbes describes the 
“inspirations” of religious upstarts as a clear and present danger to sovereign 
government. This “folly,” according to Hobbes, raises the specter of a widespread 
madness he associates with the pre-political state of nature: 
What argument of madness can there be greater than to clamour, strike, and 
throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude 
will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their 
lifetime before they have been protected and secured from injury. And if this be 
madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man….Though we 
perceive no great unquietness in one or two men, yet we may be well assured 
that their singular passions are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled 
nation. And if there were nothing else that betrayed their madness, yet that very 
arrogating such inspiration to themselves is argument enough.36 
Hobbes’s claim that the “inspirations” of the masses suggested madness prima facie 
reflects a view that the state was in place to diagnose beliefs that deviated from 
sovereign logic. These private beliefs might seem relatively harmless on an individual 
level, yet, since potentially contagious, they posed a seditious challenge to 
governmental sovereignty and, with it, the protection and security of law.  
                                                          
36 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), 42. 
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 Though the religious dissenters who left England to establish new settlements in 
America had been subjected to the kind of pathologizing rhetoric voiced in Leviathan, 
New England Calvinists frequently turned to madness to exemplify existential threats to 
their communities; in many cases, it served as evidence of demonic interference. In his 
Remarkable Providences (1684), a text that influenced the Salem Witch Trials,37 Increase 
Mather interpreted madness as a sign of Satan’s interest in the new colonies, and 
implicitly, God’s interest in their settlement as well. Reflecting the Puritan tendency to 
typology, Mather argued that madness in the colonies recapitulated conflicts found in 
the Bible: “the daemoniacks whom we read so frequently in the New Testament,” 
Mather argues, “were the same with epilepticks, lunaticks and mad men” of the present 
day.38  
Increase’s typological reading of madness had a particular use for directing the 
Calvinists’ “errand” into the wilderness. Given the tenuousness of the colonists’ 
authority in the Massachusetts settlements and their support of the Glorious Revolution 
against the king, Increase’s claims about the presence of demonic entities and their 
maddening propensities proved to be a powerful warrant for identifying and labeling 
threats to communal coherence. In particular, it justified describing contact with 
                                                          
37 Increase Mather, Remarkable Providences Illustrative of the Earlier Days of American Colonisation 
(London: Reeves and Turner, 1890). This work not to be confused with Cotton Mather’s similarly-titled 
Memorable Providences, Relating to Witchcraft and Possessions (1689), a work which even more directly 
tied to the witch trials.  
38 Mather, 171. 
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competing sects as a source of madness.39 His warnings about members of the Society 
of Friends illustrate this succinctly.   
In the eleventh chapter of the Providences, Increase warns that many Quakers 
are “undoubtedly possessed with evil and infernal spirits.” In light of this affliction, he 
carefully outlines limits for engagement with the sect: “they are indeed to be pitied, in 
that they themselves know not that an evil spirit doth possess and act them; yet others 
should, from that consideration, dread to come among such creatures, lest haply the 
righteous God suffer Satan to take possession of them also.” These stark warnings about 
commingling were justified by an account of a wayward parishioner named Mr. 
Churchman, who conversed with some Quakers, only to be driven mad by voices. After 
hearing a voice of delusion, Increase relates, Churchman was confronted with a second 
voice that reminded him of the doctrine of the Trinity and that “God had an elect 
people.” But unable to tell which voice was trustworthy, Churchman fell into paroxysms 
of madness. The competing voices in Churchman’s head imply that deviating from the 
Calvinist flock promotes dissent within the mind that cannot be resolved without God as 
mediated by the ministry of his elected community. And thus, as Mather states, the Lord 
                                                          
39 As George Offor’s introduction to a mid-nineteenth century reprinting of Remarkable Providences puts 
it, Increase’s writings “faithfully delineate... an implicit faith in the power of the visible world to hold 
intercourse with man,” an important tool for organization given that much of the community that Mather 
wanted to help construct was meant to set obey God’s commands, “however contrary to human laws, 
which are void of obligation when they infringe the rights of conscience.” George Offor, “Introduction,” 
Remarkable Providences Illustrative of the Earlier Days of American Colonisation (London: Reeves and 
Turner, 1890), x. 
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decided to “release him of all his trouble” after the local minister, Dr. Templar, visited 
him for several days. The cured Churchman and his family thus gained a “perfect dislike” 
of the Quaker way.40 
Though the Calvinists of New England were somewhat isolated from English and 
continental developments in the secular sciences,41 they did, to some extent, distinguish 
spiritual possession from medical and legal insanity.42 Increase Mather granted that 
disease could make someone behave unwillfully without necessarily pointing to satanic 
influence, but such cases deserved special scrutiny. “Sometimes indeed it is very hard to 
discern between natural disease and satanical possessions; so as that persons really 
possessed have been thought to be only molested with some natural disease, without 
any special finger of the spirit therein.”43  
                                                          
40 Mather, 246-251. Drawing a moral from this account, Increase adds, “We may by this judge whose 
servants the singing Quakers are, and what spirit doth powerfully breath in and act those miserable and 
deluded enthusiasts” (251). It stands to be mentioned that even the word “Quaker,” while frequently 
commonplace in labeling the Society of Friends, was a pejorative term used to label their comparative 
“enthusiasm.” 
41 As Walter Woodward notes, only three medical doctors practiced in New England during the 
seventeenth century, and none of them appeared before 1671. Walter Woodward, Prospero’s America: 
John Winthrop, Jr., Alchemy, and the Creation of New England Culture, 1606-1676 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2010), 163. 
42 Although the insanity defense has existed in legal literature since Roman times, so has the concept that 
madness is a form of divine visitation. H.C. Erik Midelfort notes that while Roman jurists frequently turned 
to the term “furor” to define insanity as intellectual and mental alienation, and more specifically, a state 
of mind wherein understanding and intentionality were disrupted, there were some doubts about 
whether it could be regarded as “merely a state of mental infancy or a purely physical condition. Cicero, 
for example, distinguished furor from other forms of madness, stating that “we call madness [furor] when 
the soul, pulled out of the body by divine impulse, is excited”. H.C. Erik Midelfort, A History of Madness in 
Sixteenth-Century Germany (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 187-88. 
43 Mather, 169-70. 
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Increase’s distinction between medical and spiritual sources of insanity reflects a 
bifurcated view of madness that has been in play since antiquity, but it had particular 
consequences for the New England colonists: organic insanity was a personal affliction 
that deserved treatment, sympathy, and prayer, but it was not an existential threat to 
the community; demonic possession, on the other hand, reflected a threat that required 
the community’s unambiguous response.44 As Increase implies in the lines above, it was 
more important to determine when a demonic entity might be malingering under the 
guise of disease than the other way around, and such a possibility required specialized 
interpretation that was beyond the reach of the standard physician. Giving an account 
of a man who appeared to have “ordinary epilepsy,” but was in fact possessed by a 
demon, Increase recounts how the demon made a mockery of the physicians after three 
months of treatment. The demon disclosed many of the physicians’ secrets and derided 
them “for their vain attempts to cure a man whom he had possession of.”45 This demon 
conveniently offered Increase and others plenty of evidence that the clergyman—
standard-bearer of community and expert of the soul—ought to serve as the primary 
interpreter. 
                                                          
44 Nonetheless, the association between the legally or medically insane and damnation was pervasive. In 
1676, four years before the publication of Mather’s Remarkable Providences, the General Court of 
Massachussetts appointed town representatives to take care of such persons so that “they doe not 
Damnify others,” empowering these appointees to manage the estates of people deemed insane. Gerald 
Grob, Mental Institutions in America: Social Policy to 1875 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
2009), 8-10. 
45 Mather, 120-21. 
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Amidst incipient tensions which led to the American Revolution, some influential 
religious leaders increasingly used this rhetoric to implicate the state along with 
humanity. For Benjamin Rush’s first mentor, Samuel Finley, the Irish-born Presbyterian 
preacher who would soon succeed Jonathan Edwards and Samuel Davies as president of 
the College of New Jersey, madness was a structuring metaphor for the evils of the 
sensual world. In 1754, the New Side minister outlined this pervasive threat in an 
oration that was printed at least twice in Philadelphia in the coming four years: “The 
Madness of Mankind.”46 In his lecture, he argues that “The World and its evil Customs 
are infectious,”47 and man’s madness was echoed through popular opinions and 
inconsistent principles.48  
While Hobbes viewed the citizen independent of the state as a mad man, Finley, 
who had previously been exiled from Connecticut for his teachings, pointed to divine 
truth as an alternative to state-sanctioned madness and emphasized the virtues of non-
conformity: “How much Reason there is in that divine Exhortation, Be not conformed to 
this World. Rom. Xii. 2. Do not act upon its Principles, nor accommodate yourselves to 
its evil Customs and Modes. For this World is at Variance with God, and no Man can 
                                                          
46 Samuel Finley, The Madness of Mankind (Philadelphia: William Bradford, 1754).  
47 Finley, 17. 
48 Ibid, 6. 
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serve two masters.”49 At the culmination of his oration, Finley likens the entirety of the 
world to an asylum: 
Will it seem an Abuse of Mankind, if I compare this World to a great Bedlam, 
filled with Persons strangely and variously distracted? Some are so desperate, as 
to refuse all salutary Medicines; and the Habit so inveterate, as to non-plus the 
physician’s Skill, and make him almost despair of their Cure: Some appear 
hopeful for a while, but relapse, and their Case is more dangerous than before: 
And some are actually recovered in a less, some in a greater Degree; but not so 
much as one perfectly well.50  
Here, Finley implies that no human is totally sane; however, he invests the gospel and, 
implicitly, his own oration with a medicinal response to a populace “distracted” by 
sensuality and false masters. He thus considers narrating the travails of the mad to be 
salvative and treats accounts of “mad” breaches of faith as object lessons: “Let the 
Follies of others be a Motive to engage your more earnest Pursuit of saving Wisdom,”51 
for, Finley argues, those who “become profane, or are taken in the Snare of some 
delusive Opinion, or Heresy… turn away their Ears from the Truth, and are turned into 
Fables….And thus ends their religion.”52 Yet, undoubtedly reflecting upon the fact that 
                                                          
49 Ibid, 29 (Finley’s italics). 
50 Ibid, 28 (Finley’s italics). 
51 Finley, 30. 
52 Finley, 11 (Finley’s italics). 
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his own religious beliefs made him an exile from Connecticut, he also encouraged his 
readers to be conscientious when facing the state’s propensity to pathologize dissent, 
pointing to the gospel—and not the diagnoses of others—as the only standard for 
sanity: “let it ever be a small Matter with you, to be judged weak and foolish by a mad 
World, provided always that you are wise to Salvation.”53  
  It is possible that a young Benjamin Rush, Finley’s nephew, was in the audience 
during this oration. Though initially raised to follow the traditions of his father, John, an 
Episcopalian with Quaker roots, Rush’s family converted to Presbyterianism soon after 
John’s death, and young Benjamin, born in 1746, was sent to live at Finley’s West 
Nottingham Academy by the time he was eight, the year of Finley’s oration.54 In any 
case, he was a privileged student under the minister’s teachings and Finley had an 
instrumental role in encouraging Rush to choose the medical profession over a career in 
law.55  
                                                          
53 Finley, 30 (Finley’s italics). 
54 Rush’s religious zeal and propensity for associating with a variety of faiths seems hardwired into his 
lineage. As several histories recount, the Rush family’s celebrated patriarch, Benjamin’s great-grandfather 
John Rush, was a prominent member of Cromwell’s Puritan army who converted to the Quaker faith 
during the Protectorate period. After the Restoration, the Rush’s joined Penn’s new colony in the early 
waves of Quaker settlement. Rush’s grandfather, John, however, converted to the Church of England due 
to the Quaker’s policy against interfaith marriage—a policy that would later lead to Charles Brockden 
Brown’s excommunication from the Quaker faith a century later. After the death of Benjamin Rush’s 
father, John, his mother, Susanna, converted to the Presbyterianism of that giant of the Great Awakening, 
Gilbert Tennent. Finley, one of Tennent’s most prominent collaborators, was Susanna’s brother-in-law. 
55 While Rush had originally prepared to become a lawyer, an interest that he would entertain once again 
at the tail-end of the Revolutionary War, Finley argued that Rush should avoid the legal profession, which 
was full of unhealthy temptations, and pursue medicine—a career path he frequently recommended to 
his students Nathan Goodman, Physician and Citizen, 1746-1813 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1934), 7-8. In fact, before he left to finish his medical education in Edinburgh, Rush studied 
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While Finley saw the medical profession as a refuge from the law’s insidious 
influences, and frequently posed the state as antagonistic to divine truth, Rush would 
ultimately become the most famous American physician of the era by virtue of his ability 
to fuse religious rhetoric and medical knowledge to project a vision that reconciled 
humankind, republican government, and God. Writing to Jeremy Belknap in 1791, Rush 
propounds this affinity: “Republicanism is a part of the truth of Christianity. It derives 
power from its true source. It teaches us to view our rulers in their true light. It 
abolishes the false glare which surrounds kingly government, and tends to promote the 
true happiness of all its members as well as of the whole world, for peace with 
everybody is the true interest of all republics.”56 Rush’s claim that the Revolution 
abolished the “glare” of royal government foretells the eradication of false 
consciousness, and, in turn, the discovery of truths instrumental to national and global 
happiness. And if Finley vehemently emphasized that no sane man could “serve two 
masters,” Rush would argue that knowledge of the mind and body, coupled with 
religious principles, could enable the republican government to realize and perform 
God’s will and build God-like subjects even within a nation that had no established 
                                                          
medicine under two of Finley’s pupils, John Morgan and William Shippen, Jr. Carl Binger, Revolutionary 
Doctor Benjamin Rush, 1746-1813 (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1966), 26. 
56Benjamin Rush, Letters of Benjamin Rush (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951),V.1 584 
(Rush’s italics). Similarly, Rush argues in his “On the Mode of Education Proper to a Republic”: “A Christian 
cannot fail of being a republican. The history of the creation of man and of the relation of our species to 
each other by birth, which is recorded in the Old Testament, is the best refutation that can be given to the 
divine right of kings and the strongest argument that can be used in favor of the original and natural 
equality of all mankind” Benjamin Rush, “Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic” The Selected 
Writings of Benjamin Rush, Ed. Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), 88. 
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religion. In what has become Rush’s most famous frequently cited essay, “Thoughts 
upon the Mode of Education Proper to a Republic,” Rush offers an alternative to Finley’s 
“great Bedlam”:  
I consider it as possible to convert men into republican machines. This must be 
done if we expect them to perform their parts properly in the great machine of 
the government of the state. That republic is sophisticated with monarchy or 
aristocracy that does not revolve upon the wills of the people, and these must be 
fitted to each other by means of education before they can be made to produce 
regularity and unison in government.57 
In contrast with Finley’s bedlam, Rush imagines a time when rational subjects take their 
necessary place within a rational state—a nation that is entirely sane from the top down 
and the ground up and free from sophistry. Viewed in the context of other 
contemporary metaphors of nation-building, Rush’s mechanical metaphor reflects some 
of the evolving ways in which advocates of Federalism championed a notion of the “the 
state as a work of art,”—as a mechanism that provided structures which enabled 
freedom.58  
Rush’s interpellation of the people as machines working in a greater machinery 
may invite some totalitarian comparisons; readers of the twentieth-century novelist, 
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Ralph Ellison, may recall a dystopian analogue in the lines of the servile and malicious 
African-American character who takes a perverse pride in making the ultra-white “Optic 
White” coat of “Liberty Paint:” “They got all this machinery, but that ain’t everything; 
We the machines inside the machine.”59 Nonetheless, two things must be noted about 
Rush’s metaphor; first, that it was preconditioned on a belief that this machine’s 
motions revolved upon the “will” of the people; second, that this metaphor, laying in 
the domain of possibility rather than fact, stood in contrast with the America as he saw 
it, and until people were mentally and spiritually prepared for republicanism, he would 
turn to mental weakness as an explanation for this gap. The new government, Rush 
explained, resembled “the first efforts of a child to move its body or limbs. These efforts 
are strong, but irregular, and often in a contrary direction to that which is intended.”60 
For Rush, transforming this irregular “child” into a “republican machine” 
required nurture, and by medicalizing the “will,” the fundamental basis of a politics 
based on popular assent and a central topic of religious contention, he emphasized the 
doctor’s providential role in uniting the work of the politician, reformer, and theologian. 
And until this prophecy was fulfilled, the physician would be on the front lines of a 
protracted battle against the madness of mankind. Rush would take his master’s oration 
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on the pervasiveness of madness to heart even as he sought to overcome it through 
improvements in government, medicine, and education.61 
 
The Empire of the Physician 
Just as Rush argued that America’s derivation of Christian principles would clear away 
the false glare of “kingly” authority, he believed that medicine would evolve along with 
the revolutionary spirit:  
We live, gentlemen, in a revolutionary age. Our science has caught the spirit of 
the times, and more improvements have been made in all its branches, within 
the last twenty years, than had been made in a century before. From these 
events, so auspicious to medicine, may we not cherish a hope, that our globe is 
about to undergo these happy changes, which shall render it a more safe and 
agreeable abode to man, and thereby prepare it to receive the blessing of 
universal health and longevity.62  
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Referring to a biblical parable, Rush forecasts a future of human perfectibility: “from the 
perfection of our science, men shall be so well acquainted with the method of 
destroying poisons, that they ‘shall tread upon scorpions and serpents’ without being 
injured by them.”63 Following up on this likening of the physician to Christ, Rush further 
predicts that the innovations of the republican physician will transform disease and 
prevent its emergence: “Pestilential diseases shall then cease to spread terror and death 
over half the globe” and health institutions of all kinds would also become obsolete. 
“Hospitals shall be unknown” and so, too, would madness for the “groans of pain, the 
ravings of madness, and the sighs of melancholy shall be heard no more.”64 Rush’s goals 
for the advancement of medicine could not be more bold: if the physician exerted his 
empire effectively enough, widely enough, God and man would be more unified and the 
institutional need for the doctor would wither away.  
But in the infinite meantime, the physician would be a guide for regulating the 
passions of the republic. And the exploration of mental pathologies would be central to 
this effort. As he would tell his students: “The empire of a physician who is acquainted 
with the texture and functions of the human mind, may be extended beyond the 
diseases which are induced in it by derangement. It may be employed to compose and 
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regulate the passions, when they act with excess or irregularity in the common affairs of 
life.”65 In charting out the nature of this empire, Rush commonly found potential for 
derangement in the “excessive or irregular” passions attendant on the nascent liberties 
he cherished most. Along these lines, I will read Rush’s medical reform paradigm as a 
basis for jeremiads which could restate the goals and shortcomings of the new nation.  
While Rush’s most lasting contributions to the field of mental health would rest 
in his Medical Inquiries and Observations upon Diseases of the Mind (1812),66 he laid the 
groundwork for this magnum opus with more than twenty years of treating the mentally 
ill and writing about disorders of the mind. Indeed, the notes of Elihu Hubbard Smith—
Charles Brockden Brown’s close friend, and the inspiration for Edgar Huntly’s departed 
friend, Waldegrave—indicate that he had discussed the issue of nervous disorders with 
his students in the years of 1790-91.67  
In 1787, Rush delivered his “Enquiry into the Physical effects upon the Moral 
Faculty,” a work widely recognized as an inaugural text in American psychiatry. 
Following theories of morality postulated by Adam Smith and David Hartley, Rush 
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argues that the “moral faculty” is a component of the brain that acts as a feedback 
mechanism with other aspects of the body and, as he would expand upon in later 
essays, the body’s circulatory system and organs. Drawing a parallel between people 
with disorders of memory, imagination, and judgment, who are recognized as the 
proper subjects of medicine, and those with “disorders of the moral faculty,” he states 
that the latter are often overlooked by medical professionals because they have “not 
been traced to a connection with physical causes,” including environmental, economic, 
cultural factors as well as behavioral factors such as intemperance, poor sleep, and the 
effects of defective education.68  
Further, he argued that the morally diseased were not to be treated as criminals, 
but rather as patients who had lost their moral agency: “In those cases where the moral 
faculty is deprived of its freedom, by involuntary diseases, I conceive that man ceases as 
much to be a subject of moral government, as he does to be a subject of our civil 
government, when he is deprived by involuntary diseases, of the use of his reason.”69 
Equating moral agency with civic agency, Rush argued that insanity marked grounds for 
alienability within the social contract—a condition which needed to be cured to restore 
one’s rights and responsibilities as a citizen.70 And Rush’s view on the curability of the 
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moral faculty was central for linking individuals, government, and God. As Eric Carlson 
puts it, “The existence of an innate moral faculty justifies the hortatory component of 
Rush’s theories; for the moral faculty must then be the physiological link between a 
transcendent deity and the cosmic rightness of the republican system.” Mankind was 
thus “physiologically tuned by God” to produce and be shaped by republican systems of 
government.71 By such means, the mind’s moral nature could be all but purged of 
imperfection.72  
If Rush had noted an analogue between citizen and state as a machine within a 
machine, he also argued that the mind of the individual was a microcosm of the state.73 
At the close of his essay on the moral faculty, Rush argues that  
                                                          
performer or receiver of personal and social duties, and thus no longer a legal or moral person. Rush 
agreed with [fellow physician Thomas] Percival that physicians were the best judges of sanity and that 
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it is absolutely necessary that our government, which unites into one all the 
minds of the state, should possess, in an eminent degree, not only the 
understanding, the passions, and the will, but above all, the moral faculty, and 
the conscience of an individual….nothing can be politically right, that is morally 
wrong; and no necessity can ever sanctify a law, that is contrary to equity.”74  
In this sense, Rush’s work literalizes what Christopher Castiglia calls “the federalization 
of affect: the creation of metaphors of ‘innerness’ to serve as sites of correspondence 
between individual bodies (character, personality, even biology) and state interest.”75 
Castiglia argues that this “federalization of affect” encouraged reformers to shift their 
efforts toward the regulation of bodies (encouraging temperance and good manners) 
instead of economic and political systems. Similarly, as the years following the 
revolution advanced, and, notably, as Rush became less influential in the sphere of state 
and national politics, he became more refined in his arguments about regulating the 
people’s behavior, evidenced by his widely-circulated “moral thermometer,” and his 
belief that individuals needed to be “cured” to rejoin the social compact. As Rush’s 
analogies between the individual and government bear out, however, this metaphorical 
linkage was bidirectional: just as the analogue between the government’s institutional 
structure and the mind could be used to justify civic obligations, it could also be used to 
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propel the government to conform to the needs of the people and respond to dis-ease 
of various sorts.  
Though Rush dreamed of a future state when government and the people would 
be regenerated by a providential dialectic, he also established that the citizens of the 
United States would be increasingly vulnerable to destabilizing energies if their growing 
freedoms were not maintained by religious virtue and governmental hierarchy. Rush 
argued in Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind that 
“Madness has increased since the year 1790” due to the heightened “number and 
magnitude of the objects of ambition and avarice, and to the greater joy or distress 
which is produced by gratification or disappointments in the pursuit of each of them.”76 
The relationship Rush outlines between economic opportunity and madness held true to 
a general line of argument that linked mental vulnerability to increased privileges, 
opportunities, and responsibilities.  Moreover, while he held that women had a higher 
“natural” predisposition to insanity than men because of menstruation and pregnancy, 
men were more likely to go mad from “artificial causes” such as “the evils of war, 
bankruptcy, and habits of drinking.”77 
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If “exposure” to the vulnerabilities and opportunities of the marketplace was a 
potential cause of madness, so were ideas of liberty when they clashed with 
governmental conditions.  In Diseases of the Mind, Rush suggests a relationship 
between dissent and insanity that has some Hobbesian echoes. Rush argues madness is 
rare in despotic countries “where the public passions are torpid, and where life and 
property are secured only by the extinction of the domestic affections.” He adds that 
“Habits of oppression in all those cases expend the excitability of the passions, and 
prevent their reacting upon the brain.” However, with a growing ferment of discourses 
on liberty, chaos dramatically increased in such nations. When a “just and exquisite 
sense of liberty” is “stifled by a military force,” Rush argues that “the conflicting tides of 
the public passions, by their operation upon the understanding, become in these cases a 
cause of derangement. The assassination of tyrants and their instruments of oppression, 
is generally the effect of this disease.”78  
Rush argues that “Revolutions in governments which are often accompanied 
with injustice, cruelty, and the loss of property and friends; and where this is not the 
case, with an inroad upon ancient and deep-seated principles and habits, frequently 
multiply instances of insanity.” Drawing from an account of the French Revolution by 
Constantin-François de Chassebœuf Volney, the French aristocrat and statesman, Rush 
states that “there were three times as many cases of madness in Paris in the year 1795, 
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as there were before the commencement of the French Revolution,” a stark contrast to 
the predictions of the Revolution’s advocates.79  
In contrast with the French Revolution’s madness, America’s relative sanity, Rush 
argues, is a consequence of the design of republican government, which allowed for the 
public passions to be exercised intermittently and routed through delegated channels. 
Using a thermodynamic metaphor, Rush explains the method by which the republican 
government defused antisocial passions: 
In a government in which all the power of a country is representative and 
elective, a day of general suffrage, and free presses, serve, like chimnies [sic] in a 
house, to conduct from the individual and public mind, all the discontent, 
vexation, and resentment, which have been generated in the passions, by real 
and supposed evils, and thus to prevent the understanding being injured by 
them.80  
Suggesting that the republican structure of government acts as a conductor that diffuses 
harmful passions generated by “real and imagined evils,” he poses a vision of 
governmental authority as a kind of protective prosthesis which fused, protected, and 
directed the individual and public imagination.  
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In light of this interdependence between political and mental integrity, Rush held 
that extraordinary measures could be taken to support political causes. Though Rush 
was a staunch advocate of peace,81 he nonetheless viewed violence as hygienic when 
political authority was contested:  
In favour of this conduct, I shall mention a single fact. There was a form of this 
disease, well known, during the revolutionary war, in several of the States, by 
the names of the tory-rot, and the protection-fever. It was confined exclusively 
to those friends of Great Britain, and to those timid Americans who took no 
public part in the war. Many of them died of it, but not a single whig nor royalist, 
who took an active part in the revolution, was affected with it. This was the more 
remarkable, as many of them lost their fortunes and former rank in society, by 
their exertions in support of the principles and measures to which they had 
devoted their passions or their lives.82  
At first, Rush’s depiction of Tory violence as healthier than abstention seems 
counterintuitive; however, given his belief that citizens were ultimately responsible for 
assembling for national purpose, his rationale that those who took part in the conflict 
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were ultimately healthier than those who remained pacifists suggests that violence in 
the name of the state (or, for the case of the revolutionaries, a divinely sanctioned 
purpose) had a sanative function. This opinion was by no means limited to Rush. 
Alexander Hamilton, who was one of Rush’s arch-enemies, for example, provided a 
similar basis for waging war against the French in 1797. Because the Americans had 
maintained a neutral position in evolving hostilities between the French and English 
governments, the French had begun to seize American ships, leading to what has been 
known as the “Quasi War.” In “The Warning,” published on February 21st, 1797, 
Hamilton argues that the economic consequences of political neutrality would be 
disastrous; however, Hamilton adds that the commercial consequences were “minor 
evils in the dreadful catalogue” compared to the mental effects of inaction: “the 
humiliation of the American mind would be a lasting and a mortal disease in our social 
habit. Mental debasement is the greatest misfortune that can befall a people.”83 
Rush also associated political orientations with diagnosable pathologies and 
dissent that exceeded certain boundaries as madness. On the eve of the Whiskey 
rebellion, for example, he was able to secure a pardon for one of the rebels on account 
of insanity, evidenced by his very fast pulse.84 Rush does not speak of the man’s political 
motivations; however, perhaps they were ultimately irrelevant: while his diagnosis freed 
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the man from punishment, it also disqualified him as a legitimate political agent. The 
physician, on the other hand, spoke from above the plane of the debate. In his essay on 
the medical “Effects of the American Revolution on the Mind and Body of Man,” Rush 
argues that  
The minds of the citizens of the United States were wholly unprepared for their 
new situation. The excess of their passion for liberty, inflamed by the successful 
issue of the war, produced, in many people, opinions and conduct which could 
not be removed by reason nor constrained by government. For a while, they 
threatened to render abortive the goodness of heaven to the United States, in 
delivering them from the evils of slavery and war. The extensive influence which 
these opinions had upon the understandings, passions and morals of many of 
the citizens of the United States, constituted a species of insanity, which I will 
take the liberty of distinguishing by the name of Anarchia.”85  
By “taking the liberty” to level this diagnosis of others’ claims to liberty, Rush places 
himself outside this sphere of debate and emphasizes the manner in which his own path 
to institutional reform situated claims about liberty within a rubric of mental health. 
Invoking a stance that I would like to call “diagnostic exceptionalism,” he held that the 
physician could be protected from the passions which plagued the polity: “he will be an 
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enemy to slavery and a friend to liberty; and from his frequent opportunities of 
witnessing the destructive effects of the passions upon the human body, he will be the 
advocate of those governments only, which filter laws most completely from the 
passions of legislators, judges, and the people.”86  
Given the sanctified position of the physician, Rush presented a particularly 
powerful vantage point for narrating the causes of society’s ills and advocating 
corrective measures. However, given his concern that individuals became all the more 
vulnerable as they gained more liberty, it must be emphasized that he could only secure 
this position by maintaining a fiction that he could be “free” from the circulation of 
affects. By placing the diagnostic position in the hands of a madman and a physician, 
however, Charles Brockden Brown’s Edgar Huntly considers what happens when the 
impulse to diagnose is placed within—and not apart from—the kinds of corrupting 
forces Rush found everywhere in society. 
 
Identifying Tissues of Error 
The physician may be attentive to the constitution and diseases of man in 
all ages and nations. Some opinions, on the influence of a certain diet, 
may make him eager to investigate the physical history of every human 
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being. No fact, falling within his observation, is useless or anomalous….I 
am apt to think, that the moral reasoner may discover principles equally 
universal in their application, and giving birth to similar coincidence and 
harmony among characters and events.  
– “Walstein’s School of History”87 
Reflecting on the purpose of fiction in an essay promoting the usefulness of 
literary work, Charles Brockden Brown compares the historian to an empirical scientist 
and the romancer to a theoretical one. “The observer and experimentalist,” he argues, 
“may claim the appellation of historian,” but “he who adorns these appearances with 
cause and effect, and traces resemblances between the past, distant, and future, with 
the present, performs a different part. He is a dealer, not in certainties, but 
probabilities, and is therefore a romancer.”88 For Brown, a literary romancer—or, as 
Brown calls himself in the introduction of Edgar Huntly, a “moral painter” (EH, 3)— is 
socially useful when he illustrates the complexities that underlie human life, for even 
the simplest acts are related to a vast network of events.89 The novelist, then, like a 
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physician-moralist such as Rush, was explicitly interested in exploring the variety of 
internal motives and social circumstances that produce “voluntary” actions. Echoing 
Rush’s claims about the imperiousness of providential medicine, Brown argues that the 
“empire of romance” is “absolute and undivided over the motives and tendencies of 
human actions.”90  
Romance, then, for Brown, is a mode of instructively theorizing forms of human 
motivation—an expressed goal that is parallel to, and not explicitly competitive with, 
the kind of moral theorizing Rush sought to derive and put into practice. However, 
Brown described the novel’s capacity for moral instruction to be different from religious 
education. In a letter to a friend, Joseph Bringhurst, Jr., a close friend and fellow 
follower of the Quaker faith which Brown would soon be expelled from, Brown writes 
that it is “incumbent on us, as lovers of virtue…to imitate” the pattern of Christ; 
however, he argues, the instructional value of the gospels was limited because Christ’s 
struggles “were peculiar to himself” and “virtuous examples are useful to us in 
proportion as virtue is exhibited in circumstances similar to our own.”91 He further 
suggests that the Bible is a “narrative” “debased” by “ignorant or artful interpolations 
and omissions.” He then turns to the novels of Samuel Richardson, who he viewed as a 
                                                          
90 Brown, “Difference,” 235.  
91 Charles Brockden Brown, “Letter to Joseph Bringhurst, Jr. 21 December, 1792,” Collected Writings of 
Charles Brockden Brown: Letters and Early Epistolary Writings, Ed. Philip Barnard, Elizabeth Hewitt, and 
Mark Kamrath (Bucknell University Press: Lewisburg, PA, 2013), 205. Brown refers to Christ as the only 
perfectly “virtuous man [that] has been recorded for the instruction of mankind” (Ibid).  
50 
 
useful moral alternative for present-day readers. “That one is truth and the other fiction 
is of no importance to one who considers both as moral lessons,” for, Brown asks, “what 
is the gospel history more than a Romance?” 92 In other words, Brown’s ideal romance 
would help answer “how men might best promote the happiness of mankind in given 
situations,” and thus connect with a community of readers by demonstrating the 
complexities that foreground choices between virtue from vice in a morally complicated 
world.93 
 In spite of these claims, Edgar Huntly does not provide a clear route to the 
promotion of happiness—it is a text insinuated with manifold levels of distrust, 
chicanery, failed attempts at benevolence, and dubious, religiously justified violence. 
While it does not provide a clear solution to any problem, it nonetheless draws 
attention to rhetorical and institutional problems that have a mind-bending character. 
While Rush projected a diagnostic authority that was capable of abstraction from the 
circulation of affects, and able to identify the proper motions of the republican machine, 
Brown’s novelistic account of a character who attempts to correct personal and public 
ills while on the brink of madness himself implicates assertions about officiating divine 
duties with the perpetuation—rather than the solution—of society’s ills.  
Simply to describe the story of Edgar Huntly, an effort that, in itself, requires the 
rearrangement of its chaotic plot, is to demonstrate the full force of several destabilizing 
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and madness-inducing energies circulating in the new republic—a catalog of vectors for 
disease.94  In fact, a brief recounting of the challenges that Edgar faces at the outset of 
the novel suggests that he is being ushered into a worldly Bedlam even before he begins 
sleepwalking. Circulating through a maddening wilderness, Edgar attempts to serve as 
an agent of justice while fully exposed to the destabilizing energies inherent in a life far 
out of the reach of governmental and civic institutions.  
From the beginning of Edgar Huntly, Edgar is acquainted with a barrage of 
anxieties about economic and marital speculation, religious doubt, and the virtues of 
violence. Moreover, the reliability of the narrator, who speaks of “the wanderings of my 
reason and my freaks of passion,” is also in question from the start (EH, 19). As the story 
opens, Edgar is on a mission to discover the “author” of a horrible crime— the murder 
of his best friend, Waldegrave, who is also the brother of his fiancée. Before turning to 
the matter of Huntly’s attempt to engage the prime suspect for this crime—the 
sleepwalker Clithero, I will briefly recap some other factors which play into his mental 
turmoil and draw attention to their relationship to some of Brown’s political 
perspectives.  
                                                          
94 Brown’s introduction to Edgar Huntly positions his narrative as an excavation of American habits: 
“America has opened new views to the naturalist and politician, but has seldome furnished themes to the 
moral painter. That new springs of action, and new motives to curiosity should operate; that the field of 
investigation, opened to us by our own country, should differ essentially from those which exist in Europe, 
may be readily conceived. The sources of amusement to the fancy and instruction to the heart, that are 
peculiar to ourselves, are equally numerous and inexhaustible” (EH, 3). 
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Waldegrave’s death provides Huntly with an opportunity to marry his departed 
friend’s sister, the addressee of his Memoirs, by virtue of her inheritance of $7500. But 
in an episode immediately preceding Huntly’s somnambulistic venture, the legitimacy of 
this fortune is called into doubt by Weymouth, who unceremoniously arrives and claims 
that the money is actually his.95 The consequences of this upheaval hit Huntly especially 
hard because (as we later learn) he and his sisters are in a “precarious” economic 
position. Orphaned by a marauding band of Native Americans, Edgar and his sisters have 
depended on his elderly uncle for subsistence, and Edgar is in imminent danger of losing 
the security he has been provided: “My uncle’s death will transfer this property to his 
son, who is a stranger and enemy to us, and the first act of whose authority will 
unquestionably be to turn us forth from these doors” (EH, 105). Weymouth also 
insinuates that Huntly may have impregnated Waldegrave’s sister and that she may be 
in hiding.96 
In addition to being frustrated in his attempts at marital and economic 
speculation, Huntly’s vulnerability is compounded by a religious crisis. Waldegrave, as 
                                                          
95 Weymouth, a trader, states that Waldegrave, who very earned little money teaching at a free school for 
African Americans, held the money for safekeeping while Weymouth did business abroad and became 
shipwrecked (EH, 96).  
96 “They told me that Waldegrave’s sister had gone to live in the country, but whither or for how long, she 
had not condescended to inform them, and they did not care to ask. She was a topping dame whose 
notions were much too high for her station. Who was more nice than wise, and yet was one who could 
stoop, when it most became her to stand upright. It was no business of theirs, but they could not but 
mention their suspicions that she had good reasons for leaving the city, and for concealing the place of 
her retreat. Some things were hard to be disguised. They spoke for themselves, and the only way to 
hinder disagreeable discoveries, was to keep out of sight” (EH, 100). We are given no follow-up evidence 
on the legitimacy of Weymouth’s claims to Waldegrave’s money or the rumors about his sister. 
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Huntly relates, entrusted Huntly with a set of letters that outline a Deistic philosophy: 
beliefs that “deify necessity and universalize matter,” “destroy the popular distinctions 
between soul and body,” and “dissolve” the “supposed connection between the moral 
condition of man anterior and subsequent to death” (EH, 89). However, unbeknownst to 
Huntly, he has a tendency to sleepwalk, and he has hidden these letters in a place where 
he cannot find them. Huntly goes on to say that Waldegrave relinquished these beliefs 
and desired for his letters to be destroyed.97 Huntly’s immediate concern is that these 
documents could unleash spiritual havoc. Huntly, however, “did not entirely abjure” his 
friend’s beliefs. His use of the words “popular” and “supposed” to refer to the 
immortality of the “moral” soul suggests that he is still considering many of 
Waldegrave’s theories. Furthermore, his inability to fulfill Waldegrave’s request to 
consign the documents “to oblivion”— even as he acknowledges their “pollution and 
depravity”—shows that he is morally divided about their content (EH 88-89). 
                                                          
97 Considerable evidence suggests that this scene has a special autobiographical significance for Brown’s 
relationship with Elihu Hubbard Smith. After Smith studied medicine under Rush, Brown and Smith had 
been partners in literary endeavors, and Smith had helped Brown publish his work on women’s rights, 
Alcuin, and sent Brown anecdotes about cases of somnambulism. Like Waldegrave, Elihu had taught in the 
free school for African-Americans. Aside from editing American Poems, the first major anthology of 
American poetry, Smith co-created the American Repository, the first American medical Journal. Brown 
nursed Smith on his deathbed during the Yellow Fever epidemic of 1798. Following his death, the Smith 
family asked his friends about whether he had converted from his Deist beliefs. By mentioning that 
Waldegrave gave up Deistic tenets, Brown is likely responding to the Smith family’s concerns.  Bryan 
Waterman, Republic of Intellect: The Friendly Club of New York City and the Making of American Literature 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 89. 
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Huntly, to some extent, reflects Brown’s own ambivalence about religious 
matters.98 Four years after writing Joseph Bringhurst, Jr. about the limited value of the 
gospels as tools of moral instruction, Brown wrote approvingly of the controversial 
views of Elihu Hubbard Smith and William Dunlap, the American playwright.  In a letter 
written in 1796, he demurs from sharing Smith’s “controversial” statements about 
religion, only to segue into a protracted quotation from Dunlap’s correspondence.  In 
this letter, which Brown felt had “pretty wisdom,” Dunlap disparages religion’s role in 
promoting public virtue. Dunlap acknowledges that the legal system provides a powerful 
mechanism for restraining vice: Law, he argues, “threatens the vicious man with an 
immediate punishment, to prevent his doing an act which tempted him by the lure of 
the present gratification,” and thus “may prevent the evil action.”99 
“Religion on the other hand,” Dunlap continues, “holds out a reward in a future 
and precarious state, by way of tempting men to do that which they know they ought to 
do, if right, without the inducement of such offers.” He then asserts that a man would 
have “an undoubting confidence in the rectitude of his own dispositions, if religion had 
not stepped in and told him, he was a Villain and could not have a wish to do good, of 
                                                          
98 Brown’s own religious beliefs have been considered mercurial; while he was heavily interested in Deism 
during the 1790s, there is evidence to suggest that Brown turned away from this philosophy. Indeed, he 
married into a stalwart Presbyterian family a couple years after the publication of Edgar Huntly, and the 
patriarch of this family, William Linn, issued searing attacks against Thomas Jefferson’s Deistic beliefs, 
aiming to disqualify him from the presidency. Brown was expelled from the Society of Friends for 
marrying Linn. 
99 Charles Brockden Brown, Letters, “Letter to Joseph Bringhurst,” 20th of July, 1796,” 357-359. 
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himself.” The deferral to a religious sense of duty is especially unhelpful, Dunlap 
reasons, because it bonds moral agency to an imaginary realm that perverts reason’s 
ability to discern right from wrong. Religion, he argues, discourages man’s belief that 
virtue is a valuable end in itself and “in its place he has the promise of an hirelings 
wages in a certain country, of which his reason can never give him intelligence, & which 
has not the least appearance of reality, except in the dreams of his sick and feverish 
imagination.” By thus associating religiously sanctioned action with madness, Dunlap 
forecasts a form of moral derangement: “His ideas of Justice become confused, 
confounded, while the eternal barriers which exist between Virtue and Vice, are hidden 
by the mysteries of Superstition, and their deeply determined shades blended 
together.” Dunlap continues: 
What are the punishments held out by religion to scare the evil-intender?  
Eternal torments—hereafter.  This…tends to destroy his natural sence [sic] of 
justice.  The present gratification is not balanced by the fear of immediate pain, 
but additional future ills are promised, which from their distance and uncertainty 
are rendered nearly nothing in the Competition, and are quite done away by the 
promise, in the same code, of pardon, or repentance.100 
In other words, Dunlap suggests, the belief in divine judgment aids and abets crimes 
because, on the one hand, punishment is delayed to a future state, and, on the other 
                                                          
100 Ibid, 359. 
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hand, there is no limit to the crimes that can be pardoned through expressions of pious 
guilt and repentance. Stating similar beliefs in another letter, Brown tells Bringhurst that 
“the belief of the divinity of Christ and a belief of future retribution,” and not merely the 
mistaken “ignorance or passions of its followers” have “created war & engendered 
hatred, & entailed inexpressible calamaties on mankind.” Heading off criticism of his 
treatment of Christianity, Brown writes: “You say I have mistaken the christian tenets.  It 
is of little moment: I denye [sic] that religious sanctions are friendly to morality.  I denye 
[sic] the superhuman authority of any teacher: and a future retribution.”101  
Dunlap and Brown’s critiques of religion were fueled by the writings of the 
philosopher and novelist, William Godwin.102 In the introduction to the first book of his 
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Godwin argues that man’s “individual character,” 
affiliations, and desires are not “independent from political systems and 
establishments.”103 Accordingly, Godwin argues that discourses of virtue and vice 
merely focus on how people should behave within a system that is taken for granted. 
Working from these premises, Godwin suggests: “Perhaps government is not merely in 
some cases the defender, and in other the treacherous foe of the domestic virtues. 
Perhaps it insinuates itself into our personal dispositions, and insensibly communicates 
                                                          
101 Brown, Letters, “Letter to Joseph Bringurst,” October 24, 1795,” 300. 
102 Brown had, in fact recommended Godwin’s Enquiry to Bringhurst six days after his own diatribe against 
religion. Letters, “Letter to Joseph Bringurst,” October 30th, 1795, 316. 
103 William Godwin, “Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and its Influence on Morals and Happiness” 
(London: G.G and J. Robinson, 1798), 2-3. 
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its own spirit to our private transactions.” Because of this, Godwin argues that “the 
attempt to alter the morals of mankind singly and in detail is an injudicious and futile 
undertaking; and that the change of their political institutions must keep pace with their 
advancement in knowledge.”104 For Godwin, who subscribed to arguments made by 
Constantin-François de Chassebœuf Volney, that religion enslaved subjects to political 
systems, taking God’s will for granted was a dangerous starting point for theorizing 
political conduct. In fact, while Benjamin Rush and Godwin had similar opinions about 
the relationship between morality and government, 105 Rush despised Godwin’s ideas 
about religion: “Godwin has some great and original ideas upon morals and 
government,” Rush wrote, “but upon the subject of religion he writes like a 
madman.”106  
Godwin’s view of the insidious effects of governmental institutions also raises a 
question that potentially challenges the long-term goal he expresses at the end of his 
introduction: “if government thus insinuate[s] itself in effects into our most secret 
retirements, who shall define the extent of its operation?”107 If, as Godwin theorizes, 
the individual cannot transcend the social, and, at least at this point in his career, won’t 
allow religion to authorize reform, it remains difficult to discern how a subject who is 
                                                          
104 Ibid, 5. 
105 Rush also shared several mutual friendships with Godwin, including Joseph Priestley and the 
Universalist Reverend Richard Price.  
106 Letter to John Seward, December 28, 1796. Benjamin Rush, Letters, V.2, 783. 
107 Ibid. 
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shaped by this political condition might find stable epistemological ground from which 
to authorize social change.108  
If these uncertainties inform our understanding of Huntly’s moral predicament, it 
is perhaps no surprise that he has trouble deciding upon a morally responsible action to 
take when he sees the suspicious Irishman, Clithero Edny, sleepwalking near the site of 
Waldegrave’s death.109 As it turns out, the etiology of Clithero’s mental turmoil 
originates in problems even more blatantly rooted in economic repression and a 
perverse form of worship.  
From his childhood onward, Clithero tells Edgar, he has lived a life of self-
abasement as the officious servant of a politically forward-looking Anglo-Irish aristocrat, 
Mrs. Lorimer. This relationship fundamentally shapes Clithero’s being: after years of 
being a functionary for Lorimer, he claims that no one could have known her better, and 
he deems that his life would be “a cheap sacrifice in her cause” (EH, 30). For a moment, 
it becomes conceivable that Clithero will be united in marriage with Mrs. Lorimer’s 
daughter, Clarice, and thus elevated to a position that would otherwise be unimaginable 
                                                          
108 As Peter H. Marshall argues, Godwin “was left with the apparent dilemma of believing that human 
beings cannot become wholly rational as long as government exists, and yet government must continue 
to exist while they remain irrational. His problem was that he failed to tackle reform on the level of 
institutions.” Peter H. Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1991), 219. 
109 When first deciding whether or not to follow the Irishman, Edgar asks himself: “‘Is it wise to undertake 
experiments by which nothing can be gained, and much may be lost? Curiosity is vicious, if undisciplined 
by reason, and inconducive to benefit.’” In the next line, however, he justifies pursuit by answering his 
own question: “Curiosity, like virtue, is its own reward. Knowledge is of value for its own sake, and 
pleasure is annexed to the acquisition, without regard to anything beyond” (EH, 13).  
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for him. That such an opportunity is even possible reflects her advanced beliefs and her 
rejection of aristocratic norms.  
As we learn, Mrs. Lorimer’s progressiveness about marriage comes from her own 
thwarted attempt at marriage with Sarsefield, the surgeon and soldier who serves as 
Clithero and Huntly’s mentor. This marriage had been stopped by the machinations of 
her evil twin brother, Wiatte. Though Clithero despises him from the beginning, 
Sarsefield, who wishes to “obviate” the man’s presence, tells the Irishman of Wiatte’s 
past misdeeds with an eloquence that “amplifies” his understanding of Wiatte’s 
“incurable” depravity.110  As it turns out, Clithero obviates this danger by shooting 
Wiatte in self-defense.111  
What would seem to be a solution to the problem, however, quickly changes to 
tragedy because Mrs. Lorimer has written, in a purportedly incontrovertible textual 
“monument,” that her soul is inseparable from Wiatte’s and that one will die if the 
other passes. The presence of this ridiculous document—which is of parallel import to 
Huntly’s collection of Waldegrave’s letters—speaks to the persistence of a structure of 
belief that Mrs. Lorimer has retained in spite of her active opposition to many of the 
                                                          
110 As Sarsefield tells Clithero, “You know his character. No time was likely to change the principles of such 
a man, but his appearance sufficiently betrayed the incurableness of his habits. The same sullen and 
atrocious passions were written in his visage. You recollect the vengeance which Wiatte denounced 
against his sister. There is everything to dread from his malignity. How to obviate the danger, I know not” 
(EH, 47). 
111 Of the killing, Clithero states, “The attack was so abrupt that my thoughts could not be suddenly 
recalled from the confusion into which they are thrown. My exertions were mechanical. My will might be 
said to be passive, and it was only by retrospect and a contemplation of consequences, that I became fully 
informed of the nature of the scene” (EH, 51). 
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visible injustices of the aristocratic scheme. Because of an almost religious ascription to 
Mrs. Lorimer’s authority, Clithero is perversely compelled to fulfill her prophecy.  
Similar to the way in which Huntly describes the act of killing presented at the 
beginning of this chapter, Clithero states that his “limbs were guided to the bloody 
office by a power foreign and superior” (59). Thus, while Clithero’s attempt to kill Mrs. 
Lorimer can be taken as a fit of lunacy from one perspective, his actions also reflect the 
position of servitude he has grown accustomed to throughout his service to Mrs. 
Lorimer; moreover, they seem to be spiritual injunctions, even if demonic ones. Once 
Clithero believes that he has killed Mrs. Lorimer, he is in a position where he can no 
longer serve his mistress, nor can he exorcise “the dæmon” that continues to control 
him. Accordingly, Clithero has little to live for but the perpetual guilt involved with his 
role in culminating Mrs. Lorimer’s prophecy.  
 Reflecting a similar fugue of competing allegiances and senses of duty, Edgar 
Huntly perversely hems and haws from one sense of moral justification to another 
about whether to cure or kill Clithero. He begins the narrative relating his divine 
imperative to commit revenge: “Methought that to ascertain the hand who killed my 
friend, was not impossible, and to punish the crime was just. That to forbear inquiry or 
withhold punishment was to violate my duty to my God and mankind” (EH, 7). Such a 
sense of duty, of course, flies in the face of Dunlap’s argument. However, upon seeing 
Clithero weeping, he has a revolution in benevolent sympathy: “Every sentiment, at 
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length, yielded to my sympathy. Every new accent of the mourner struck upon my heart 
with additional force, and tears found their way spontaneously to my eyes” (EH, 9). 
From a political standpoint, Huntly’s attempt to cure the wayward Irishman 
Clithero has a two-fold nature; it is a gesture of inclusion, but also an assertion of 
hierarchy. Moved by tears of pity to assume the role of healer, Huntly swears off the 
idea of killing the man, and instead takes on the tone of a paternal authority or religious 
advisor: “it shall be my province to emulate a father’s clemency, and restore this 
unhappy man to purity and to peace” (EH, 24).112 Upon hearing Clithero’s story, he 
poses the question: “Shall we impute guilt where there is no design?” (EH, 64). When 
Edgar asks this, he is pondering whether Clithero is ultimately responsible for his actions 
in light of the suddenness and ferocity of the attack against him, but he also implies that 
Clithero’s education rendered him unequipped to get past his violation of Mrs. Lorimer’s 
key tenet. In other words, Edgar’s defense of Clithero rests on the assumption that 
Lorimer’s reform efforts could not dismantle the aristocratic structures to which she and 
Clithero remained spiritually adhered. The chain of responsibility goes further and 
further back, implicitly pointing to the persistence of aristocratic structures of feeling in 
spite of a perception of progress. 
                                                          
112 Andy Doolen usefully refers to this contradiction thus: Edgar and Clithero’s “midnight wanderings 
display how the revolutionary virtues of benevolence and sympathy could also mask an irrational need to 
police the alien.” Andy Doolen, Fugitive Empire: Locating Early American Imperialism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 49. 
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Huntly’s question about design, abstractly expressed as it is, more broadly refers 
to the question of how we assign cause and responsibility for actions that appear 
irrational. And it directly relates to an accompanying question he asks a moment later: 
“Shall we deem ourselves criminal because we do not enjoy the attributes of Deity?” 
(EH, 64). If Rush could argue that his belief in moral responsibility comes from his belief 
in the deity’s infallibility, Huntly brings up the question of what happens when the 
motivations of such a deity are inscrutable, and in turn raises the question of whose 
designs, ultimately, Huntly is fulfilling when he invokes his “duty to god and mankind.” 
Clithero’s response to Huntly’s inquiry calls into question Huntly’s own motives for 
attempting to cure him: 
the inferences which you have drawn, with regard to my designs, and my 
conduct, are a tissue of destructive errors. You, like others, are blind to the most 
momentous consequences of your own actions. You talk of imparting 
consolation. You boast the beneficence of your intentions. You set yourself to do 
me benefit. What are the effects of your misguided zeal, and random efforts? 
They have brought my life to a miserable close. (EH, 25) 
This response points to the contradictions inherent in the attempt to cure insanity: if a 
diagnosis of insanity prima facie exempts someone from civic responsibility, restoring 
sanity means reinstating a capacity for political engagement and a potential for 
asserting control.  
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Huntly’s explanation suggests that the ease and arbitrariness with which one can 
attribute design and larger purpose to actions—virtue, sympathy, benevolence, 
violence—erects an excuse-machine that can place interested action under the banner 
of universal interest. In this way, Huntly’s argument brings to mind Benjamin Franklin’s 
famous point: “So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables 
one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do.”113 Brown’s novel 
suggests that the diagnosis of unreason provides a similar convenience.  
 
The Pleasures of Foundational Violence 
Focusing on the millennial aspects of Rush’s post-Revolutionary theories of 
mental health, I have followed an attempt to redirect the violent energies of the 
American Revolution into a pacific, reformative program. The freedom provided by the 
Revolution, and the multiple forms of “madness” it fomented, also entailed that citizens 
be ready to act mechanically when the greater good demanded it. Running in parallel 
with this, I have been exploring how the arc of Huntly’s self-description projects a 
subject who describes his behavior in terms that begin with madness and then 
transitions into an associating his participation in violence with a “fate” that literally 
forces his hands.  
                                                          
113 Benjamin Franklin, “The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin.” Autobiography, Poor Richard, and Later 
Writings (New York: Library of America, 1997), 599 (Franklin’s italics). 
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I suggest that Edgar Huntly raises attention to something akin to what Slavoj 
Žižek calls the “obscene stain” of “pre-political” violence. Following the writings of 
Giorgio Agamben and Hannah Arendt, Žižek discusses how post-Revolutionary states 
appeal to the idea of transcendent and allegedly “non-political” discourses to justify 
politically interested decisions and establish governmental apparatuses. For Žižek, the 
“political space is never ‘pure’ but always involves some kind of reliance on ‘pre-
political’ violence,” an “obscene stain” that is only apparently “pre-political,” but which 
enables political power to consolidate systemically. “The relationship between political 
power and pre-political violence,” Žižek continues, “is one of mutual implication: “not 
only is violence the necessary supplement of power, (political) power itself is always-
already at the roots of every apparently ‘non-political’ relationship of violence.…. In 
human society, the political is the encompassing structuring principle, so that every 
neutralization of some partial content as ‘non-political’ is a political gesture par 
excellence.”114  Žižek’s use of scare quotes around the terms “non” and “pre-political” 
emphasize that concepts which appear to be outside of the domain of the political have 
an important role in organizing the conceptualization of the political; namely, that the 
transition from a revolutionary condition to a bona fide state depends upon a fantasy of 
monumental change that justifies the institutionalization of new modes of order, 
including “apparently ‘non-political’” institutions. Important elements of the political 
                                                          
114 Slavoj Žižek, “Against Human Rights” Wronging Rights?: Philosophical Challenges to Human Rights,  ed. 
Aakash Sing Rathore and Alex Cistelecan, (New Dehli: Routledge, 2011), 160-61. (149-167) 
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domain, are thus shaped by elements that seem to be outside of the realm of politics, as 
well as imaginings of conditions that precede the arrival of the state. Taking a similar 
line of argument in his argument that governmental institutions become insinuated into 
the traditionally recognized “private” life, Godwin’s Political Justice argues that the role 
of the state in shaping private life only seems visible during “peculiar emergencies,” 
such as criminal offenses, legal challenges, or foreign hostilities.115 
Certainly, Edgar Huntly’s confrontation with the band of Delaware and his 
pursuit of the Irish murder suspect Clithero resemble the kind of “peculiar emergency” 
that Godwin sees as the most visible point of intersection between the subject and the 
state. On the frontier, however, there is no state in sight—in fact, the only state-like 
presence in the novel intercedes after Edgar has destroyed the Delaware band, in the 
form of a posse comitatus led by Sarsefield. 
If Edgar’s violence in some way precedes the establishment of the state,116 it is 
significant that his three major explanations for violence—insanity, biological necessity, 
and divine sanction—constitute a reservoir of “apolitical” justifications for violence—a 
                                                          
115 Godwin, 3. Godwin writes that individuals are usually supposed “to be in ordinary cases independent 
of all political systems and establishments. It is only in peculiar emergencies and matters that depart from 
the accustomed routine of affairs, that they conceive a private individual to have any occasion to 
remember, or to be in the least affected by the government of his country. If he commit or is supposed to 
commit any offence against the general welfare, if he find himself called upon to repress the offense of 
another, or if any danger from foreign hostility threaten the community in which hre resides, in these 
cases and these cases only is he obliged to recollect that he has a country. Ibid.  
116 Norman Grabo has noted that the novel takes place in 1787—the year of the U.S. Constitution’s 
ratification. Norman Grabo, “Introduction,” Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a Sleepwalker, ed. Norman 
Grabo (New York: Penguin Classics, 1988), xvii. 
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departure from the pacifism he professes. In this sense, the compulsive aspects of 
Edgar’s violence, related at the opening of this chapter, can be viewed as a 
servomechanism of the kind of abstraction that Dana Nelson sees operating in Rush’s 
educational plan—one that emphasizes the priority of eternal principles, as well as 
national and public interests over temporal, local, and private ones.117   
When Rush pushed for his most radical political goals, he aimed to unite the 
public in a sense of emergency that required participation in ways that he, along with 
other political reformers of the coming generations, believed to offer unprecedented 
possibilities for civic engagement because the state itself revolved around the “will” of 
the people. At the “apolitical” margins of this vision of an e plurbus unum of wills are the 
subject who is insane—the subject excluded from the political system—and the subject 
who calls him mad, who is above the plane of politics, and a mediator of divine purpose. 
Nevertheless, his descriptions of political forms of madness in the post-revolutionary 
moment—“Anarchia,” “tory-rot,” and “protection fever”— suggested there were 
definite limits to the sane expression of the political will.  Though Rush rhetorically 
situated himself in an exceptional position that was above the plane of political dispute, 
                                                          
117 In “On the Modes of Education Proper to the Republic,” Rush advises that instructors “Let our pupil be 
taught that he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property. Let him be taught to love his 
family, but let him be taught at the same time that he must forsake and even forget them when the 
welfare of his country requires it.” Nelson argues that “Rush’s plan works structurally to reroute anxieties 
about national unity and sameness into the psychological interior of the American boy/man, who must 
equalize the contradictory demands of self, family, market, and national interests in his own person. 
National concerns for the reassuring experiences of unity and sameness are educationally recodified as 
the territory of national manhood, the white man’s self-management of the ‘differences’ loaded into 
him.” Nelson, National Manhood, 12.  
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his diagnoses of wayward political beliefs demonstrate how arbitrary political decisions 
can be couched within a rhetoric of objectivity. I suggest that Edgar’s frontier rampage 
explores private impulses and desires becoming enabled through his disavowals of 
moral complicity. 
Huntly suggests that he must kill the natives no matter how he feels about it, and 
the gradual accretion of a divine imperative displaces his madness with only vague hints 
at his complicity in the act:  “In an extremity like this, my muscles would have acted 
almost in defiance of my will” (EH, 120). If Huntly’s narrative strategies separate his 
private morality (his religious scruples and his capacity to express sympathy for the 
fallen natives) from the violence he calls a “direst necessity,” Brown suggests that such a 
separation, much like Dunlap’s argument about justice, allows for violence to be 
endlessly permitted provided that it can be converted into sanctioned means.  
Edgar, of course, has a personal investment in fighting the band of Delaware. 
Soon after Huntly recounts emerging from the cave and seeing them, he states: “Let the 
fate of my parents be…remembered. I was not certain but that these very men were the 
assassins of my family, and were those who had reduced me and my sisters to the 
condition of orphans and dependents.” Edgar’s claim that the Delaware band might be 
the “very men” responsible for his dispossession, of course, resets a complex history of 
Native-settler conflict around his childhood trauma and makes him the primary agent 
for resolving a personally inflicted wrong. Additionally, his tentative “not certain but” 
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reminds us that this connection lies in his selective imagination. Thus, although Edgar 
does acknowledge political conditions which generated the conflict, “a long course of 
injuries and encroachments had lately exasperated the Indian tribes,” his memory and 
imagination direct his action: the loss of his parents, “and the sight of the body of one of 
this savage band, who…was overtaken and killed,” produced “lasting and terrific 
images” in Edgar’s “fancy” (EH, 119). Consequently, just thinking about the Lenni Lenape 
produces a visceral response (“I never looked upon or called up the image of a savage 
without shuddering”) that obviates the Delaware people’s legitimate grievances and 
informs the actions that immediately follow.118  
                                                          
118 Brown was well aware that Edgar Huntly’s somnambulistic journey takes place in the same location as 
a monumental act of territorial fraud against the Delaware people, which was known as the “Walking 
Purchase.” In September of 1737, as Peter Kafer recounts, a group of land speculators working in the 
interest of William Penn’s sons set out from a township just southwest of Solebury, a town mentioned in 
Huntly, in order to purchase a portion of the fringes of Penn’s property that had been historically 
inhabited by the Delaware Indians. (Peter Kafer, Charles Brockden Brown’s Revolution and the Birth of the 
American Gothic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 173). Through a convoluted series 
of machinations, these speculators tricked the Delawares into thinking that they were agreeing upon a 
way to establish the accepted boundaries between already-purchased property and Delaware territory; in 
reality, however, the Delawares were technically placing their own territories within the acceptable 
boundaries of the purchase (ibid). Compounding insult with injury was the fact that the extent of the land 
to be taken up, which was supposed to be limited by a border that could be “leisurely” walked in a day 
and a half (about twenty miles) was grossly extended. Instead of following the expected protocol, the 
speculators hired fast-moving men who were paced by horses. By the end of this day-and-a-half “walk,” 
the speculators’ men had traveled sixty-four miles, forty-seven of which were stolen directly from the 
Delawares (ibid). This “Walking Purchase,” as it was later called, fomented intermittent outbreaks of 
hostilities during the mid-1750s: Pennsylvania settlements were attacked and the local militias responded 
in kind.  In his ramble through the wilderness of Norwalk, Edgar Huntly is thus wandering through a land 
cursed by a legacy of deceit, aggression, and counter-aggression—and Edgar seems unable or unwilling to 
look backward far enough to attempt to set the wayward chain of events aright. In effect, then, Edgar 
Huntly’s “sleepwalk” through this land is a ghastly restaging of the “Walking Purchase” venture that is 
challenged by, and ultimately reconfirms, the Indians’ ancestral dispossession.  
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Throughout the episode when Huntly engages the natives and frees the child 
they have held captive,119 Huntly is like an efficient killing-machine who dispatches his 
enemies: an “instrument of their destruction.” As he does so, he constantly draws 
attention to his lack of self-control and the fact that these “necessary” acts violate his 
“religious scruples.”120 These scruples, he states, “could not withhold my hand, when 
urged by a necessity like this,” but “they were sufficient to make me look back upon the 
deed with remorse and dismay” (EH, 120). “Sufficient” here draws attention to the 
utility of Edgar’s guilt—not as a means of correcting future action, but of suggesting that 
moralizing upon the deed—which amounts to narrating it just the right way—can 
excuse it.  
And yet, as his violence builds to a climax, Huntly’s narrative control becomes all 
the more tenuous as he explains the interior dimensions of his most “virtuous” act of 
                                                          
119 Dieter Schulz notes how this girl’s captivity is underplayed in this story. Although the captivity narrative 
had been so steeped in the American tradition by 1799 that Brown’s contemporaries would have likely 
filled in the details on their own, the fact that this girl is so scarcely mentioned leads Schulz to believe that 
Brown “consciously or unconsciously” minimized the moral component that foregrounds this violence 
Dieter Schulz, “Edgar Huntly as Quest Romance,” American Literature 43 no. 3 (November 1971), 330.  
120 Edgar’s first kill is typical of this. After remarking upon his reluctance to “imbrue my hands in the blood 
of my fellow men,” he recalls himself crouching in the path of his first victim’s movement, concealed by a 
shadow of a rock and fearful of detection. Though acknowledging that the man was unarmed and 
unaware of his presence, he elevates the threat of the Delaware by turning his unsuspecting actions into 
portents of violence: the path between them “engaged all his vigilance,” and the Lenni Lenape’s motions 
constituted an impending danger that “aimed at nothing less than my life.” Turning the man’s 
unsuspecting motions into a clear and present danger, he emphasizes that he had no choice but to kill the 
man: “How else could I act?” In the moment which follows, he throws his tomahawk, stating simply that 
“The means were in my hand, and they were used.” Rhetorically submerging his agency in the act, he 
displaces violent agency upon the weapon itself: “the hatchet buried itself in his breast, and rolled with 
him to the bottom of the precipice,” before the man could “descry the author of his fate.” Indeed, 
Huntly’s major narrative tendency is to make the authorship of his action illegible. 
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violence. Upon spying the final member of the band who has not seen him yet, Edgar 
claims that his “abhorrence of bloodshed was not abated” (EH, 191), but, nonetheless, 
he plots the man’s death. In this moment of deliberation, Huntly asks himself whether 
or not the Delaware should be “suffered to live,” as he “will live only to pursue the same 
sanguinary trade; to drink the blood and exult in the laments of his unhappy foes, and of 
my own brethren.” Thus, Huntly surmises, “Fate has reserved him for a bloody and 
violent death” (EH, 191-192). A moment later, Huntly shoots the native out of 
“indispensable necessity” (EH, 192).  
Although Huntly claims that his “heart sunk” (EH, 192) as he did this, his reason 
for this “necessary” action is that the Delaware heard the sound of Huntly’s own gun 
being cocked. Not only is this rationalization unconvincing in light of the preceding 
conviction, it also allows Huntly to reinforce his assertion that that he has merely been 
“led” to become the “instrument” of the band’s destruction (EH, 186). By his own logic, 
he is simply following the dictates of “fate,” and this transcendental justification enables 
him to recodify himself from a killing machine to an agent of medical compassion when 
he realizes that he has merely wounded the man with his gun. Deciding to bayonet the 
wounded man in an act of “cruel lenity,” “prescribed by pity,” (EH, 193) Huntly reflects 
upon the act thus: 
Such are the deeds which perverse nature compels thousands of rational beings 
to perform and to witness! Such is the spectacle, endlessly prolonged and 
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diversified which is exhibited in every field of battle; of which, habit and 
example, the temptations of gain, and the illusions of honour, will make us, not 
reluctant or indifferent, but zealous and delighted actors and beholders! 
Thus, by a series of events impossible to be computed and foreseen, was the 
destruction of a band, selected from their fellows for an arduous enterprise, 
distinguished by prowess and skill, and equally armed against surpize [sic] and 
force, completed by a boy, uninsured to hostility, unprovided with arms, 
precipitate and timerous…[sic] 
…I left the savage where he lay, but made prize of his tom-hawk….Prompted by 
some freak of fancy, I stuck his musquet in the ground, and left it standing in 
the middle of the road. (EH, 193-194)  
As the passage suggests, Huntly depicts himself as a rational man who was compelled to 
kill the natives by “perverse nature,” but his reaction is also perverse.  Describing himself 
as an “actor” and “beholder” of the deed, he cloaks his actions in moral ambiguity. Even 
as he describes himself as forced into committing these acts, he describes a delight in 
participating in this violence that belies his attempts to assert moral distance; moreover, 
the delight he has in beholding himself committing the act from a safe distance potentially 
implicates his reader-witness in such delights. His lauding of the Delawares’ “arduous 
enterprise,” and “prowess,” conspicuously absent a moment before, now serves as a 
yardstick for his own maturation--elevating him from a mere “boy” to a man capable of 
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shoving his phallic musket into the ground. And the joy that accompanies this “freak of 
fancy” shows that he has found a sublime, if perverse, pleasure in the “cruel lenity” of 
following the “prescriptions of pity”.  
If all of Huntly’s attempts to present himself as an innocent “beholder” of the 
action cannot obviate the pleasure he partakes in being an “actor” in frontier violence, 
the arrival of the physician Sarsefield provides a stable corrective to Edgar’s bizarre 
story. Notably, the stability he provides has little to do with his skill as a medical 
practitioner. As a surgeon and veteran of wars fought on behalf of the British Empire’s 
East India Company, he is a more seasoned beholder and agent of violence who is 
particularly effective at warfare against indigenous peoples—a truly imperious 
physician.121 And by arriving in time to lead the community’s response to the Native 
American threat, he serves as a kind of institution-builder who follows up on Huntly’s 
frenzied killing with a comparatively rational and organized plan of action—resembling a 
state response. Furthermore, he provides a corrective explanation for Huntly’s narrative 
and alleviates a source of his suffering: confirming to Huntly that he did, in fact, 
sleepwalk into the wilderness, he also explains that he has found Waldegrave’s 
manuscript. Finally, as the husband of the wealthy Mrs. Lorimer and mentor of Huntly, 
he presents avenues of mobility that had been blocked off to Edgar before. Now that 
                                                          
121 Huntly, in fact, kills most of the Delaware band with a gun that Sarsefield had used in East Indian 
warfare. 
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Mrs. Lorimer, has moved to America with her daughter, Sarsefield hints that Edgar may 
be a potential suitor for Clarice—the girl whom Clithero once hoped to marry.  
But if Sarsefield seems to promise stability with the martial, marital and 
narrative resources he provides, Edgar’s continued attempt to cure the Irishman has 
disastrous consequences. Soon after the skirmish with the Native Americans at the 
center of the novel, Sarsefield informs Huntly that Mrs. Lorimer is alive. Huntly provides 
Clithero the good news that he is not in fact a murderer. Immediately afterward, 
however, the Irishman sets off like a “maniac,” bent on fulfilling the crime that plagued 
his conscience. In spite of Huntly’s efforts, Clithero is still compelled by the same mad 
drive which had compelled him to fulfill the dictates of Mrs. Lorimer’s text. When Edgar 
tries to prevent the madman from fulfilling his quest by sending letters of warning, Mrs. 
Lorimer, who is pregnant with Sarsefield’s child opens the letter. The ensuing panic 
causes her to miscarry.    
In a series of letters that follow the main narrative, Sarsefield chides Huntly’s 
attempt to cure the madman. He emphasizes that he, rather than Huntly, is the one 
with the authority to decide who should be given treatment. Sarsefield recounts how he 
apprehended the Irishman and attempted to turn him into an asylum—an attempt 
which provokes Clithero’s suicide. Thus, Edgar’s quest to cure the Irishman ends in 
broken dreams and death. Speaking from the perspective of medical experience, and 
textually unbound from Huntly’s narration, Sarsefield has the final word on Clithero:  
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I will not torture your sensibility by recounting the incidents of his arrest and 
detention. You will imagine that his strong but perverted reason exclaimed 
loudly against the injustice of his treatment. It was easy for him to out-reason his 
antagonist, and nothing but force could subdue his opposition. On me devolved 
the province of his jailer and his tyrant,--a province which required a heart more 
steeled by spectacles of suffering and the exercise of cruelty than mine had 
been.  (EH, 194) 
Sarsefield’s tone here is, of course, extremely different from the intense emotionalism 
that Edgar Huntly displays throughout the novel. However, in his matter of fact way, he 
describes his actions in a manner that is strikingly similar to the madmen who have 
spoken for much of the rest of the novel. Describing the act of taking on the role of 
“jailor and tyrant,” as a “province” that has “devolved” on him while using the passive 
voice, he presents his duty as a task that has been bequeathed to him from an 
undefined agency, rendering the act into the performance of an abstract principle. In 
this way, the sympathy he claims to have becomes obviated by the antipathetic 
injunctions of communal preservation.  
Ironically, however, his deferral to this province appears structurally similar to 
Clithero’s own explanation of his actions: “It was the demon that possessed me. My 
limbs were guided to the bloody office by a power foreign and superior to mine. I had 
been defrauded, for a moment, of the empire of my muscles.”  Perhaps even more 
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significantly, his description of his deeds bear a resemblance to Huntly’s portrayal of his 
actions overcoming his moral volition. Whereas Edgar refers to the final shot he fires as 
“a loathsome obligation, … performed with unconquerable reluctance”—a reluctance he 
nonetheless manages to “conquer”—Sarsefield arrests the Irishman in spite of the fact 
that his heart is insufficiently “steeled” to do so.  
While Sarsefield claims he does not have a heart “steeled” enough to restrain 
Clithero, we are given some reason to doubt this: amidst the explosion of frontier 
warfare that occurs in the middle of the novel, Sarsefield violates the basic premise of 
medical ethics by refusing to heal wounds Clithero receives at the hands of the 
Delaware. Perhaps the measure of his unimpeachable authority has less to do with his 
stoicism than the narrative precautions which he takes in describing his “cruel” deeds. 
By deciding not to “torture” Edgar’s sensibility with the details of Clithero’s 
apprehension he evades the possible self-incrimination that accompanies the madmen’s 
emotionally laden tales. 
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Chapter Two: Republic of Disgust: Robert Montgomery Bird’s Desirable Repulsions 
Thirty years after the publication of Edgar Huntly, Robert Montgomery Bird, the 
physician, playwright, and novelist, revisited confluences of madness and frontier 
conflict from the hindsight of decades of national consolidation. Set in the wake of the 
Revolutionary Army’s last major defeat at the hands of Native American and British 
forces in the Kentucky territories, Nick of the Woods, or the Jibbenainosay. A Tale of 
Kentucky (1837) portrays frontier sojourners caught in the final hostilities of the 
American Revolution.122 And by concluding with the arrival of General George Rogers 
Clark’s retaliatory expedition, which went beyond the borders of the Kentucky to expel 
the Shawnee from the region in November of 1782, Bird portrays a liminal moment that 
conjoins a story of state and national liberation with the first acts of Indian Removal.123 
Within this moment, Nick of the Woods illustrates a fantasy of national union 
that aligns a conglomeration of subjects from different classes and sections of 
America—soldiers, frontiersmen, horse thieves, a “Yankee” from Boston, Virginia 
                                                          
122 Robert Montgomery Bird, Nick of the Woods, or the Jibbenainosay. A Tale of Kentucky, Ed. Curtis Dahl 
(New Haven, Conn: College & University Press, 1967). Subsequent citations will appear in-text as Nick. The 
Battle of Blue Licks (August 19, 1782) took place in the months between the American Continental Army’s 
decisive victory at the Battle of Yorktown (October, 1781) and the signing of the Treaty of Paris, which 
formally ended the Revolution on September 3rd, 1783. The battle pitted Kentuckians against the native 
Shawnee, a small cohort of British holdouts, and Simon Girty, the notorious white renegade. George 
Rogers Clark’s successful retaliatory expedition, which crossed the Ohio River to expel the Shawnee from 
the region, began in November of 1782.  Cecil. B. Williams, “Introduction.” Nick of the Woods: Or, the 
Jibbenainosay: A Tale of Kentucky (New York: American Book Co, 1939). xi-xiii. 
123 Rather speciously, Bird labels this victory the “first” instance of aggression to take place in Native 
territories: “Clark, the great protector, and almost founder of the West, struck a blow which was destined 
long to be remembered by the Indians, thus for the first time assailed in their own territory” (Nick, 339).  
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aristocrats and their slaves—against a confederation of crypto-Loyalists and Native 
American tribes led by the repulsive, blood-drinking Shawnee Chief, Wenonga, or “Black 
Vulture.” By the end of the novel, these forces of attraction and aversion are so strong 
that even the white renegade, Abel Doe, aligns with the Anglos.124 In this spirit, as Cecil 
Williams puts it, Bird portrays a glimpse of a moment when “Americans were first 
beginning to realize and to reveal their intrinsic Americanism.”125 
At the heart of Bird’s bestselling novel,126  however, is the story of a devilish 
figure who hunts and murders Shawnee tribesmen at the outskirts of Kentucky’s white 
settlements. By picking off his victims one by one and carving crosses into their chests, 
the Jibbenainosay (meaning, per Bird’s translation: “dead man who walks”) produces 
grisly spectacles of gore that strike horror and fascination in the minds of the natives 
and frontiersmen alike. Halfway through the narrative, this roaming spirit of 
bloodletting is revealed to be the lowly Nathan Slaughter—a meek Pennsylvania Quaker 
who has endured years of mockery for refusing to take up arms against the Shawnee. 
Nathan’s family, we learn, in a tearful confession, was murdered with weapons he 
                                                          
124 The Native threat is so strong that even the threat of slave rebellion takes second fiddle to the “red” 
threat: as one of the frontiersmen proclaims “the red abbregynes war the rule children of Sattan, and 
niggers only the grand-boys, he should now hold the matter to be as settled as if booked down in an 
almanac,—he would, ‘tarnal death to him.” (Nick 265, dialect here and hereafter unchanged). 
125 Williams, lxiii.  
126 Christine Bold, “Popular Forms I.”Columbian History of the American Novel. Edited by Emory Elliot and 
Cathy Davidson (New York: Coumbia University Press, 1991), 294. Arthur Hobson Quinn notes that Louisa 
Honor de Medina’s 1838 theatrical adaptation of Nick of the Woods was performing well into the Civil 
War Era. Arthur Hobson Quinn, A History of the American Drama from the Beginning to the Civil War (New 
York: Appleton, 1927), 4. 
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handed over in a gesture of peace to Wenonga, who scalped Nathan and left him for 
dead. These wounds produced a tortured heart and a fractured brain prone to episodes 
of epileptic fury: a “dreadful infliction whose convulsions seem ever to have been 
proposed as the favorite exemplars for the prophetic fury and the demoniacal orgasm” 
(Nick, 316). 
Nathan’s spectral place in the minds of the frontiersmen and the natives is thus 
fleshed out to reveal an agent of vengeance who is both a victim and a madman. As a 
victimized “man of peace,” Nathan’s trauma eclipses the history of white encroachment 
upon Native American territories and serves as an example of the Native American’s 
depravity “whenever not softened by cultivation” (Nick, 32).  Along these lines, Bird’s 
novel depicts the Native American as the deserving outlet of white rage and validates 
U.S. policies of Indian Removal undertaken during the decade of the novel’s 
publication.127 But as a madman, Nathan exercises this communal rage in revolting ways 
that transgress norms of propriety and moral restraint.  Likened to a “hyena” “wolf,” 
and, finally, appearing like a native himself as he gleefully converts to the settlers’ 
unifying creed of vengeance, Nathan serves as a grotesque nexus of contradictions. He 
blurs boundaries between the sacred and the demonic, the human and the animal, the 
sympathetic and the disgusting. By virtue of these contradictory traits, Nathan 
                                                          
127 For example, The Indian Removal Act of 1830, The Second Seminole War, which began in 1835, the 
Black Hawk War of 1832, and Georgia’s controversial policies of Cherokee removal. 
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underscores the tenuousness of boundaries between the Shawnee’s wanton cruelty and 
the ecstasies of public vengeance.   
While the bizarre aspects of Nathan’s character make him a prototype for the 
fantastic superheroes and serial killers of twentieth-century fiction,128 many of Bird’s 
contemporaries praised Nick for depicting frontier violence with a realism that was 
“more graphic, more distinct, more true to life than anything of the sort that we 
remember to have seen.”129 In an 1854 introduction, Bird framed this realism as an 
                                                          
128 Peter Coogan hypothesizes that Nathan may have even set the prototype for the modern superhero—
characters like Batman, Spiderman, and the Incredible Hulk who lead dual lives as non-violent citizens and 
extralegal arbiters of justice. Peter Coogan, Superhero: The Secret History of a Genre (Austin, TX: 
MonkeyBrain Books, 2006), 150. Mark Twain’s Life on the Mississippi (1883), which references the novel 
with a familiarity that implies his readership’s wide recognition of the novel, paints the Jibbenainosay as a 
precursor to the serial killer. Twain’s reference to “The Jibbenainosay” is spurred on by his memory of his 
“chiefest hero”; a local carpenter and “romantic, sentimental, melodramatic fraud” who captivated the 
young Twain’s imagination by claiming to have committed a multitude of crimes that were clearly inspired 
by the novel. Mark Twain. Life on the Mississippi (London: Chatto & Windus, 1883), 486-490. Gary 
Hoppenstand argues that Nathan Slaughter was one of the first American narratives to depict a noble 
vigilante. Gary Hoppenstand, “Justified Bloodshed: Robert Montgomery Bird’s Nick of the Woods and the 
Origins of the Vigilante Hero in American Literature and Culture.” Journal of American Culture 15, no.2 
(1992), 51.   
129 “Nick of the Woods, or the Jibbenainosay. A Tale of Kentucky.” Southern Literary Messenger 3, no.4 
(April 1837), 254. In subsequent generations, Francis Parkman praised the novel’s “spirited” explanation 
of the period: “It is not easy for those living in the tranquility of polished life fully to conceive the depth 
and force of that unquenchable, indiscriminate hate, which Indian outrages can awaken in those who 
have suffered them. The chronicles of the American borders are filled with the deeds of men, who, having 
lost all by the merciless tomahawk, have lived for vengeance alone; and such men will never cease to exist 
so long as a hostile tribe remains within striking distance of an American settlement.” Describing 
sentiments of the Pennsylvania frontier, Parkman adds, “Never was this hatred more deep or more 
general than on the Pennsylvania frontier at this period; and never, perhaps, did so many collateral causes 
unite to inflame it to madness.” Francis Parkman, History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac, and the War of the 
North American Tribes against the English Colonies (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1851), 411.  
A New York Mirror reviewer, who praised Bird’s “singular fidelity” of Bird’s descriptions of “horrors and 
extravagancies,” anticipates that an ignorant critic would look upon the novel in “disgust” and dismiss it 
as “prurient catering for the morbid taste of the day.” However, he praised the novel for commemorating 
disgusting realities with the “very spirit of historical truth.” Anon., “American Romance-Nick of the 
Woods,” New-York Mirror: A Weekly Gazette of Literature and the fine Arts 14, no 41 (Apr 8, 1837); 327. 
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effort to provide a realistic antidote to a trend of sentimental depiction of the vanishing 
Indian: a “poetic illusion” of “the Indian character” that James Fennimore Cooper and 
Francois-Rene de Chateaubriand “stereotyped into the popular mind.” In contrast with 
these authors, Bird claimed that he chose to paint “real Indians” with “Indian ink, 
rejecting the brighter pigments which might have yielded more brilliant effects, and add 
an Indian hater to the group” and bring “not the appearance of truth, but truth itself, to 
the picture” of frontier warfare (Nick, 31). Within this context, the Indian-killer was a 
subject of otherwise “good repute,” who was “infected” with a passion to kill. Such 
killers, he argued, were “careful to conceal” their vengefulness “from the public eye” 
(Nick, 34).  
But if Bird describes the Indian hater’s violence as a somewhat shameful 
symptom of the brazen violence of “real Indians,” Nick’s most dramatic scenes expose 
Nathan and his fellow frontiersmen crushing, pounding, and scalping the heads of their 
sworn enemies.130 Because of the novel’s unflinching portrayal of the settlers as 
perpetrators of violence, strains of criticism have considered Nick of the Woods a 
revelatory, and perhaps unconsciously self-incriminating, portrayal of atrocities 
                                                          
130 Demonstrating his capacity for gross-outs, Nathan shocks the chief Wenonga by giving him a “a look 
more hideous than his own, and indeed so strangely unnatural and revolting, with lips so retracted, 
features so distorted by some nameless passion, and eyes gleaming with fires so wild and unearthly, that 
even Wenonga, chief as he was, and then in no condition to be daunted by anything, drew slowly back, 
removing his hands from the prisoner’s shoulder, who immediately fell down in horrible convulsions, the 
foam flying from his lips, and his fingers clenching like spikes of iron into the flesh of two Indians that had 
hold of him.” (Nick, 299). 
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committed by whites in the name of Manifest Destiny. Putting it bluntly, James Herbert 
Morse called Nick “a book which, intended to show the savageness of the savage, 
succeeds mainly displaying the intense cruelty possible in the white man.”131 Michael 
Drinnon, who calls Nathan “the most grotesque Indian hater of them all” in a long 
tradition of anti-native literatures, argues that Bird’s “violent pornography…verged on 
explicit acknowledgment that white Americans were the real devils in the woods, proud 
of it, and rightly so.”132 For Eric Sundquist, Nathan’s resemblance to the native even 
betrays an “undercurrent of white guilt” driven by “a paradoxical imbalance of emotions 
brought on by an ideology of conquest that harbored a powerful identification with that 
which is being destroyed.”133 
Richard Slotkin argues that the potentially incriminating implications of Nathan’s 
violence are effectively submerged by the narrative’s attention to the storyline of the 
more blandly heroic Roland Forrester—the disinherited Virginia aristocrat and war 
veteran who unravels the mystery of Nathan’s secret identity and commands the gaze 
                                                          
131 James Herbert Morse, “The Native Element in American Fiction: Before the War,” Century Illustrated 
Magazine 26 no.2 (Jun 1883), 292. 
132 Michael Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 158. 
133 Eric Sundquist, Empire and Slavery in American Literature, 1820-1865 (Jackson, MS: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2006), 135. Following up in this vein, Michael T. Wilson argues that “Bird’s Nick of the Woods 
seems thus at once the most openly honest...about the nature of white violence against the Indians, but 
also the most determined to obscure, rationalize, and evade white culpability for that violence. If Bird’s 
desire was to de-romanticize Cooper’s Indians, he substantially de-romanticized the settlers as well.” 
Michael T. Wilson, “‘Saturnalia of Blood’: Masculine Self-Control and American Indians in the Frontier 
Novel” Studies in American Fiction 33, no.2 (2005), 143. 
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of much of the novel.134 Because Roland’s narrative occludes the “psychological 
insights” that drive Nathan’s madness,  Slotkin sees Bird “defending the premises of the 
artificial arrangements of southern society, rather than examining the psychological 
grounds of those premises,” and thus sees Bird’s “promising work” become a “tragic 
failure.”135 
Rather than focusing upon aesthetic and psychological truths that Bird fails to 
deliver, I argue that Bird’s shocking disclosures, and Roland’s role as spectator, provide 
nuanced political critique about democracy and violence. Expanding upon Dana Nelson’s 
argument that Roland serves as a mediator of readerly identification who solicits 
complicity in the project of Indian Removal,136 I argue that Roland’s engagement with 
Nathan’s story takes readers on a dialectical journey that puts the hyperbolic violence of 
Nick of the Woods in dialogue with a suite of political instabilities emerging in the 
1830’s, which were marked with aggressive sectionalism, lynching, and riots. Along 
these lines, I follow how Bird’s narrative portrays the emergence of a democratic 
imaginary infused with social discord. By tracing how Nathan’s compulsive rage disturbs 
                                                          
134Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 515. Slotkin argues that Nathan’s identity is more 
“complex than any of Cooper’s heroes, more intensely divided within himself, and hence more 
dramatically interesting.” But whereas Cooper gives more attention to his less complex hero, Natty 
Bumppo, “Bird’s analysis of Nick of the Woods [i.e.:Nathan] remains a subordinate, tangential theme in 
the Romantic story of Roland Forrester” (Ibid, 511). 
135Ibid, 510. Slotkin adds that whereas Cooper presents the “wilderness experience as a search for values 
and identity,” Bird’s portrayal of Roland’s side of the story shifts the narrative’s emphasis to exhibit 
“cultural assumptions and class types” (Ibid, 515).  
136 Dana Nelson, The Word in Black and White: Reading “Race” in American Literature, 1638-1867 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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boundaries between the settlers’ limitless desire for violence and the Shawnee’s 
brutality, I argue that the novel’s (dis)identificatory strategies encourage assent to the 
intervention of national government as a prophylaxis that protects the masses by 
waging violence in their place.  
Pondering his literary ambitions in 1831, Bird argued that the ideal dramatist 
would be “almost a god”; along with imagination and common sense, he ought to be 
“capable of feeling, in the extremes, all the passions which elevate and debase, which 
subdue and torture the mind; and at the same time should mingle with them a cold-
blooded and restraining philosophy.137 This tempering of extreme passion with a 
philosophy of restraint informs the manner in which Bird draws from the deepest 
reservoirs of the “blood and thunder” tradition to invoke the appeal of violence while 
bringing readers to recognize the revolting excesses of these desires when unmediated 
by the sanative structures of republican law. Nathan Slaughter thus sits at center stage 
in a theater of examination that dramatizes the frontier’s transition from a postlapsarian 
barbaric state to a sacralized space with all the “benefits of civil government and laws” 
(Nick, 27).  
By exploring how Bird portrays stoic principle emerging from visceral emotion, I 
follow up on recent scholarship that has frequently placed Nick in contrast with his 
                                                          
137 Richard Harris, “A Young Dramatist’s Diary: The Secret Records of R.M. Bird.” The Library Chronicle of 
the Friends of the University of Pennsylvania Library 25 (1959), 17-18. 
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more overtly political novel, Sheppard Lee (1836). Scholars interested in Lee, a 
picaresque send-up of antebellum sentimental culture, have drawn attention to how 
Bird’s medically informed treatment of character explores an embodied subjectivity 
driven by bodily urges. This metempsychotic journey, in which a lazy farmer dies and 
experiences (or hallucinates) his spirit moving from body to body, presents a self that 
radically changes as it inhabits the bodies of a brewer, a dandy, a miser, a Quaker 
philanthropist, a slave, and finally a wealthy slaveowner. In each case, the identity 
Sheppard experiences is radically constrained and shaped by the dictates of the body. In 
the longest episode of the novel, Bird makes a mockery of the narcissism of the Quaker 
philanthropist whose desire to act benevolently “takes up the entire frame of 
imaginative space; he can see only himself in the transaction, which is why his 
philanthropy fails.”138 Because of reason’s inability to transcend embodiment in these 
tales, Christopher Looby points out that Bird undermines the discourses of civic 
abstraction that I explored in my discussion of Benjamin Rush.139 
         Drawing upon the strengths and limits of embodied citizenship, Nick of the 
Woods’s meditations on what James Cox calls a collective “biological imperative” for the 
annihilation of the native140 reflect an understanding of the political utility of 
                                                          
138 Justine S. Murison, The Politics of Anxiety in Nineteenth Century American Literature (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 24. 
139 Christopher Looby, “Introduction.” Sheppard Lee. New York: New York Review of Books. 2008. 
140 James Cox, Muting White Noise: Native American and European American Novel Traditions (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 209. 
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empathetic imagining that could convert “insensible men into men of feeling through 
acts of violence in which they are compelled to participate, acts that then become a 
vehicle for their empathetic identification with others.”141  But the novel’s portrayal of 
Nathan and the settler’s adoption of the natives’ brutality raises the specter of what 
Michael Meranze calls “mimetic corruption”: the possibility that observation of vice 
leads to participation in vice;142 as such, the novel also channels anxieties Bird expressed 
about his contemporary political moment: a Whig-situated fear of mobs who were 
“enslaved by sovereign passions” and rallying around demagogues in the Age of Jackson.  
As I will argue, Bird leads toward this restraining philosophy by heightening 
Nathan’s disgusting qualities when he becomes most empathetic. In posing disgust as 
the civilized reaction to the violent desires that structure a lawless frontier democracy, 
Bird’s novel anticipates William Ian Miller’s assessment about how disgust’s 
intersubjective nature contributes to concepts of refinement and culture: “The disgust 
of the refined, their good taste, is a revulsion at other people’s lack of disgust.”143 For in 
the process of documenting an abject element to the pleasures of a democratic society 
unified against an Indian presence that is demonized for their violent pleasures, Bird’s 
                                                          
141 Elizabeth Barnes, Love’s Whipping Boy: Violence and Sentimentality in the American Imagination 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 119-20. 
142 Michael Meranze, Laboratories of Virtue: Punishment, Revolution, and Authority in Philadelphia, 1760-
1835 (University of North Carolina Press Books, 1996), 46. 
143 William Ian Miller, Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), 169. 
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novel works to fashion national government as a corrective to an irresistible, and all-
encompassing, covenant forged through violent desires. 
 
Sovereign passions and Imperial Whims.   
The world likes romance better than truth, as the booksellers can testify. 
—Calavar; Or the Knight of the Conquest144 
Robert Montgomery Bird’s literary aspirations developed alongside a 
multifaceted professional career.  After shuttering his short-lived medical practice on 
account of financial difficulties,145 he produced a prodigious volume of poems, short-
stories, plays, novels and essays, and served a brief stint as an editor for the American 
Monthly Magazine. Though Vernon Parrington would recognize Bird as “probably the 
                                                          
144 Robert Montgomery Bird, Calavar; Or the Knight of the Conquest: a Romance of Mexico (New York: 
Redfield, 1854), 28. 
145 Bird also explained his frustration with the medical profession in the opening episode of “My Friends in 
a Madhouse.” A wise asylum inmate claims that the physicians’ madness is self-evident by their choice of 
profession, principally because it violates an all-encompassing code of self-interest that pervades 
American society; “had you chosen the law, you might have gabbled and cheated your way to fortune, 
and to Congress with the bargain; with you might have married rich wives…whereas, as doctors, 
supposing you don’t prove, from sheer incompetency, public murderers, you will waste your days in 
works of humanity, for which you are only half paid, and not thanked at all.” Doctors are also functionally 
perverse, according to the logic of this character, because the populace prefers the easy consumption-
driven offerings of charlatans to medical expertise “the world, and the American world in particular, 
would have liked you just as well, and indeed, a great deal better, if you had begun to slash and physic, 
without any study or preparation whatever. Men must be mad, indeed, who will stand physic, when they 
can make a fortune three times as fast by quackery!” Robert Montgomery Bird, “My Friends in the 
Madhouse,” Peter Pilgrim: Or A Rambler’s Recollections (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1838), V1. 104. 
Subsequent in-text references will refer to this text as “Madhouse.” 
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ablest man of letters that Philadelphia produced” during the 30’s and 40’s,146 and his 
smash-hit play, The Gladiator (1831), was one the most popular American plays of the 
nineteenth century, he did not profit from this venture.147 Bird speculated that 
authoring novels would provide more concrete opportunities for becoming 
“immortalized” in finance and fame.148   
Bird also realized that he was all but exclusively dependent upon the tastes of 
American readers for success.149 While several of Bird’s novels, such as Calavar (1834), 
The Infidel (1835), and Nick of the Woods were quickly translated into several languages 
and sold well abroad,150 he was unable to secure the kind of publishing contract that 
would allow Washington Irving and James Fennimore Cooper to cater to the English 
market.151 In reaction to these challenges, Bird joined twenty-nine authors, including 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and John Neal, in cosigning a petition to Congress that 
                                                          
146 Vernon Parrington, Main Current of American Thought (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co. 1927), V.2. 
191.  
147 As Bird understood it, Edwin Forrest, the eminent actor who commissioned The Gladiator, violated an 
oral contract which would have provided Bird a share of the play’s considerable profits. Clement E. Foust, 
The Life and Dramatic Works of Robert Montgomery Bird (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1919), 71. 
Forrest, who performed in The Gladiator over 1,000 times in Bird’s lifetime, paid the author half of what 
he originally expected (Williams, xv). As his wife put it, The Gladiator “must surely have made a princely 
fortune, but it, surely, was not Dr. Bird’s.” Mary Mayer Bird, The Life of Robert Montgomery Bird. 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Library, 1945), 34. 
148 Foust, 77. 
149 Williams, xxix. 
150 Foust, 84-85. 
151 Though he spent from May to July of 1834 in England lobbying publishers and authors for a publication 
of Calavar, his efforts were met with double embarrassment: he was rebuffed by a dismissive letter from 
Edward Bulwer-Lytton, who had avoided him for weeks, only to find upon returning that Bentley, the 
English publisher, was selling his novel in “four handsomely printed volumes.” (Williams, xix). 
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linked the development of national literature with state defense:  “Native writers [are] 
as indispensable as a native militia; …our people must look, for the defense of their 
habits, their opinions, and their peculiar institutions, to those who belong to them –to 
their own authors, as to their own soldiers.”152 Echoing this martial tone, Bird explained 
to his editorial counterparts at the American Monthly Magazine, a trans-regional 
magazine that published early works by Poe and Hawthorne simultaneously in New York 
and Philadelphia, that he aimed to fight the “slavery of the sovereign American people 
to trans-Atlantic literature and literary influences” by turning to American manners, 
morals, and subjects.153  
Bird’s focus on frontier combat found a receptive audience in an environment 
where Indian Fighters were celebrated as civic heroes. In the decade when Nick of the 
Woods achieved its bestselling status, Andrew Jackson capitalized upon his fame as an 
Indian fighter to reach the presidency; Bird’s favored candidate, William Henry Harrison, 
or “Old Tippecanoe,” would soon follow;154 and the Vice President at the time of Nick’s 
                                                          
152 Thorvald Solberg, International Copyright in the Congress of the United States, 1837-1886.( Boston: 
Rockwell & Churchill, 1886), 5. Bird’s “Community of Copyright Between the United States and Great 
Britain,” which appeared on the front page of the October 1835 issue of The Knickerbocker, was cited in 
copyright legislation and deliberations throughout the century. Catherine Seville, The Internationalisation 
of Copyright Law: Books, Buccaneers and the Black Flag in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 158.  
153 Bird added “Novelty and interest—as well as the national character you wish to impress on the work—
can be looked for only at home. Indigenous subjects…then, are those I would drive at—the peculiarities of 
our own character and country—our vices and virtues—our tendencies social and political…all that can 
excite public feeling, interest, or curiosity” (Williams xxix). 
154 Such sentiment was not universal, however; the defeated Chief Black Hawk, likely the inspiration for 
Bird’s villainous “Black Vulture,” toured the U.S. upon his defeat and received celebratory greetings in 
states like New York. 
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publication, Richard Mentor Johnson, a Kentucky Congressman who survived the 
Shawnee attacks of 1782 that inspired the setting of Bird’s novel, achieved his claim to 
fame by (purportedly) personally killing Tecumseh and allowing his riflemen to “cut 
razor strops out of the dead chief’s skin.”155  Though Nick of the Woods evokes this 
sanguinary point of consensus in the popular imaginary, I shall argue that its depiction 
of the European settlers must be viewed in the context of Bird’s grievances with a 
nation maddened by sectional conflict, economic uncertainty, and riots—ripe indicators 
of what Daniel Walker Howe calls an “atmosphere of violence.”156 
While several critics of Nick of the Woods have argued that Bird’s focus on the 
slave owner, Roland Forrester, emphasize Bird’s southernist anxieties,157 Bird’s political 
and literary efforts reflect more nuanced concerns about the stability of the United 
States as a national entity. Amidst the political and popular tumults of the period, Bird 
developed affiliations with the nascent American Whig Party, which he would become 
                                                          
155 Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of American Whigs (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1979), 42. In spite of the fact that he had maintained a common law marriage with one of his slaves, 
Johnson successfully campaigned for Vice Presidency under the slogan “Rumpsey Dumpsey, Rumpsey 
Dumpsey, Colonel Johnson killed Tecumseh.”   
156 Howe, 14. 
157 Richard Slotkin, 515; Patricia Roberts-Miller, “Robert Montgomery Bird and the Rhetoric of the 
Improbable Cause.” RSA 35 no.1 (Winter 2005). Bird’s depiction of a slave uprising in Sheppard Lee, which 
resembles the Nat Turner rebellion, was lauded by Southern and Northern critics of abolition, most 
notably Edgar Allan Poe, “Sheppard Lee,” Southern Literary Messenger 2, no.10 (1836). The fact that the 
slave rebellion in Sheppard Lee is spawned by the slaves’ discovery of anti-slavery pamphlets puts him in 
the league of pro-slavery critics of the abolitionist mail campaigns of 1835. These positions were by no 
means limited to Southerners, however; The Boston Pearl’s praiseful review of Sheppard Lee highlights 
the import of the scene above all else in their review of the novel, entitled “Abolition Tracts—How they 
Work.” The Boston Pearl, a Gazette of Polite Literature 6 no.16 (September 14, 1836). 
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formally aligned with in later years as a Congressional candidate in 1842.158 When Bird 
was writing Nick of the Woods, the Whig party was a slowly accreting coalition with 
grievances over the economic policies of Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren.  
Though somewhat diffuse in character, Whigs generally prioritized internal 
improvements, economic controls, and grand reform schemes—Dorothea Dix’s petitions 
to develop state-supported asylums and Horace Mann’s education reforms, for 
example—over territorial expansionism and deregulated markets.159  By 1837, the Whig 
party was too regionally divided to put forth a national candidate at the time of Nick of 
the Woods’s publication;160 however, Bird was concerned with seeds of discord being 
sewn by the Nullification Crisis, which helped to facilitate the party’s formation.161 In 
                                                          
158 In the 1830’s, Bird developed especially close alliances with Mid-Atlantic Whigs such as Delaware 
Senator Robert Middleton Clayton, who silently loaned Bird $20,000 for co-ownership of Philadelphia’s 
most influential Whig newspaper, the North American and United States Gazette, in 1847. Robert L. 
Bloom, “Robert Montgomery Bird, Editor.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 76 no.2 
(April 1952). 
159 Rowland Hughes offers the most recent, and trenchant, discussion of Bird’s Whig affiliation. He links 
the horrors of Bird’s novel with an argument against expansionism. In what follows, I take a closer look at 
how Bird depicted the political disruption which coincided with the territorial goals of the Whig party. 
Rowland Hughes, “Whiggery in the Wilderness : The Politics of Indian-hating in Robert Montgomery Bird’s 
Nick of the Woods” Literature in the Early American Republic: Annual Studies on Cooper and His 
Contemporaries 3 (2011). 
160 In the 1836 election, three Whig-aligned candidates unsuccessfully contended against Andrew 
Jackson’s Vice President, Martin Van Buren; Daniel Webster was on the Northern ballots, William Henry 
Harrison of Ohio had support in the west and Mid-Atlantic region, while Hugh White was the southern 
candidate. As a resident of Philadelphia, it is very likely that Bird voted for Harrison. 
161 The Nullification Crisis was a major political confrontation which pitted advocates of the federal 
government’s primacy on economic matters against politicians from Southern states, such as John C. 
Calhoun. Southern advocates of nullification attempted to abolish federal tariff laws that were geared to 
promote internal improvements and Northern industry, which were most prominently put forth by Henry 
Clay, a Kentucky Senator allied with Bird’s political circle. 
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light of these conflicts, Bird felt that the Congress of his contemporaries, and the newly 
augmented electorate who elected them, had turned America into a madhouse.162   
Bird’s diagnosis of the manners and morals of the American populace were most 
pointedly expressed through tales told from the vantage point of mad characters in a 
satirical short story, “My Friends in the Madhouse,” which was published shortly after 
Nick of the Woods. “Madhouse” tells of a series of men who, in attempting to act upon 
principles of consensus and deference of to the greater national good, are ridiculed and 
eventually confined by a mad populace that “out votes” them.163  Voicing transgressive 
desires through a veil of disavowal, these “madmen” portray a political system 
corrupted by narrow self-interest and the factionalism instilled by Jackson and Van 
Buren’s “spoils system.” In doing so, they offer trenchant critiques of a debased political 
mentality and a capricious political theology. 
At the center of Bird’s asylum story is a former Southern Congressman who was 
condemned by his peers and his rabbling constituents for prioritizing national interests 
                                                          
162 In “Merry the Miner,” an allegory about greed, Bird describes a hall of legislation, where “fools were 
destroying a nation, and knaves pilfering it, and both parties quarreling upon the question which best 
deserved the name of patriots.” Such conditions make the hall of legislation a “madhouse and prison in 
one” “Merry the Miner,” Peter Pilgrim: Or A Rambler’s Recollections.(Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 
1838), V1. 57. 
163 “The virtues best rewarded in the world are its vices….a man can practice no virtue safely: he may 
write about it, he may talk about it, and gain credit thereby; but the acting of it will assuredly bring him 
into trouble….all of us around you are examples of the world’s injustice—the martyrs of principle, the 
victims of our several virtues. We were too good for the world, sir, and therefore the world has clapped us 
into a madhouse….we are a living monument of the world’s injustice” (“Madhouse,”111). 
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over the provincial interests of the South.164  Amongst his heresies: sponsoring a bill that 
would fund a standing army on the frontier to defend western interests instead of local 
militias, which were supposedly inclined to corruption and freebooting;165 committing 
the two-fold “sin” of crossing party lines to vote with the Democrats and refusing to 
accept the administration’s spoils when he did so; and refusing to accept that states had 
a right to nullify national law. For doing these things, he is condemned for “Blasphemy” 
(“Madhouse,” 140).  And upon agreeing with the president on a single issue, he is 
viewed by his fellow partymen as an “apostate,” “fool,” and “madman” (“Madhouse,” 
134). 
His counterparts in congress, meanwhile, project “a strong example of the effect 
of sectional and party feeling in warping the minds of honourable men from the path of 
duty” (“Madhouse,” 132). So when the unfortunate southern congressman resolves “to 
tear all sectional feelings from my bosom, to forget that Virginia lay on one side of 
Mason and Dixon’s line and Massachusetts on the other, and remember, only, as 
Washington had done before me, that I was an American,” and votes for a “northern 
measure,” he is immediately branded a “madman.” The most unpardonable sin the 
congressman commits involves his linkage of democracy with lawlessness:  
                                                          
164 “When I can serve the people of my district, without infringing the interests of the nation, the 
commonwealth will be served; when I can serve my country, I must do so, and without asking whether 
the interests of my state or district suffer or not.” (“Madhouse,” 130). 
165 This promotion of a standing army is contrasted with state-based military forces: “with all my respect 
for the militia, I thought they were a very uncertain set of personages (126-128).” 
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being somewhat tired of the eternal croaking honourable members made 
against the aristocracy—that is, the foolish ladies and gentlemen of the land—as 
being the foes of democracy and liberty, [the congressman] ventured to express 
a belief, founded on the house-burnings, riots, lynchings, &c., at the time 
somewhat prevalent in the democratic circle, that liberty was less in danger from 
the aristocracy, or foolish ladies and gentlemen as aforesaid, than from 
democracy itself.  
Violating what Bird considered to be the sacred cow of American political discourse, he 
is quickly sent to the madhouse for this “astonishing piece of atheism” (“Madhouse,” 
140).  Reflecting on this tainted political theology, Bird roots the destruction of common 
sense and deference to the collective national welfare in the whims of tyrannical mobs: 
Bird’s “mad” Congressman shouts that the public demanded  
not men of integrity and talent—upright and experienced sages—to watch over 
the interests of the nation; but truckling parasites, the slaves of their sovereign 
passions, the tools of their imperial whims to “play their hand”…in the gambling 
contest of interest against interest, section against section, party against party, 
which they have chosen to dignify with the title of legislation (“Madhouse,” 
143).166  
                                                          
166 Bird’s criticism of abolitionist groups in “My friends in the madhouse,” for example, is as much about 
their self-interest as a constituency as it is about slavery. Relating the testimony of a fictive internee at an 
asylum who sought to collaborate with abolitionists to end slavery by replacing slaves with machines, he 
is met with stern rebuke:  “instead of the rapture and triumph which I looked for among the members, 
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In portraying an “imperial” populace enslaved by “sovereign” passions, Bird finds the 
“whims” of the public further susceptible to demagoguery. Bird was especially 
concerned about how these “sovereign passions” could be manipulated through 
gestures of patriotic imaginings. While Bird held that “Patriotism—as a sentiment, or 
poetic fiction, or historical remembrance—is dear to the imaginations of all men,” actual 
patriots “have a scurvy time of it” (“Madhouse,” 144).  
In fact, Bird found that patriotic demagoguery provided a more pressing threat 
to white Americans than did the Native American. Comparing the power of American 
demagogues who channel these sovereign passions to the mesmeric abilities of snakes, 
Bird disparages Indian Philanthropists,167 but finds the false patriot to be a more 
dangerous manipulator: “a lank, homely, insignificant-looking creature, yet a reptile 
more powerful to charm, more strong to destroy, than all of those who proceeded him.” 
This man-snake enslaves and embattles the masses with the rhetoric of liberty. He  
crawls through the multitude, hissing a song of liberty, a collar around his throat 
with the name of Patriot engraved thereon, and at his tail a cluster of penny-
                                                          
rage and jealousy took possession of their souls. They could not bear that they should lose the honour, 
and glory, and profit of completing the great work of emancipation—that I, who was not actually a 
professed member of their society—or that anybody, save, themselves, should reap the splendid reward;” 
accordingly, the abolitionists charge him with madness and send him to the asylum. “It must be 
remembered, they belong to the majority—that is, to the madmen; and were hence incapable of seeing 
that, in persecuting me, they were destroying the negro’s best friend” (“Madhouse,” 106-108). 
167 Robert Montgomery Bird, “The Fascinating Power of Reptiles,” Peter Pilgrim: Or A Rambler’s 
Recollections (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1838),V.1 244. V1.The serpent-philanthropist carries “a 
bundle of lucifer-matches and tomahawks, wherewith, as he charms the virtuous multitude, he supplies 
the means …of knocking one another’s brains out, and setting a community in flames” (Ibid, 244). 
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trumpets and popguns, with which he makes a music that sets all to dancing with 
joy, and to knocking one another upon the head; while he crawls upon their 
necks, wreathing them together in hideous chains, and, as he wreathes, sucking 
away their blood and substance. 
In the diverse snake-pit of civil society, “thousands of reptiles such as these, and 
thousands of others of different hues and species, creep round about us, plying their 
basilisk arts every hour and every moment, making victims alike of high and low, of old 
and young, of rich and poor.”168  
A republican lynching that concludes the life of Sheppard Lee’s bumbling Quaker 
philanthropist also provides a stark warning about southern demagoguery and lynch-
law. After helping an ungrateful slave escape to the North, Bird’s Quaker is kidnapped 
by a party and taken through Virginia, where he is surrounded by a mob of “good 
republicans” on their way to cast their ballot on election day. Their determination to 
lynch him at the election booth is interrupted by one of the candidates, “a man destined 
to shake the walls of the Capitol,” who proposes to execute “the wretch” in “an orderly 
and dignified way…and so adjudge him to death with a regularity and decorum which 
shall excite the admiration and approbation of the whole world.” Responding to the 
candidate’s eloquent weaving of the desire to lynch the Quaker through a veneer of law 
                                                          
168 Ibid, 244-247. 
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and shibboleth about America’s neo-classical grandeur, the “sovereigns” (i.e. the mob) 
chant his name.169  
Bird was also concerned with print culture’s manipulation of these passions and 
their mediation through popular entertainment.170 Though Bird experienced his greatest 
successes telling violent tales that tapped into the passions of the masses, his reflections 
on manufacturing such stories evince anxieties about their reception. On the cusp of 
The Gladiator’s phenomenal success, Bird anticipated the adulation of his blood and 
thunder play with disgust. Describing his misgivings about theatrical productions in a 
diary entry dated August 27th, 1831, he found it a cheap distinction “to write for and be 
admired by the groundlings! Villains that will clap when you are most nonsensical and 
applaud you most heartily when you are most vulgar; that will call you ‘a genius, by G…’ 
when you can make the judicious grieve and a ‘witty devil’ when you force a woman to 
blush.”171   
Moreover, because the drama portrays the slave rebellion sympathetically 
enough for Walt Whitman to proclaim that The Gladiator was “as full of ‘Abolitionism’ 
as an egg is of meat,”172 Bird was fearful that it would anger Southern audiences. 
                                                          
169 Robert Montgomery Bird. Sheppard Lee: Written by Himself (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1836), V.2 
150-153. 
170 One of his “madmen,” a repentant editor who laments a career of political manipulation through print 
demagoguery, explains that “we knew how to inflame the rage, and disturb the fears…we knew how to 
awaken their self-love, their vanity, their pride, and thus lead them to deeds of glory” (“Madhouse,” 147). 
171 Harris, “Secret Records,” 16. 
172 From Whitman’s review of a December 25th, 1846 Park Theatre, New York, production. Reprinted in 
Walt Whitman, The Gathering of the Forces (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1920). V.2, 330-31.  
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“Consider the freedom of an American author,” Bird wrote, “If The Gladiator were 
produced in a slave state, the managers, players, and perhaps myself into the bargain, 
would be rewarded with the Penitentiary! Happy States!”173  
Bird’s apprehension about the audience’s response to The Gladiator seizes upon 
an irony internal to the play itself. Retelling the story of Spartacus’s rebellion, the play 
valorizes its noble slave-hero, who has been coerced into taking part in spectacles 
geared to control a Roman population cowed by spectacles of bloodshed.174 After 
building an alliance of slaves from many nations, he seeks to build a proper 
multinational alliance out of the affair, but he is sold out by a more radical member of 
the group who seeks to gain the glory of sacking and pillaging Rome for himself; 
Spartacus’s failure to achieve freedom, in other words, is essentially a consequence of 
                                                          
173 Harris, “Secret Records,” 16. Bird was by no means an abolitionist. His diary entry, which coincided 
with breaking news on the Nat Turner rebellion, relates his fear of the African American and anxieties 
about the apocalyptic implications of slavery. “If they had but a Spartacus among them — to organize the 
half million of Virginia, the hundreds of thousands of the states, and lead them on in the Crusade of 
Massacre, what a blessed example might they not give to the world of the excellence of slavery! what a 
field of interest to the playwriters of posterity! Some day we shall have it, and future generations will 
perhaps remember the horrors of Haiti as a farce compared with the tragedies of our own happy land! 
The vis et amor sceleratus habendi will be repaid, violence with violence, and avarice with blood. I had 
sooner live among bedbugs than negroes” (Harris, “Secret Records,” 17) 
174 In The Gladiator, the Roman masses purportedly lend their allegiance to the best showmen: the central 
villain of the play, a cynical consul, tells his confidante that the “proper” leader “can give us shows and 
feasts; and therefore is the proper man.” Speaking of managing the masses, he argues that “They forgot 
their fury,/ When once they had looked upon his fighting lions.” Robert Montgomery Bird, “The 
Gladiator.” Edited by Clement E Foust. The Life and Dramatic Works of Robert Montgomery Bird (New 
York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1919), 328. 
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the fractiousness of his coalition and the unquenchable desires that fail to make 
Spartacus’s union cohere.175   
Whereas Bird reflected that “It is only in the theatre, that genius is at the mercy 
of the mob,”176 Bird’s first attempt at novel-writing evinces an attempt to cultivate a 
readership that could observe and learn from the circulation of violent affects which he 
envisioned as circulating uncontrollably in the theater. Along these lines, the 
introduction to Bird’s first novel, Calavar, a tale about the Spanish conquest of Mexico, 
sketches out the significance of cultivating a literature capable of mirroring and 
improving American habits and mentalities. The frame story that introduces the 
narrative puts the “editor” of the text in conversation with an eccentric priest, who 
hands him a jumbled and arcane manuscript which tells a silenced history of the 
Conquest of Mexico.  Thought to be a madman by the Mexican populace, the wise man 
hands his manuscript to the editor and suggests that understanding the fall of the 
ancient Mexican republic is an important lesson for American readers.   
Contrasting the Mexican readership with the American one, the cura states that 
the Mexicans cannot be trusted with their history because the “barbaric romance” that 
                                                          
175 Bird’s anxieties about the reception of the Gladiator, and the success of The Gladiator itself, attest to a 
fine line between rhetoric of national liberty and rhetorics of class struggle and rebellion. The 
phenomenal success of the Gladiator in the Southern as well as Northern venues was perhaps owing to 
the fact that it valorizes concepts about freedom and liberty and anti-imperialism that spoke to America’s 
post-colonial liberation as well as its intra-national conflicts; moreover, its historical dislocation of these 
concepts enabled audiences to view them in terms of their making.  
176 Harris, “Secret Records,” 10. 
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“loiters about the brains” of European nations is “the pith and medulla of a Mexican 
head. The poetry of bloodshed, the sentiment of renown, the first and last passion, and 
the true test, of the savage state, are not yet removed from us,” the curandero avers; 
“We are not yet civilized up to the point of seeing that reason reprobates, human 
happiness denounces, and God abhors, the splendor of contention.” In contrast with the 
Mexican populace which, with the help of conventions of the European Romance, would 
become captivated by the violent affects of the text, the curandero suggests that 
Americans, “the happiest and most favored of modern days,” can reflect upon the 
violent affects of the narrative and correct them with the help of the American editor, 
who can “shave,” “amputate” and “compress” the manuscript and “open the eyes of 
men to some of the specks of barbarism which yet sully their own foreheads.”177  
Bird’s suggestion that American readers can recognize their own barbarity 
through observing the barbarism of the other positions authorship as a technology for 
cultivating and correcting reading practices entwined with institutional mentalities. 
Mexico, as Bird’s narrator describes it, is a “Pandemonium” wherein the possibilities of 
grandeur have been mixed with “the causes of decline and perdition”; namely by “the 
folly and madness of its inhabitants” and demagogues. While Bird contrasts a Mexican 
                                                          
177 Calavar, 19-27. This mediation is also protective, for inhabiting the mad state of Mexico is contagious: 
“gusts of anarchy, rising from a distempered republic, disease thy imagination, until thou comest to be 
disgusted with the yet untainted excellence of thine own institutions, because thou perceives the evils of 
their perversion” (Ibid, 13). 
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populace he describes as “enslaved” by “Revolution after revolution, frenzy after 
frenzy!” with America,178 these distinctions also telegraph what Jesse Alemán calls “an 
uncanny figure for the United States.”179  
In the following sections, I will examine how Bird invests his portraiture of the 
Native American with an uncanniness that hints at a latent potential for declension 
within American democracy. I will then explore how the narrative cultivates a 
commingling of sympathy and disgust that poses an avenue for recognizing and 
disavowing the potential for barbarism that Bird found in his fractious antebellum 
culture.  
   
“Obstreperous Enjoyments” in the Barbaric State 
It is on the frontiers, indeed, where adventurers from every corner of the world, and 
from every circle of society are thrown together, that we behold the strongest contrasts, 
and the strangest varieties, of human character.  
—Nick of the Woods, 71 
                                                          
178 Ibid, 12. 
179 Jesse Alemán, “The Other Country: Mexico, the United States and the Gothic History of Conquest,” 
Hemispheric American Studies. Ed. Caroline F. Levander and Robert S. Levine (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2008), 77. “Even as the United States turned away from Europe and the mother country, 
it turned to… Mexcico, to stage its romantic primitivism and in the process generated an alternate literary 
and national narrative that placed the legacy of the Spanish conquest of Mexico strangely at the heart of 
the historical emergence of the United States” (Ibid). 
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Responding to a British critic’s claims that his literary portraits of the native were 
“coloured by national antipathy, and by a desire to justify the encroachments of his 
countrymen upon the persecuted natives,” Bird denied he was promoting the 
extermination of Native Americans, which he preferred to call “the humane design of 
influencing the passions of his countrymen against the remnant of an unfortunate race.” 
His main quibble with this argument was that the “final destruction” of the natives was 
“against all probability, if not against all possibility, to predict as a certain future event” 
(Nick, 33).  Bird’s insidious claims about the ineradicability of Native Americans—much 
like Ishmael of Moby-Dick’s claim that the whales will never go extinct—speaks to the 
manner in which Bird, along with generations of writers and scientists, turned to the 
Native American as an inexhaustible resource for self-definition. By posing the Native 
American as an enemy that transcends America’s pre-national past, contentious 
present, and the horizon of its future, Bird imagines a civic identity united through 
complicity in Indian-settler warfare and makes the expression of this compulsion the 
test of American civilization.  
In The Sketch-Book of Geoffrery Crayon (1817), Washington Irving predicted that 
realities of European encroachment on Native American territories would be obscured 
by fantasy: “If, perchance, some dubious memorial of them should survive, it may be in 
the romantic dreams of the poet, to people in imagination his glades and grove, like the 
fauns and satyrs and sylvan deities of antiquity.” Though these representations would 
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be “dubious” in their reality, he anticipated that the true story would evoke self-
incriminatory horrors that would defy belief:  
should he venture upon the dark story of their wrongs and wretchedness; should 
he tell how they were invaded, corrupted, and despoiled, driven from their 
native abodes and sepulchers of their fathers, hunted like wild beasts about the 
earth, and sent down with violence and butchery to the grave, posterity will 
either turn with horror or incredulity from the tale, or blush with indignation at 
the inhumanity of their forefathers.180  
Invoking aspects of this trend while making the case for the Indian Removal Act of 1830, 
Andrew Jackson emphasized the need to mentally displace guilt about the literal 
displacement of Native Americans: “To follow to the tomb the last of his race and to 
tread on the graves of extinct nations excites melancholy reflections.” However,  
true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these vicissitudes as it does to the 
extinction of one generation to make room for another….Philanthropy could not 
wish to see this continent restored to the condition in which it was found by our 
forefathers. What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and 
ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, 
towns, and prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art 
                                                          
180 Quoted by Sundquist, 73.  
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can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, 
and filled with the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?181  
Jackson’s abstract temporal metaphors, which liken the extirpation of Native Americans 
with any generational shift, encourage a transition in sentiment from the melancholy 
and personal to a concept of broader, and more stoic, principle, implying that a mind 
attuned to “true philanthropy” will ultimately put sadness into context with the forward 
march of “civilization.”   
Charting out his preliminary notes on Nick of the Woods, Bird translates 
Jackson’s concepts into aesthetic and formal vocabularies: “It has ever delighted the 
imaginations of romantic men, to find, in the poor barbarians, who roamed the forest 
and now are fading away from the prairies, of America, the relics of a once powerful and 
civilized community.” And he acknowledges that “It is the fashion of poetry to lament 
the change--to weep over the rapacity of the settler and [the] wrong of the red king of 
the forest.” While “It is right that poetry should do so; for there is something deeply 
melancholy and humbling in the fate of the Indian,” Bird emphasizes a need for a more 
objective and “philosophical” approach to expansionism.  Though romantic and poetic 
literatures may stir emotions, “philosophy has no sigh for the change, for the earth is 
the dwelling of man, not the brute, and its fair fields are intended for those who will 
cultivate them and multiply, not for those who harvest it for wild beasts.”  It is 
                                                          
181 Annual Message to Congress in 1830. Quoted by Sundquist, 68. 
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ultimately “nobler and more profitable” to set aside such speculations and “investigate 
the origin of a people, whose ancestors fought them hand to hand for the possession of 
the wilderness, and purchasing it with blood and tears, gave it, now blossoming like a 
rose, to be an inheritance to their children.”182   
Bird’s call for a “philosophical” and Anglo-centric approach to native-settler 
conflict informs his departure from sentimental portrayals of white and native subjects. 
In Nick of the Woods, he exposes and vindicates the violence suppressed by the 
aesthetic tradition that Irving anticipated. Critics of nineteenth-century fictive 
representations of the Native American have remarked how sentimental and humorous 
portrayals of frontier characters enabled audiences to entertain “self-justifying fantasies 
that conceal the violence marking European America’s origins” from a distance.183  In 
Moving Encounters, Laura Mielke points out that sentimental portrayals of the noble 
savage and vanishing Indian connected mourning the Indian with acceptance of 
Removal’s purported inevitability.184 Indeed, Cooper’s portrayal of virtuous Uncas, who 
dies fighting alongside whites against the cruel Magua in The Last of the Mohicans, 
abetted the demonization of living Native Americans.  When Bird openly rejects the 
romantic and sentimental portrait of the Native American, he thus brings white 
                                                          
182Williams, xxx-xxxi.   
183 Shari Huhndorf, Going Native: Indians in the American Cultural Imagination (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 5. Robert Morgan. Lions of the West: Heroes and Villains of Westward Expansion 
(Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 2011), 2.  
184 Laura Mielke, Moving Encounters: Sympathy and the Indian Question in Antebellum Literature 
(Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 2-3. 
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complicity in Native American removal to the fore for philosophical inspection. 
However, as we shall soon see, Bird’s portrayal of the “real” Indians and the realities of 
the frontiersmen’s experiences soon become uncanny reflections of one another in 
ways that reflect the political critiques I discussed in the previous section.  
Bird suggests that he’s offering us a portrait of the Native that escapes the 
appropriation of the white gaze.185 While the Native American might be able to hide his 
barbaric “inferiority” in front of the white man, he states that the native behaves 
differently when outside of the white man’s scrutiny. Outside of the civilized eye, “the 
native can give himself up to wild indulgence, the sport of whim and frolic.” As, in their 
grotesque bacchanalian festivals, they partake in grotesque reveries, their “loss of 
friends and country, was mingled in the joy of the debauch: 
now fierce and startling, now plaintive and mourning,… the halloo of revenge… 
the whoop of lamentation…chiming strangely with unmeaning shrieks and 
roaring laughter, the squeaking of women and the gibbering of children, with the 
barking of curs, the utterance of obstreperous enjoyment, in which the whole 
village, brute and human, seemed to equally share. 
                                                          
185 In a reversal of these terms, Bird portrays the terror of whites who not only deal with the terror of 
seeing the native American, but also the terror of being seen by them: “as if that spectacle was not 
enough to chill the heart’s blood of the spectators, there were seen, over his shoulders, the gleaming 
eyes, and heard, behind his back, the malign laughter of three or four equally wild and ferocious 
companions” (Nick, 157). 
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This blending of animal and human sounds, male, female, young and old, makes 
the village seem like an “an outer burgh of Pandemonium itself.” Later, he compares 
their “wildest and maddest revelry, to the sway of unchained demons, or of men 
abandoned to all the horrible impulses of lycanthropy” (Nick, 303). In spite of these 
demonic features, Bird also regards the Native American as a fundamentally reformable 
being, “perfectly capable” of civilization; but “real Indians,” are fundamentally shaped 
by structures of feeling produced within the barbaric state.186 Employing aspersions 
similar to those he directed toward the contemporary Mexican culture maligned in 
Calavar, Bird most emphatically paints the abjection of the Native American through 
their enjoyments as spectators of violence. Wenonga, the standard-bearer of the 
Shawnee, gleefully shouts about his love of white blood and his rejection of sentiment: 
“me have no heart.” He also is a demagogue whose passion for killing overwhelms more 
sensitive Native voices.187  
This cruelty isn’t merely a matter of innate disposition, but also stems from the 
native’s chosen pleasures: “His mind is then voluntarily given up to the drunkenness of 
                                                          
186 The writer differed from his critical friends, and from many philanthropists, in believing the Indian to 
be capable—perfectly capable, where restraint assists the work of friendly instruction—of civilization: the 
Choctaws and Cherokees, and the ancient Mexicans and Peruvians, prove it; but, in his natural barbaric 
state, he is a barbarian—and it is not possible he could be anything else. The purposes of the author, in 
his book, confined him to real Indians. He drew them as, in his judgment, they existed—and as, according 
to all observation, they still exist wherever not softened by cultivation,—ignorant, violent, debased, 
brutal; he drew them, too, as they appeared, and still appear, in war—or the scalp-hunt—when all the 
worst deformities of the savage temperament receive their strongest and fiercest development (Nick, 32). 
187 “The squaws and the children curse me…they say I am the killer of their husbands and fathers; they tell 
me it was the deed of Wenonga that brought the white-man’s devil to kill them” (Nick, 321).  
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passion; and cruelty, in its most atrocious and fiendish character, reigns predominant.” 
When a wicked squaw prepares to burn her captives alive, the narrator interjects that 
an Indian has a capacity to feel pity as “deeply, and perhaps as benignly as a white 
man”; however, their participation in violence foments a change so stark that it seems 
as if such sentiment “had never entered into his nature.” When Edith, the young woman 
of the party, is captured, this sadistic spectatorship is further emphasized: “The shriek of 
the wretched maiden, as she beheld the deplorable, the maddening sight, might have 
melted hearts of stone, had there been even such among the Indians. But Indians, 
engaged in the delights of torturing a prisoner, are, as the dead chief has boasted 
himself, without heart” (Nick, 328).  In these circumstances, the native’s passionate 
cruelty seems to exceed the sadism of Old World boogeymen.188 
But even as Bird emphasizes the exceptional nature of Native American 
depravity, he suggests tentative similarities between whites and “savages” which 
indicate that the shadow of this phenomenon falls upon the white men of Nick of the 
Woods, too. In their intemperate reveries, “The savage can drink and dance through the 
night with as lusty a zeal as his white neighbor,” and “the song the jest, the merry tale, 
                                                          
188 “The familiar of a Spanish Inquisition has sometimes moistened the lips of a heretic stretched upon the 
rack,—the Buccaneer of the tropics has relented over the contumacious prisoner gasping to death under 
his lashes and heated pincers; but we know of no instance where an Indian, torturing a prisoner at the 
stake, the torture once begun, has ever been moved to compassionate, to regard with any feelings but 
those of exultation and joy, the agonies of the thrice-wretched victim. (Nick, 328-29 my italics). In addition 
to exceeding the European in this cruelty, the native assimilates and perverts European influences. At 
times, they appear like postcolonial zombies who, debauched with alcohol, spout out corrupted French 
phrases like “Bo-zhoo, brudders,—Injun good friend!” as they raise their tomahawks to kill (Nick, 157). 
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are as dear to his imagination.” Even more significantly, as Edith and Roland—both 
Virginia aristocrats—are encircled by the mob of Shawnee, Bird paints Native American 
fury as the dystopian extension of mob rule:  “the whole population of the village, old 
and young, the strong and the feeble, all agitated alike by those passions, which, when 
let loose in a mob, whether civilized or savage, almost enforce the conviction that there 
is something essentially demoniac in the human character and composition; as if, 
indeed, the earth of which man is framed had been gathered only after it had been 
trodden by the foot of the Prince of Darkness” (Nick, 327, my italics). 
In recapitulating the development of white modes of affiliation forged through 
Indian killing, Bird portrays a proto-American psychology inscribed within a holistic 
system of violence. The New York Mirror reviewer who lauded Nick of the Woods 
described the Kentucky frontier as a site of “continual” and “ceaseless” warfare long 
before the settlers arrived. When European pioneers entered the territory for 
settlement, the Mirror author writes that they redirected these cycles of 
“inextinguishable hostility, blood-shed, and devastation” and insinuated whites and 
Natives in “reciprocal outrages.” Growing up amidst this cyclical hostility, “the first 
children of what is now a great state were cradled in fire—doing, daring, and suffering 
more than did ever band of colonists on any shore.”189  
                                                          
189  “American Romance-Nick of the Woods.” Anticipating the novel’s depiction of national sovereignty’s 
role in ending this period of cyclical terror, the reviewer adds that “no act of the colonial government 
109 
 
Within this hellscape, Bird portrays identities being jointly polarized and 
conflated. Invoking the instability of identity on the frontier while acknowledging the 
whites’ adoptions of the Natives’ methods, Bird almost grammatically conflates the 
distinction when describing the “dramatis personae” of his frontier tale: “The savage 
and the man who fought and subdued the savage—the bold spirits who met him with 
his own weapons and his own hunting-grounds and villages, and, with natural 
vengeance, retaliated in the shadow of his own wigwam some few of the cruel acts of 
butchery with which he so often stained the hearth of the settler” (Nick, 31). As Bird 
suggests here, the “bold [white] spirits” wreak this “natural” vengeance while 
appropriating the Native American’s “own” tools, spaces, and methods – demonstrating 
the tenuousness of the boundaries that Nathan thoroughly blurs. 
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, discussions of Bird’s novel frequently 
invoke his 1854 critique of representations of Native Americans as “embodiments of 
grand and tender sentiment—a new style of the beau-ideal—brave, gentle, loving, 
refined honorable, romantic personages—nature’s nobles, the chivalry of the forest.” 
Such qualities, he submits, “are not the lineaments of the race—that they never were 
the lineaments of any race existing in an uncivilized state—indeed, could not be” (Nick, 
32). Bird’s original introduction, however, puts more emphasis upon dispelling romantic 
illusions about the settler. Anticipating his later statements about Cooper’s 
                                                          
could ever put a stop to the burnings and the slaughterings continually occurring along that frontier” 
(Ibid). 
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pastoralization of the Native in the state of nature, Bird explains that Kentucky’s history 
had hitherto been inflected with a poetics that emphasized the white man’s freedom 
from the constraints of civilization: the popular “ramblings of solitary [Daniel] Boone,” 
he states, evince the “influence of a wild passion” to “‘roam for food, and be a naked 
man, / And wander up and down at liberty.’”190  While such fantasies, Bird continues, 
are “productive of all the effects of poetry on the minds of the dreamy and the 
imaginative,” he explains that Nick’s “grave and reflecting” tone is “derived from” the 
character of the men who laid the “foundations of a great and powerful State” amidst 
“numerous and urgent” dangers (Nick, 27).   
Bird’s attention to the historical moment as part of the larger narrative of the 
construction of the state of Kentucky dramatizes white subjectivity’s development in the 
absence of the cultural and legal frameworks supplied by later institutions. Bird states 
that while it is easy to look down upon men from the “humbler spheres of life” from the 
“vanity” the present, they laid the foundations for the great state of Kentucky “as if” it 
were “planned by the subtlest and wisest spirits of the age.” These “true fathers of the 
state…[were] ignorant but ardent, unpolished and unpretending, yet brave, sagacious 
                                                          
190 The source of Bird’s poetic citation, Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “The Foster-Mother’s Tale: A Dramatic 
Fragment,” captures the zeitgeist of a romantic rejection of civilization that supplements the Rousseauian 
ideal of the “noble savage.” It tells the story of a rural Spanish boy whose education leads him to 
dejection with the life and faith of civilized men. This “mad boy” joins and abandons an exploratory 
expedition to live with the “savages.” William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge “The Foster-
Mother’s Tale.” Lyrical Ballads: 1798-1802, ed. Fiona Stafford (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
25-27. 
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and energetic…the very men, in fact for the time and occasion.” He praises how 
“without influence of any great and experienced mind to impel, direct, or counsel, 
[they] succeeded in their vast enterprise, wrested from the savage the garden-land of 
his domain, and secured to their conquest all the benefits of civil government and laws” 
(Nick, 27-28).  
Though Bird valorizes “the very men for the occasion,” he historicizes these 
men’s behavior as reflective of an psycho-institutional absence that ought to be viewed 
with detachment:  While “Their success may be considered a phenomenon in history,” 
Bird continues, “the philosophic examiner will perhaps find in it an illustration of the 
republican principle in enlarging the mind and awakening the energies, of men whom 
the influence another code of political faith would have kept in the darkness and 
insignificance to which they were born” (Nick, 28). In the absence of psycho-institutional 
scaffolding, they are marked with an umbraic otherness which is intimately connected 
to the darkness of the Indian. Thus, though they provide an example of a proto-
American mentality that does the work necessary for the foundation of the state, they 
are nonetheless constituted within and shaped by this barbaric state.  
Within the zone of democratic possibility Bird sketches out, the war-forged 
barbarism of the frontiersmen joined by a communal creed of Indian-fighting suggests a 
latent possibility for the erosion of social and racial hierarchy.  Though “typical” for 
people in the “sanguinary struggle by which alone the desert was to be won from the 
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wandering barbarian,” the “wild, singular, and striking,” group resembles a barbaric 
tribe, giving “the appearance of an army or moving village, of Vandals in quest of some 
new home to be avenged with the sword.” In this condition, roles traditionally 
determined by age and rank break down. Slaves stand at the ready with rifles, guarding 
the women “and other chattels.” Children as young as eleven balance their rifles on 
their shoulders. Colonel Bruce, a product of this environment likened to the Biblical 
Nimrod, leads the community with a militarism “instilled into the American 
frontiersman in the earliest infancy” and serves as a central node in the community’s 
network (Nick,41). Though an imposing figure described by the narrator as reminiscent 
of Nimrod, he is uncouth and awkward, rough in dialect, and prone to cursing and 
bragging about his violent spawn: Bruce’s son had taken a scalp of “of a full-grown 
Shawnee before he was fourteen y’ar old”. And he “blubbered all night, to think he had 
not killed them both” (Nick, 50).  
Along these lines, the white men in the barbaric state of the novel share the 
Native Americans’ “obstreperous enjoyment” of violence. When word first reaches the 
frontier stations about the Jibbenainosay’s deeds, Bruce is adamant that the culprit 
cannot be one of the settlers because “Thar’s no man ‘arns a scalp in Kentucky, without 
taking great pains to show it to his neighbors” (Nick, 65). Throughout the novel’s early 
portrait of the frontier, the vocabulary that Bird utilizes to single out the Native 
American’s depravity surfaces in his description of the frontiersmen, and reflects larger 
113 
 
concerns about the absence of law. These concerns are most significantly embodied in 
the behaviors of the community’s most conspicuous frontier celebrity, horse thief 
Roaring Ralph Stackpole, who has been given the informal title of “Captain” by the 
frontier’s hoi polloi. Ralph, the “outlandish and ludicrous” “demibarbarian,” stands 
“Ugly, mean, and villainous of look; yet with an impudent, swaggering joyous self-
esteem traced in every feature and expressed in every action of body, that rather 
disposed the beholder to laugh than to be displeased by his appearance”(Nick, 66).191 
While Bird would mock the idealized Native American by stating that “The Indian is 
doubtless a gentleman; but he is a gentleman who wears a very dirty shirt, and lives a 
very miserable life, having nothing to employ him or keep him alive except the pleasures 
of the chase and of the scalp-hunt,” Ralph scalps with abandon and proclaims “I’m a 
gentleman, and my name’s Fight!” (Nick, 68). 
An “extraordinary specimen” of Kentucky’’s inhabitants (Nick, 71), Ralph 
exemplifies a persona “wholly unknown to history, though not to local and traditionary 
fame” (Nick, 68) and hyperbolizes the kind of roaring braggart that James Kirke Paulding 
presented on the stage in Lions of the West (1833).192 Like Davy Crockett turned 
grotesque, the self-professed “alligator half-breed” possesses a performative animalism 
                                                          
191 Bird’s description of Ralph shows that there is at least one exception to a rule he lays out elsewhere: 
“It is only among children (we mean, of course bad ones) and savages, who are but grown children after 
all, that we find malice and mirth go hand in hand,--the will to create misery and the power to see it 
invested in ludicrous colors” (Nick, 209). 
192 Paulding’s Nimrod Wildfire, who has been recognized as a spoof of Davy Crockett, also claims himself 
to be half-man half alligator (Morgan, 2). 
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that summons every “chanticleer in the settlement” to watch him snorting and neighing 
like a horse, flapping his wings, barking like a dog, whining like a panther, and shouting 
like an Indian. The narrator thus calls him “A living menagerie, comprising within his 
single body the spirit of every animal noted for its love of conflict” (Nick, 70). 
Though Ralph’s compulsive displays—punctuated by his repeated shouts of 
phrases like “Cock a Doodle Doo!”— resemble a form of madness, they hint more 
generally at a class instability and lawlessness within the community:  Bird describes his 
apparent “madness” as strategic—a display that gives him social recognition, helping 
him evade “the contempt to which his low habits and appearance would have otherwise 
justly consigned him” (Nick, 75). Indeed, his first paroxysms immediately respond to 
Roland’s refusal to shake his hand. This instability is further underscored by the fact that 
Ralph’s major skill, and flaw, lies in his compulsive horse theft.  While his skill in stealing 
Indian horses is one of the traits that make him a “A prime creatur’!” (so Bruce states), 
his habits have become hardwired so that “he can scarce keep his hands off a 
Christian’s” (Nick, 66-67). But because the poor people of the region have no horses for 
him to steal, he is tolerated by the masses and exempted from punishment. 
Thus, in spite of Bird’s praise of the historical settlers’ role in setting a framework 
for civilization, national unity, and law through Indian-killing, the lawlessness of the 
frontiersmen he portrays was as controversial, if not more so, than his depiction of 
Native Americans. In a sharp critique of the novel, the Kentucky-based Western Monthly 
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Magazine reviewer complained that Bird could “hand down to posterity 
‘representatives of the race’ of men who founded the commonwealth of Kentucky,” but 
“conceive of nothing fitter for his pages than ‘Roaring Ralph Stackpole,’ and bruteing 
[sic] ‘Cunnel Bruce!’”193 In spite of Bird’s introductory adulation, this reviewer was not 
far off from telegraphing Bird’s ridicule for rural westerners: writing home from a trip to 
Tennessee in 1833, Bird complained: “I think Hooger’s, Roarers, and, in general, all the 
geniuses of the river and prairie are mighty stupid rascals; and I wish I was back in 
Philadelphia.”194  
Throughout these early scenes, Roland the Virginian registers a tension 
characteristic of Bird’s ambivalent attitude toward the frontiersmen. At first, he displays 
an aristocratic chauvinism that keeps the settlers at a distance. Upon first arriving in the 
frontier encampment, he refrains from contact with the settlers.  The opening conflict of 
the novel, in fact, features Roland and his cousin, Edith, debating about how to react to 
these frontiersmen’s greetings. Roland, an aristocratic chauvinist who has fallen upon 
hard times, is repulsed by the “noisy barbarians” he has taken company with, and he 
refuses to associate with “the outcasts of our borders, the poor, the rude, the savage,--
                                                          
193 “Monthly Review: Nick of the Woods,” Western Monthly Magazine, and Literary Journal 1 no.4 (May 
1837). The reviewer also argued that Bird went beyond the good humored “burlesque” portrayals of the 
western character exemplified by J.K. Paulding’s Westward Ho! and turned them into actors in a minstrel 
show. Such figures, the reviewer avers, were “very much such a representative as Jim Crow Rice would be 
of Shakespeare’s heroes.” 
194 Curtis Dahl, “Introduction.” Nick of the Woods, or the Jibbenainosay. A Tale of Kentucky (New Haven, 
Conn: College & University Press, 1967), 10. 
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but one degree elevated above the Indians, with whom they contend.” Emphasizing the 
importance of this degree, Edith, whose tolerance and equanimity is a guiding light for 
Roland and others in the narrative, recognizes the genuine possibility of communion 
with the settlers: “these wild people of the woods do not confine their welcomes to 
kinsmen. Kinder and more hospitable people do not exist in the world,” and there are 
“many worthy of her regard and affection” (Nick, 45).  
As Roland and the frontiersmen begin to collaborate, he begins to adopt 
elements of the frontiersmen’s brand of justice; when the aristocrat’s horse is stolen by 
Ralph, the local Regulators suspend their tolerance for the braggart and summarily tie a 
noose to his neck, leaving him sitting upon a pony in the woods. In this episode, which 
hearkens to Bird’s own concerns about the lynch-law of his contemporaries, Roland 
comes close to allowing nature to take its course and let him hang—an opinion shared 
by his slave, Emperor, who calls him a “white niggah” (Nick, 108). But as with the earlier 
episode, Edith responds to Roland’s attitude toward “Kentucky law” with a corrective 
philosophy which is attuned to a higher law that transcends the law of the frontier: “the 
law is murderous, its makers and executioners barbarians” (Nick, 109). Edith’s virtuous 
republican sentiment pays off in the form of Stackpole’s undying allegiance to the 
“angeliferous” woman and he supplicates every element of his body and soul to her:  
 ‘Oh! You splendiferous creatur’! you angeliferous anngel! here am I, Ralph 
Stackpole the Screamer, that can whip all Kentucky, white, black, mixed, and 
117 
 
Injun; and I’m the man to go with you to the ends of the ‘arth to fight, die, work, 
beg, and steal hosses for you! I am, and you may make a little dog of me; you 
may, or a niggur, or a hoss, or a doorpost, or a back-log, or a dinner—’tarnal 
death to me, but you may eat me! (Nick, 111) 
While Edith is edified by exerting control over frontier violence, and Roland 
bonds with the community as he begins to acclimate to the frontier’s violent norms, 
Nathan Slaughter the Quaker is roundly maligned for attempting to avoid participation 
in violence altogether. As “The only man in Kentucky that won’t fight!” (Nick, 74), he is 
viewed with “disgust” by the community’s “warlike personages” (Nick, 72-73).  Though 
elements of Nathan’s “uncommonly wild and savage” appearance shine through, 195 his 
madness appears to be symptomatic of his religious objection to the community’s 
violent creed. His “conscientious aversion to bloodshed” violates the “canon of belief 
imprinted on the heart of every man in the district” that “it was incumbent upon every 
able-bodied man to fight the enemies of their little state” (Nick, 79). But if Nathan’s 
apparent devotion to pacifistic principles make him a heretic in a community that is 
tenuously bound together by violence, his mad alter ego, the Jibbenainosay, follows the 
community’s violent “doctrine” with a devilish orthodoxy. In the following pages, I will 
                                                          
195 “Some say his wits are unsettled,” Bruce remarks, while reminiscing upon seeing him with “his mouth 
full of foam” (Nick, 74). 
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examine how Nathan’s pathological submission to the communal urge toward violence 
makes the unsavory elements of the community’s desires visible.196  
 
“A Spectacle too Palpable to be Doubted”: Terror, Complicity, and Disgust 
Our terrors were ridiculous enough, when they could convert a peaceful man like you 
into a blood-thirsty creature.  
-Nick of the Woods, 127 
 
As Edith and Roland become lost in the wilderness while on their search for a 
relative on the frontier, Bird’s focus shifts from a culture shaped by violence to depict 
the mental anguish, horrors, and thrills of violence itself. The horrors of Bird’s tale of the 
“dark and bloody ground” of Kentucky territories are wrought through visceral details 
that strain boundaries between reader and text, history and the present.  In its 
unmediated state, the conflict tests the limits of representation, providing Edith, the 
novel’s mandatory damsel in distress, a “sight to rend her eyeballs from her sockets.” 
But the narrator reminds us that these scenes are all too real: “It was no error of sight; 
                                                          
196 The sight of one of Nathan’s mangled victims fills Edith with “such horror,” that when her “eyes had 
once fallen upon it, it seemed as if her enthralled spirit would never have recovered strength to remove 
them.” (Nick, 327-28). 
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no delusion of mind: the spectacle was too palpable to be doubted.” As the urbane and 
sheltered people venture deeper into the woods, their sanity and values are tested, and 
Roland’s vulnerability to the maddening effects of life in the barbaric wilderness comes 
to a head. Roland’s fears “crowd into his mind with benumbing effect, engrossing his 
faculties” and they “shock” his “mind from its propriety,” leaving “him in a manner 
unfitted to exercise the decision and energy so necessary to the welfare of his feeble 
and well-nigh helpless followers” (Nick, 115).  
Ironically, given the novel’s projection of the Native American as an object of 
pervasive fear, the first terrifying encounter in the novel occurs when Roland’s party 
bears witness to one of the Jibbenainosay’s victims. Before Nathan’s identity is revealed, 
the spectral nature of the Jibbenainosay myth allows for his violence to be viewed 
without rationalization or moralization. As they stare at a cross carved into a Shawnee’s 
chest, the wound conveys a “wantonness of malice and lust of blood which even death 
could not satisfy” (Nick, 124),197 and they are paralyzed and enraptured with horror as 
they witness the body.198 After they look up from the corpse, they are primed for 
                                                          
197The first Shawnee body they encounter is perhaps all the more horrifying due to the way that Bird 
brings medical nuance to the description: “they beheld with horror the body of a savage, of vast and 
noble proportions, lying on its face across the roots of the tree, and glued, it might also be  said, to the 
earth by a mass of coagulated blood, that had issued from the scalp and axe-cloven skull…the earth was 
torn where he lay, and his hands, yet grasping the soil, were dyed a double red in the blood of his 
antagonist, or perhaps in his own” (Nick, 124). 
198 Their horse halts in “instinctive terror,” Edith is struck dumb by a sight that evokes “the highest degree 
of terror, and the feeling was so overpowering, that her lips, though moving as in the act of speech, gave 
forth no sound whatever.” Telie Doe, the young girl of the party, looks at the corpse with “mingled horror 
and wonder” (Nick, 122). Pardon, the New Englander, and Emperor, the loyal slave, are “discomposed by 
the spectacle.” Roland, meanwhile “gaze[s] upon the spectacle, amazed, and wondering” (Nick, 123). 
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further terrors as they see a “monstrous” and “wily” figure approaching from a distance. 
When this figure turns out to be the apparently peaceable Nathan, they laugh off their 
mistake: “Our terrors were ridiculous enough, when they could convert a peaceful man 
like you into a blood-thirsty creature!” (Nick, 127). In the ensuing pages, the terrors of 
the genteel aristocrats ultimately catalyze a conversion that brings Nathan’s violence 
into the open and forces the party to account for this violence as it is waged on their 
behalf.  
Roland initially threatens to kill the Quaker if he does not join his party. In spite 
of his initial protests, Nathan soon betrays a smoldering, quasi-erotic desire to let his 
inner monster loose as Roland insults his masculinity. Operating outside of Roland’s field 
of vision, Nathan kills a warrior who has Roland in a death-grip, shooting “a jet of warm 
blood” onto Roland’s arm. Nathan denies his involvement, and Roland admonishes: “by 
Heaven, I hoped and believed you had yourself finished him like a man” (Nick, 161). 
Soon afterward, Nathan offers to prop up Roland’s unsteady gun, “If thee will not 
consider it an evil thing of me, and a blood-guiltiness, I will hold thee gun for thee, and 
thee shall pull the trigger” (Nick, 162).  
The sexual threat that the Natives pose to the women of the party, Edith and 
Telie, ultimately leads Nathan to unleash his inner fury. Invoking the women several 
times, he shouts, “Blood upon my hands, but not upon my head!” and fires upon the 
throng of “murdering dogs” (Nick, 162). Disavowing guilt for joining into the fray, the 
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“man of peace” undergoes an immediate transformation in character that hints at the 
hyperbolic capacity for violence at his disposal: “entirely beside himself,” he behaves “as 
if the first act of warfare had forever released him from all peaceful obligations” and he 
rushes against one of the Shawnee, “dealing him a blow with the butt of his heavy-
stocked rifle that crushed through skull and brain like a gourd, killing the man on the 
spot” (Nick, 163). Even though Nathan’s scruples are momentarily reawakened, the 
narrator (quite approvingly) recounts that Nathan “fired away with extreme good-will at 
every evil Shawnee creature that showed himself, encouraging Roland to do the same, 
and exhibiting throughout the whole contest the most exemplary courage and good 
conduct” (Nick, 166). 
As Nick of the Woods verges into some of the most gruesome portraits ever 
written in frontier literature, Edith, the object of Nathan’s benevolent viciousness, and 
the narrative’s most progressive voice, is mentally protected from witnessing the 
violence waged in her name when she falls into a convenient stupor: “a lethargy of 
spirit, result from overwrought feelings, in which she happily remained, more than half 
unconscious of what was passing around her” (Nick, 163). Soon afterward, she is 
kidnapped by the Shawnee and taken back to the camp. While Edith is marginalized 
from the circulation of these affects, Roland is increasingly vulnerable to forgoing her 
civilized restraint. He thus navigates the vortex of frontier violence on his own terms.199  
                                                          
199 In a scene that depicts a wounded Piankeshaw warrior attempting his last kill, Nathan’s gorey violence 
amplifies the Native American’s horrifying appearance: “a dark and bloody figure, which staggering and 
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If Nathan is seduced into committing violence in the open on Roland’s behalf, he 
is just as concerned with getting Roland to understand and accept his violent behavior: 
after revealing that his family was murdered by the band, he explains his violent 
purpose in a speech that uncannily blends his Quaker dialect (shown through his use of 
“thee”), sense of violent justification, and his propensity for madness: 
‘By night and by day, in summer and in winter, in the wood and in the wigwam, 
thee would seek for their blood, and thee would shed it;--thee would think of 
thee wife and thee little babes, and thee heart would be as stone and fire within 
thee--thee would kill, friend, thee would kill!’ And the monsosyllable was 
breathed over and over again with the ferocity of emphasis that showed how 
deep and vindictive was the passion in the speaker’s mind. (Nick, 236) 
Given the novel’s incessant apologetics about Indian-killing and Roland’s 
heartfelt gratitude for his actions,200 Nathan’s attempt to get Roland to accept his 
violence seems strange. After all, by this point in the narrative, it’s quite certain that 
Roland needs little convincing about the virtues of Indian killing. He himself has been 
                                                          
falling over the body of the young warrior, crawled like a scotched reptile upon Roland’s breast; when the 
light of the fire shining upon it revealed to his eyes the horrible spectacle of the old Piankeshaw warrior, 
the lower part of his face shot entirely away, and his eyes rolling hideously, and, as it seemed, sightlessly, 
in the pangs of death, his hand clutching the knife with which he had so often threatened, and with which 
he yet seemed destined to take, though in the last gasp of his own, the soldier’s life. With one hand he 
felt along the prisoner’s body, as if seeking a vital part, and sustained his own weight, while with the other 
he made repeated, though feeble and ineffectual, strokes with the knife, all the time rolling, and 
staggering, and shaking his gory head in a manner most horrible to behold” (Nick, 218). 
200 “Condemn you indeed!” Roland responds, “it was an act to bind my gratitude for ever,—an act to win 
you the admiration and respect of the whole world, which I shall take care to make acquainted with it.” 
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driven to near madness at the sight of Edith being captured.201  Dana Nelson argues that 
this emphasis upon Roland’s approval serves a larger political purpose of uniting the 
perspectives of the narrator, reader, Nathan, and Roland, in the project of Indian 
Removal: The narrator, by functioning “as Roland’s twin,” brings “the frontier lesson 
back to civilization and forward in time” and thus “implicate[s] its readers in its drive for 
revenge precisely by absolving them of complicity in political and historical 
circumstance.”202 While I agree with Nelson’s assessment about Bird’s general stance on 
Indian Removal, and significance of Roland’s perspective, the scenes that depict 
Roland’s discovery of Nathan’s madness put increased pressure on the social 
implications of the violent desires that Nathan channels.  
As Nathan falls into an epileptic fit, his cap falls off, exposing the source of 
Nathan’s behavior. “Roland saw that Nathan carried with him a better cause for the 
affliction than could be referred to any mere temporary emotion, however 
overwhelming to the mind.” He notices “A horrible scar disfigured the top of his head, 
which seemed to have been, many years before, crushed by the blows of a heavy 
weapon; and it was equally manifest that the savage scalping-knife had done its work on 
the mangled head.” Aware that “injuries to the head often resulted in insanity of some 
                                                          
201 “Pain of body was then, and for many moments after, lost in agony of mind, which could be conceived 
only by him who, like the young solder, has been doomed…to see a tender female, the nearest and 
dearest object of his affections, in the hands of enemies, the most heartless, merciless and brutal of all 
the races of men” (Nick, 189). 
202 Nelson, 44. 
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species or other; he could now speculate…upon some of those singular points of 
character which seemed to distinguish the houseless Nathan from the rest of his fellow-
men” (Nick, 235). Though the dreadful calamities that “had made him what he was” are 
beyond articulation—the lacunae in Nathan’s story are filled in by Roland’s diagnostic 
imagination: 
His imagination supplied the imperfect links of the story; he could well believe 
that the same hands which had shed the blood of every member of the poor 
borderer’s family, might have struck the hatchet into the head of the resisting 
husband and father; and that the effects of that blow, with the desolation of 
heart and fortune which the heavier ones, struck at the same time, had entailed, 
might have driven him to the woods, an idle, perhaps aimless, wanderer….  
How far these causes might have operated in leading Nathan into those late acts 
of blood which were at such variance with his faith and professions, it remained 
also for Roland to imagine; and, in truth, he imagined they had operated deeply 
and far; though nothing in Nathan’s own admissions could be found to sanction 
any belief save they were the results partly of accident, and partly of sudden and 
irresistible impulse. (Nick, 243) 
Through this imaginative projection, Roland’s diagnosis of Nathan’s trauma does 
reflect his identification with Nathan’s overall purpose. Following Nathan’s uncanny 
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Quaker-inflected solicitations,203  Roland states that he understands Nathan’s desire, 
and that he would have also “Declared eternal war upon them and their accursed 
race!...I would have sworn undying vengeance, and I would have sought it,—ay, sought 
it without ceasing. Day and night, summer and winter, on the frontier and in their own 
lands and villages, I would have pursued the wretches, and pursued them to the death” 
(Nick, 236). Nelson argues that this call and response urges the reader “to identify with 
Nathan and to consider him heroic” by giving the public “a reason to hate Indians that 
arises from a sense of innocent personal loss.”204  
In this way, Bird does summon up a sense of solidarity the Elizabeth Barnes finds 
in antebellum American texts which “transcended divisions of race and social division 
through their depictions of violence,” and encouraged subjects to identify “with forms 
of power that make and unmake men.” This kind of imagining, Barnes continues, could 
convert “insensible men into men of feeling through acts of violence in which they are 
compelled to participate, acts that then become a vehicle for their empathetic 
identification with others.”205 Along similar lines, Nelson argues that Roland “models his 
own behavior after the Indian-hater’s.”206    
                                                          
203 “Thee has heard it, and thee knows it, thee knows what the Shawnee have done to me--they have 
killed them all, all that was of my blood! Had they done so by thee, friend,” he demands with wild 
eagerness, “had they done so by thee, what would have done to them?” (Nick, 219-20). 
204 Nelson, 43. 
205 Barnes, Love’s Whipping Boy, 100; 119-20. 
206 Nelson, 42. 
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However, I suggest that because these empathic procedures transcend lines 
between race and class, and come so close to the forms of anarchy that Bird feared 
were circulating in the public sphere of his contemporary moment through 
representations of violence, Roland in fact, learns to not model his behavior after 
Nathan’s behavior, even as he recognizes that violence is necessary in the barbaric 
state.  
Though Nathan’s traumatic story elicits empathy, this fellow feeling is undercut 
by his inability to control himself: Nathan’s “struggle to subdue the passions…served to 
add double distortion to his changes of countenance, which, assumed at last an 
appearance so wild, so hideous, so truly terrific, that Roland was seized with horror, 
deeming himself confronted with a raging maniac.”  A bit later, Roland disarms one of 
the Shawnee and he “begs” Nathan not to kill him, but to no avail: “‘To the last man of 
his tribe!’ cried Nathan with unexampled ferocity; and, without another word, drove the 
hatchet into the wretch’s brain” (Nick, 254). 
Moreover, as Nathan becomes comfortable with accepting his violent nature207, 
he increasingly resembles the uncloseted agents of violence that inhabit the frontier 
stations, and he adopts their coarse habits and language. This commonality becomes 
apparent when Nathan, Roland, and Ralph re-unite in the quest to save Edith from the 
                                                          
207 Resolving to persist in the quest to save Edith, he states that “things should never be done by halves” 
(Nick, 239) 
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Shawnee.208 Ironically, as Roland views commonalities between Nathan, Ralph, and 
Native American savagery, he is shocked into a propriety that distinguishes him from the 
group. This civilized aversion becomes clearest when he watches his two companions 
“crowning their victory” with the scalps of their fallen enemies. Bird’s narrator explains 
their behavior thus:  
Such is the practice of the border, and such it has been ever since the mortal 
feud, never destined to be really ended but with the annihilation, or civilization 
of the American race, first began between the savage and the white intruder. It 
was, and is, essentially, a measure of retaliation compelled, if not justified, by 
the ferocious example of the red-man. Brutality ever begets brutality; and the 
magnanimity of arms can only be exercised in the case of a magnanimous foe. 
With such, the wildest and fiercest rover of the frontier becomes a generous and 
even humane enemy. (Nick, 256-7) 
In these scenes, Bird’s narrator affirms Ralph and Nathan’s behavior as a natural 
response to Native American warfare. But he is also careful to distinguish “compulsion” 
from “justification.” Moreover he betrays a hint of repugnance by stating that “we are 
sorry to say” that “conscientious Nathan” joined Ralph in the scalping. The scene itself is 
                                                          
208 Demonstrating a similar capacity for unrestrained violence, Roland spies Ralph in a “spectacle as novel 
as it was shocking.” While an “Indian lay on his back suffocating in mire and water” Ralph sits astride him 
“covered from head to foot with mud and gore, furiously plying his fists…about the head and face of his 
foe, his blows falling like sledgehammers or battering-rams, with such strength and fury that it seemed 
impossible any one of them could fail to crush the skull to atoms” (Nick, 254). 
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wrought with equivocation rooted in the distinction Bird lays out between the ethics of 
a lawless environment and a civilized one; while Roland would have “gladly” stopped 
the scalping, such sentiments are “opposed to all border ideas of manly spirit and 
propriety.” Given his inability to stop this compulsion, Roland’s reaction registers as an 
implicit ethical response by turning away in “disgust from a scene he could not prevent” 
(Nick, 257). 
Roland’s impotent disgust reflects a compulsion to escape the natural cycles of 
brutality linked with proto-American culture, but also brings us back to William Ian 
Miller’s point about how ideas about class and civility are reinforced through 
repudiating the desires of others. Explaining the social significance of disgust within a 
broader context, William Ian Miller argues that  
The vulgar are those given to the excessive, the cloying, the fulsome and facile, 
the refined are those who can discern vulgarity and reject it in advance by the 
mechanism of good taste, which is disgust. Taste thus manifests itself by 
refusing, by turning away in disgust, by recoiling at that which bears the marks of 
the vulgar, easy, cloying, and cheap. The disgusting is that which poses no 
resistance; it is the easy, that which just happens unless we cultivate and train to 
avoid and reject it; it is the path of least resistance, the allure of sinking back into 
the belly.209  
                                                          
209William Ian Miller, 169. 
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Roland is thus ennobled less for what he does in this scene than by the fact that he is 
disturbed by Nathan and Ralph’s descent into the state of nature. In doing nothing, but 
gazing upon the enjoyments of his violent counterparts in disgust, Roland implicitly 
absolves himself from Nathan’s compulsions and the frontiersmen’s profane 
enjoyments.  
Acknowledging the disturbing nature of Nathan and Ralph’s behavior and Bird’s 
statement that such behavior will never be “ended but with the annihilation, or 
civilization of the American race,” Michael T. Wilson argues that the symptomatic 
nature of this rage provides an object lesson about the corrupting influences of the 
Native American presence.210 However, this disgust is all the more critical in light of 
Bird’s concerns about violence and instability within his contemporary moment. In 
posing the Native American as an eternal enemy, Bird makes the matter of managing 
the compulsion to kill them the test of American civilization. Nathan’s spectacular 
madness provides a reservoir for examining this compulsion and vicariously accessing its 
attendant pleasures; however, Roland’s aversion points to a need to harness and 
contain these sentiments.  As such, Nathan’s madness emblematizes a kind of spectral 
precursor for forms of violence that enable a lawful community to be created, but also 
ones that must be negated and displaced for civilization, law, and order to emerge. 
                                                          
210“Nathan’s struggle to reintegrate the split halves of his personality apparently cannot be accomplished 
short of the complete extermination of Indians on the frontier, a Final Solution that seems clearly echoed 
by the novel’s implication that white violence cannot be rendered more palatable until it is no longer 
necessary for that same genocidal project.” Wilson, 140. 
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The Insanity of the Moment 
After Roland recognizes the horrific nature of Nathan’s violence, the mutual 
antipathies of the Natives and the European frontiersmen reach their apogee in a 
violent finale as they clash along the Ohio River beyond the fringes of the Kentucky 
territory. The final chapters of Nick of the Woods present an explosive series of scenes 
that juxtapose Nathan’s repulsiveness with the arrival of George Rogers Clark’s 
expeditionary force. Nathan’s quest for revenge culminates in a scene that exhibits his 
most disturbing qualities. In marking Nathan’s trajectory thus, Bird reflects the closing of 
the holistic depravity of the postlapsarian “barbaric state” and the emergence of a 
national framework that enables Kentucky to be established within the new American 
nation. 
In a gruesome display of cruelty, Wenonga shows Nathan, who has been caught 
and tied up, a long stick bearing the scalps of his loved ones and which, presumably, 
contains Nathan’s scalp as well. Nathan tricks Wenonga into setting him free. Believing 
that Nathan’s epilepsy is proof that he is a medium for contacting the Jibbenainosay, 
Wenonga acquiesces to Nathan’s demand that the chief untie him so that he can 
confront the “white man’s devil.” Once unfettered, Nathan fastens his eyes onto his 
jailer “with a wild but joyous glare” and a laugh that “would have become the jaws of a 
hyena.”  Then, “with rather the rancorous ferocity of a wolf than an enmity of a human 
being,” he leaps upon Wenonga by the throat, seizes his tomahawk, and buries it in his 
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brain before they hit the ground. Using his knife, Nathan tears the chief’s scalp from his 
“dishonored head” and then uses it as a crude scalpel to etch his final cross, “dividing 
skin, cartilage, and even bone.”  Completing this bloody ritual, he revels in the 
culmination of his vengeful quest in a moment of cathartic madness:  
leaping to his feet, and snatching from the post the bundle of withered scalps—
the locks of his own murdered family, which he spread a moment before his eyes 
with one hand, while the other extended, as if to contrast the two prizes 
together, the reeking  scalp-lock of the murderer, he sprang through the door of 
the lodge, and fled from the village; but not until he had, in the insane fury of the 
moment, given forth a wild, ear-piecing yell, that spoke the triumph, the exulting 
transport, of long-baffled but never-dying revenge. (Nick, 323) 
This moment of insane fury punctuates poetic justice with grisly details; using 
Wenonga’s own weapon against him, crushing his brain, and parading his scalp, 
Nathan’s actions redress the primal scene when Wenonga killed Nathan’s loved ones 
with the Quaker’s own weapons and brings closure to his covert quest for revenge. But 
even as this scene evokes the sublime “transport” of satisfying a “long-baffled but 
never-dying” revenge, the fearful symmetry of the prized scalps and the underlying 
erosion between boundaries of man and animal link this spiritual rapture, and the 
closure of a cycle of revenge, with the oblivion of the civilized subject.  
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In contrast with previous scenes of bloodshed I have recounted, which are 
marked by continuous attention to characters’ reactions to this violence, the final stages 
of Bird’s portrayal of Nathan’s pursuit of cathartic vengeance have no witness save the 
reader; as he approaches a sleeping Wenonga, no character is  
at hand to gaze upon [Nathan’s] own, to mark the hideous frown of hate, and 
the more hideous grin of delight, that mingled on, and distorted his visage, as he 
gloated, snake-like, over that of the chief. …..Nathan [was] quivering through 
every fibre with nameless joy and exultation, and forgetful of everything but his 
prey. (Nick, 281)    
It thus falls upon the reader to witness Nathan’s adoption of the Shawnee’s 
“obstreperous enjoyment,” their serpentine features, and to negotiate the affective 
push and pull between the imperatives that justify his violence and their abject 
elements. For if Nathan’s depravity in the act of killing provides an outlet for a fantasy of 
killing the Indian, his insane and transportive vengeance also realizes a fantasy of killing 
with the lawlessness and brutality of the Indian. Though Nathan’s actions are not 
witnessed by a moralizing outsider in the “insane fury” of this moment, the behavior of 
its auditors, fellow inhabitants of the Shawnee camp, provide a counterpoint in their 
example of the society that is not shocked by violence: hearing these shrieks, the Native 
men and women are awakened, “but such sounds in a disorderly hamlet of barbarians 
were too common to create alarm or uneasiness,” thus “leaving the corse of their chief 
133 
 
to stiffen on the floor of his wigwam” (Nick, 324). If this scene does not overtly critique 
Nathan’s behavior, it offers an implicit acknowledgment of the structures of feeling 
constitutive of the natives’ everyday lives, and points to the moral edification of 
disgusted observers such as Roland.  
Further problematizing the disturbing catharsis of this scene, Nathan, in his mad 
reverie, leaves the captive Edith in the hut, and, in doing so, fails to accomplish the 
quest that ostensibly led him to the camp: she lies in “painful slumbers,” in Wenonga’s 
wigwam, shielded from witnessing the action while remaining vulnerable. Though 
closing the circle of his private revenge, he has left the sacralized subject of civilization 
unprotected and the task of the civilized men unfinished. Moreover, Roland and Ralph 
are bound to stakes, about to be burned alive by the wicked squaw who is Edith’s 
counterpoint. 
With Nathan momentarily out of sight, Clark’s forces appear as a chiasmatic 
inversion of the Native Americans’ devilish rage.  As the Shawnee, captivated by their 
own “universal devotion to the Saturnalia of blood,” give a shout that awakens 
“responsive echoes among the surrounding hills,” they are interrupted by the explosion 
of fifty rifles, “sharp, rattling, and deadly, like the war-note of the rattlesnake, followed 
by the mighty hurrah of Christian voices” (Nick, 329).  Following this logic, Clark’s 
soldiers and the local militia evoke and invert the fury of the violence ascribed to the 
Shawnee and Nathan.  In the initial stages of the chaos which follows, “a din too horrible 
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for description,” it appears as if Clark’s soldiers may be partaking in the perpetuation of 
the Shawnee’s unpardonable sins. Observing the carnage while maintaining a defensive 
posture around Edith, Pardon Dodge, the greenhorn from Boston, expresses his fear of 
this development: “Everlasting bad work…they’re killing the squaws! hark, don’t you 
hear them squeaking? Now, Cunnel, I can kill your tarnal man fellers…but, I rather 
calkilate, I hadn’t no disposition to kill wimming!” (Nick, 336). Nathan appears at the 
vanguard of the local militia’s contingent, “flying with the scalp and arms of Wenonga in 
his hand, and looking more like an infuriated madman than the inoffensive man of 
peace he had been long so esteemed” (Nick, 339). Roland stares at 
the medicine-man, and former captive, the Indian habiliments and paint still on 
his body and visage, though both were flecked and begrimed with blood. In his 
left hand was a bundle of scalps, the same he had taken from Wenonga; the 
grizzled scalp-lock of the chief, known by the vulture feathers, beak, and talons, 
still attached to it, was hanging to his girdle; while the steel battle-axe so often 
wielded by Wenonga, was gleaming aloft in his right hand. (Nick, 331) 
Wearing the natives’ clothes and carrying the chief’s gleaming weapon into 
battle, Nathan appropriates the Natives’ appearances and demeanor, while their marks 
on his enciphered body, and the narrator’s adoption of his former captors’ designation 
of him as “the medicine man,” position Nathan as both a victim and iteration of the 
Shawnee’s cultural and psychological inscriptions. As he does so, the narrator remarks 
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that Nathan “was among the most zealous in destroying the Indian village, applying the 
fire with his own hands to at least a dozen different wigwams, shouting with the most 
savage exultation, as each burst into flames” (Nick, 343). 
As the moment evolves, Bird portrays the General’s forces in contrast with the 
Kentucky militiamen. The volunteer forces, joined by Nathan and “burning” with 
revenge as they march into the battle, almost hamper Clark; their “impetuosity” almost 
thwarts the General’s strategic plan to “invest the Indian village, so as to ensure the 
destruction or capture of every inhabitant” (Nick, 339). Even so, Clark’s forces wreak a 
definitive and portentous victory: “within a few hours after they first appeared, as if 
bursting from the earth…nothing remained among the place and site of a populous 
village, save scattered ruins and mangled corses.”  
As the smoke clears, Bird’s narrator interjects to dispel fears that the military has 
succumbed to the Native Americans’ methods. In spite of the fears voiced by Pardon 
Dodge of Massachusetts, the general manages to spare “all of the women and children” 
while killing more than half of the Shawnee and sustaining minimal losses (Nick, 340). 
The demoniacal squaw who aroused Pardon’s conscience—who grinned at Edith as she 
kept watch over her and delighted in torturing Roland—has been burned by the flames 
she kindled for Roland’s destruction. And in a move which is proleptic to later 
generations of removal, the Shawnee move out to “the Settlements” (Nick, 340-41).  
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The avatars of national government harness and contain this rage by 
methodizing it into policy: “the village, with its fields of standing corn, had been entirely 
destroyed—a work of cruel vengeance, yet not so much of vengeance as of policy” 
(Ibid). As such, the military force poses an avenue for a collective agency that picks up 
almost seamlessly where Nathan leaves off, extending and purifying the divine 
injunction toward violence, but also acting as prophylaxis for the affective contagion of 
frontier combat. The government’s intervention realizes a philosophical apotheosis that 
offers a clean break from the cyclical hostility waged by the Native Americans that 
motivated the organization of frontier democracy and its provisional perversions. In 
thus capping the action’s repulsive desires, the novel fashions a vision of an America 
structured and sacralized through the government’s mediation of Kentucky’s (and 
American Democracy’s) constitutive violence.  
 
The Vanishing Madman  
In the final pages of Nick of the Woods, the expulsion of the Shawnee leads to 
the restoration of the hierarchies disturbed by the Native American presence. And in the 
aftermath of these events, Nathan and Ralph abruptly exit the frontier stage. Ralph and 
Nathan’s disappearance reinstalls them into the umbraic narrative space that is 
maintained by tradition and tales—maintained through romance but outside the zone 
of official history. While we can say that Bird’s novel aims to give substance to this 
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legendary history, this documentation of the unrecorded and excluded element of 
history and local truth draws attention to the romance’s capacity to articulate structures 
of feeling silenced by the merely historical. Even as power structures are affirmed with 
the termination of the Native threat, the disappearance of the novel’s most bizarre 
figures offers a glimpse of the uncertainties of Bird’s era as they reflect a new 
undercurrent of lawlessness amidst the frontiersmen’s celebrations. Nathan, in fact, 
becomes cured of his madness by observing the frontiersmen’s celebrations of his 
deeds:  
It was not indeed until the work of destruction was completed, the retreat 
commenced, and the army once more buried in the woods, that the demon 
which had thus taken possession of his spirit, seemed inclined to relax its hold, 
and restore him once more to his wits. It was then, however, that the remarks 
which all had now leisure to make on his extraordinary transformation, the 
mingled jests and commendations of which he found himself the theme, began 
to make an impression on his mind, and gradually wake him as from a dream 
that had long mastered and distracted his faculties. The fire of military 
enthusiasm flashed no more from his eyes, his step lost its bold spring and 
confidence, he eyed those who so liberally heaped praise on his lately acquired 
courage and heroic actions, with uneasiness, embarrassment, and dismay; and 
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cast his troubled eyes around, as if in search of some friend capable of giving 
counsel and comfort in such case made and provided. (Nick, 343)  
While victory plays a significant role in his transition, it is also significant that Nathan is 
shocked back into sanity through his own repulsion toward the community that deems 
him, like Stackpole and Bruce, one of the “redoubtable” men of violence who earned 
their place in popular legend. While in the town “he found the cheers and hearty 
hurrahs,” he “found as little to relish in encomiums passed on his valor as in the 
invectives to which he had formerly been exposed. He stole away, therefore, into the 
woods, abandoning the army altogether.” This refusal to take credit is also reflected in 
his unwillingness to accept Roland’s gift of property.  Nathan retreats into the 
wilderness, with little commentary on his future other than the absence of his 
pathological violence. The Jibbenainosay in Nathan has been exorcized with the death of 
Wenonga and, as the narrator tells us, “the phantom Nick of the Woods was never more 
beheld stalking around the gloom; nor was his fearful cross ever again seen traced on 
the breast of a slaughtered Indian.”  However, if Nathan is “cured” of these violent 
deeds as the Jibbenainosay vanishes, his actions have been assimilated into the popular 
legends of the region.  
If Nathan has ultimately overcome the physiological constraints of his madness, 
Ralph has also become a reformed man by the end of the novel. But notably, he is not 
cured of his compulsion through benevolence. Soon after Roland and Edith gift their 
139 
 
property to him, Ralph’s “improvident, harum-scarum habits” lead him to squander his 
gift, and he continues to steal horses. His propensity toward theft only diminishes when 
he is brought to the bar of judgment for these crimes and absolved by citizens who 
remember his valor in frontier combat. Incapable of transgressing frontier norms, 
Roaring Ralph Stackpole disappears with an air of mythos, as he, like Nathan, becomes a 
folk legend and is rumored to have turned into an alligator (Nick, 348).   
The vanishing of Nick of the Woods’s grotesque heroes could potentially point to 
the purification of the nascent community. In light of the purging of the Native 
American threat, Ralph and Nathan’s disappearance might seem to signify the 
culmination of the restoration of law and order, and, moreover, the cure of the Indian 
as a corporeal and psychological threat; however, the conditions that set their voluntary 
exile in motion makes this closure problematic.  
While it may seem that these characters’ bizarre ways have rendered them 
incompatible to the developing system of government, and thus leave them with no 
recourse but to light out for the territory a la Cooper’s hero, Natty Bumppo, at the end 
of The Pioneers,211 the resolution of Bird’s novel suggests that Nathan and Ralph’s 
“barbarities” remain alive within a “civilized state.” Far from rejecting these men’s 
violence or pushing it under the rug, the populace within the newly civilized state have 
                                                          
211 Or, for that matter, the way in which Mark Twain’s famous social outcast, Huck Finn, rejects being 
“sivilized” at the end of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.  
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reasserted their love of violence in a space of relative safety and express their 
lawlessness through the means of law. The lawless fancies these fringe characters 
embodied, in other words, are not cured, contained or outmoded, by civilization, but 
they are instead given new life within an emerging legal and popular culture that 
resembles the contemporary culture Robert Montgomery Bird satirized in his madhouse 
stories. In the following chapter, I will examine how Oliver Wendell Holmes turns to 
medical and theological concepts to exorcise a similar form of “barbarism” within New 
England’s theological traditions.  
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Chapter Three: “A Grave Scientific Doctrine”:  Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Medicated 
Romance of Destiny 
First serialized in The Atlantic Monthly as The Professor’s Story from December of 
1859 to April of 1861, the month in which the first shots were fired at Fort Sumter, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.’s Elsie Venner: A Romance of Destiny turns to theological and 
medical discourses about insanity to reform and revitalize New England’s cultural 
traditions and make a plea for universal compassion.212   
At the center of Holmes’s novel is the mysterious case of Elsie, an eighteen-year-
old schoolgirl whose strange, snake-like traits titillate, mesmerize, and repel the 
inhabitants of the sleepy village of Rockland.213 At the summer ball, the Dionysian “dark 
girl” with “flame in her cheeks and fire in her eyes…vigorous tints and emphatic 
outlines” (EV V.1 134), wears bizarrely patterned dresses and plays with a necklace that 
hides a serpent-shaped birthmark. Violating norms of paternal discipline, she slithers 
                                                          
212 Oliver Wendell Holmes. Elsie Venner, A Romance of Destiny (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1861). 
Subsequent citations will appear as EV. 
213 The novel’s first description of Elsie is threaded through with consonance that links the snakelike 
features, behaviors, and adornments with the poetic feeling she incites: “She was tall and slender, but 
rounded, with a peculiar undulation of movement…. She was a splendid scowling beauty, black-browed, 
with a flash of white teeth which was always like a surprise when her lips parted. She wore a checkered 
dress, of a curious pattern, and a camel’s-hair scarf twisted a little fantastically about her. She went to her 
seat, which she had moved a short distance apart from the rest, and, sitting down, began playing listlessly 
with her gold chain, as was a common habit with her, coiling it and uncoiling it about her slender wrist, 
and braiding it in with her long, delicate fingers. Presently she looked up. Black, piercing eyes, not 
large…black hair, twisted in heavy braids,—a face that one could not help looking at for its beauty, yet 
that one wanted to look away from for something in its expression, and could not for those diamond 
eyes” (EV V.1 103). 
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out her window and disappears for days on end, returning with flowers and birds’ nests 
from the treacherous and rattlesnake-infested (and always capitalized) “Mountain” that 
looms over the region. Her diamond eyes have the uncanny ability to charm snakes and 
women away from her desired suitor, Bernard Langdon, a destitute medical student 
from Boston who takes up a position as a schoolteacher in a village steeped in 
theological controversy.  
While it eventually becomes clear that Elsie’s anomalous behavior originates in a 
fatal rattlesnake bite that struck her mother before she was born,214 the majority of 
Holmes’s novel concerns the mindset of a community that finds itself attracted and 
repelled by her high-born beauty and atavistic tendencies.215 Incredibly lonely, almost 
mute, and accompanied only by her African-American maid, Sophy, a manumitted 
descendant of cannibals, and her “savage,” half-South American cousin, Dick, this 
“apparition of wild beauty” is read through the lens of fears about feminine desire and 
discipline, racial purity, and original sin.  
Unable to understand, much less control, Elsie’s “anomalous,” “lawless,” and 
“ungovernable” behavior, many of Rockland’s denizens believe that this “crazy girl” 
                                                          
214 As Holmes’s narrator puts it, this fatal bite took place in the year “184_.” This likely positions the 
setting of the novel somewhere in the late 1850’s. 
215 She is “superb in vigorous womanhood, with a beauty such as never comes but after generations of 
culture,” but also “as full of dangerous life as ever lay under the slender flanks and clean-shaped limbs of 
a panther” (EV 2:203; 2:38). 
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ought to be sent to an asylum (EV V.1 240).216 But instead of institutionalizing her, Elsie’s 
wise physician, Dr. Kittredge, tells everyone to “bear with her, and let her have her way 
as much as they could, but watch her, as far as possible, without making her suspicious 
of them” (EV V.1 185). By suspending the practical means for Elsie’s removal, and 
putting pressure on the community’s professionals to discipline themselves to conform 
to Elsie’s icy gaze, Elsie Venner forces Rockland’s doctors, theologians, and teachers, as 
well as the novel’s readers, to   
test the doctrine of ‘original sin’ and human responsibility for the disordered 
volition coming under that technical denomination. Was Elsie Venner, poisoned 
by the venom of a crotalus before she was born, morally responsible for the 
‘volitional’ aberrations, which translated into acts become what as sin, and it 
may be, what is punished as crime?  
Urging readers to read Elsie’s prenatal disorder through the lens of emerging theories of 
moral insanity, Holmes teases out a parallel between her prenatal disease and human 
responsibility for Adamic sin.217 
                                                          
216 “Her temper was singular, her tastes were anomalous, her habits were lawless, her antipathies were 
many and intense, and she was liable to explosions of ungovernable anger” (EV V.1 240) 
217 “If, on presentation of the evidence, she becomes by the verdict of the human conscience a proper 
object of divine pity and not of divine wrath, as a subject of moral poisoning, wherein lies the difference 
between her position at the bar of judgment, human or divine, and that of the unfortunate victim who 
received a moral poison from a remote ancestor before he drew his first breath?” Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
“Second Preface,” Elsie Venner; A Romance of Destiny (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1894), Ix-x. 
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In this chapter, I explore how Holmes turns a medically-informed eye upon the 
community of professionals who speculate about Elsie and advances an argument for 
recognizing the broader implications of contemporary theories of insanity and moral 
responsibility. Drawing from theories, including phrenology and heredity, which 
postulated that physiology helped dictate moral capacities and responsibilities, Holmes 
positions Elsie and her savage cousin’s moral constitutions within a continuum of 
physiological determinism which encompasses her observers as well. By doing so, Elsie 
Venner explicates links between socio-biological qualities of individuals, moral 
capacities, and sympathies in ways that call into question the limits of moral judgment.  
Recognizing that Western culture had turned away from treating the lunatic as a 
figure of demonic possession, Holmes makes compassion for Elsie a starting point for 
displacing the judgment of sin with management of disease: “Treat bad men exactly as if 
they were insane” (EV V.1 283). By doing so, Holmes’s novel unfolds a logic for 
reconstituting a vision of American society and divinity along revised notions of 
sympathy, compassion, and non-violence.   
Due to its physiological analysis of New England culture, Elsie Venner has been 
recognized as an early precursor to American literary realism. In particular, Cynthia 
Davis and Jane Thrailkill have drawn attention to the novel’s “clinical” and “statistical” 
portrayal of human identity as a radical departure from traditional practices of 
sentimental representation. However, as Davis notes, when Elsie faces death, Holmes’s 
145 
 
narrative returns to sentimental conventions with a vengeance—a dramatic shift which 
leads her to read the novel as a “confused” blend of “residual” and “emergent” 
modes.218  By putting the theological argument Holmes centers in his novel into closer 
conversation with the era’s discourses of mental health, I examine how the underlying 
thread of biological determinism that motivates Holmes’s call to revise the doctrine of 
original sin lays the groundwork for reinstating exclusionary practices under the banner 
of medical compassion. 
Elsie Venner’s provincial setting and non-violent message may initially seem 
unrelated to the spectacular frontier violence of Nick of The Woods and Edgar Huntly. In 
fact, when we are introduced to the sleepy mountain town of Rockland, we are shown 
that even the memory of the Native American seems to be fading away as 
demonstrated by the fact that the town is in the process of relabeling the indigenous 
names of local landmarks with Anglicized terms. But while Rockland’s settlers 
vanquished the “‘screeching Indian Divell,’ [sic] as our fathers called him,” they remain 
captivated by the symbolic system that turned the Native into a powerful avatar of evil. 
The region’s serpents, which were often metonymically linked with both the Native and 
Satan, remain alive and well as the village’s “reigning nightmare.” While it had been 
“easy enough, after a time, to drive away the savages,” the serpents survived the 
                                                          
218 Cynthia Davis, Bodily and Narrative Forms: The Influence of Medicine on American Literature, 1845-
1915 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 16. Jane Thrailkill, Affecting Fictions: Mind, Body, and 
Emotion in American Literary Realism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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exterminatory “great snake hunts” by always slipping out of the hunters’ sight and 
reach.  
This irresolvable fear, rooted as much in theological myth as instinctive self-
protection, continues to fuel the community’s internal conflicts. In an anecdote from 
Rockland’s history that takes a page from John Winthrop’s History of New England, the 
professor relates how a snake’s appearance and sudden death in the chapel of a 
controversial Reverend confirmed the opinions of people on all sides of the debate.219 
This obsession not only contributes to social division, it also distracts Rockland’s citizens 
from actual dangers: Crystalline Lake, the “smiling pond,” which now replaces the 
Native American-named Quinnepeg Pond, has drowned more young maidens than the 
serpents have ever claimed (EV V.1 63-67).  
Elsie’s serpentine characteristics, in other words, confront Rockland’s citizens, as 
well as the novel’s readers, with the dangerous implications of a postlapsarian 
hermeneutics that warrants quests to find and destroy evil.  While much of Elsie Venner 
seems to be hermetically sealed off from concerns outside of New England, I consider at 
the end of this chapter how Holmes’s linkage of territorial, biological, and psychological 
boundaries and medical authority speak to emerging national hostilities.  
                                                          
219 Holmes mentions the Winthrop anecdote in “The Medical Profession in Massachusetts.” Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, “The Medical Profession in Massachusetts.” Medical Essays 1842-1882 (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 312-370), 356. 
147 
 
A Post-Postlapsarian Romance 
Oliver Wendell Holmes recollected that his psychological development was 
profoundly influenced by John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, a text he would refer to time 
and again as an exemplary exponent of the Calvinist doctrine of his ancestors and many 
of his contemporaries. While he considered Bunyan’s tale a “work of genius” that 
“captivates all persons of active imagination,” he resented its portrayal of “the universe 
as a trap which catches most of the human vermin that have its bait dangled before 
them, and the only wonder is that a few escape the elaborate arrangement made for 
their capture.” To Holmes, the sadistic God of this “wonderful work of the imagination, 
with all its beauty in power” seemed more like Satan and its pious hero, Christian, 
seemed a like a madman.220 These inversions of the deific and the diabolic,221 the sane 
and the mad, left an indelible stain on the moral constitutions of his contemporaries and 
                                                          
220 Holmes breaks down his diagnosis of Bunyan’s hero “Christian” thus: “Suppose a person to have 
become so excited by religious stimulants that he is subject to what are known to the records of insanity 
as hallucinations: that he hears voices whispering blasphemy in his ears, and sees devils coming to meet 
him, and thinks he is going to be torn in pieces, or trodden into the mire. Suppose that his mental 
conflicts, after plunging him into the depths of despondency, at last reduce him to a state of despair, so 
that he now contemplates taking his own life, and debates with himself whether it shall be by knife, 
halter, or poison, and after much questioning is apparently making up his mind to commit suicide. Is not 
this a manifest case of insanity, in the form known as melancholia? Would not any prudent physician keep 
such a person under the eye of constant watchers, as in a dangerous state of, at least, partial mental 
alienation? Yet this is an exact transcript of the mental condition of Christian in ‘Pilgrim’s Progress,’ and its 
counterpart has been found in thousands of wretched lives terminated by the act of self-destruction, 
which came so near taking place in the hero of the allegory.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Pulpit and the 
Pew.” Pages From an Old Volume of Life (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891), 416-417. 
221 Holmes argued that the events of Progress seemed more like “the hunting of sinners with a pack of 
demons for the amusement of the Lord of the terrestrial manor than like the tender care of a father of his 
offspring.” John Terry Morse, Life and Letters of Oliver Wendell Holmes (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1896), V.1 47. 
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himself: “No child can overcome these early impressions without doing violence to the 
whole mental and moral machinery of his being.”222  
Holmes’s fascination with Pilgrim’s Progress’s ability to “captivate” and, 
effectively, hardwire New Englanders with a fear of innumerable worldly traps is a 
testament to the persuasive power of homilectic pedagogy, which, as Gregory Jackson 
argues, enabled “the possibility for accruing knowledge through simulated - rather than 
actual - experience” and encouraged “active readerly or performative engagement.” In a 
way that may remind us of the process of empathy segueing into disgust in Robert 
Montgomery Bird’s postlapsarian wilderness, homilectic pedagogy evoked emotions 
that were “so overwhelming that the body registered them as involuntary physiological 
responses” that would ideally “open the mind to new awareness, preparing it for 
spiritual transformation.”223 At key moments, Holmes’s “physiological romance” brings 
readers into contact with a system which is no less divine or all-encompassing; however, 
when he does so, he encourages readers to take a less fearful attitude toward human 
agency and worldly observation.224 
In composing Elsie Venner, Holmes shamelessly borrowed tropes and themes 
                                                          
222 Though “he may conquer them in after years,” the “wretches and strains which this victory has cost 
him leave him a cripple as compared with a child trained in sound and reasonable beliefs.” Morse, V.1 48; 
39-40. Years later, writing to Stowe, Holmes argues that though their entire generation will be unable to 
fully overcome the Calvinist teachings which constitute them; however future generations may be able to 
do so. 
223 Gregory Jackson, The Word and its Witness: The Spiritualization of American Realism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009), 69. 
224 Holmes, “Second Preface.” Xii. 
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from Nathaniel Hawthorne, who notoriously mocked the Calvinist obsession with 
rooting out sin; but Hawthorne’s critiques of this obsession frequently reified the 
persistence of Adamic sin in the human heart and its inextricable relationship with 
human constructions.225  As his post-apocalyptic tale “The New Adam and Eve” begins: 
“We, who are born into the world’s artificial system, can never adequately know how 
little in our present state and circumstances is natural, and how much is merely the 
interpolation of the perverted mind and heart of man.” In spite of this subjective 
entrapment in artificial and perverted structures, Hawthorne poses aesthetics as a 
mechanism for enabling the imagination to escape the confines of the body and reflect 
upon the symptoms of original sin: “It is only through the medium of the imagination 
that we can loosen those iron fetters, which we call truth and reality, and make 
ourselves even partially sensible what prisoners we are.”226 
A significant medium for this sense of transport and escape, for Hawthorne, lay 
in poetic ambiguity. Responding to his decision to leave unresolved the mystery of the 
title figure at the center of his Marble Faun (1860), who may be the incarnation of a 
man-animal-marble statue, Hawthorne explains that excitement, poetry, fancy, and 
                                                          
225 Hawthorne’s “Earth’s Holocaust,” for example, features large a group of reformers who attempt to 
throw everything that bears the stain of imperfection into a great conflagration. However, by the end of 
the narrative, it is clear that the human heart, and hence, all humanity, would be destroyed in the 
process. Nathaniel Hawthorne, “Earth’s Holocaust.” Mosses from an Old Manse (Boston: Ticknor and 
Fields, 1863), 163-190. 
226 Nathaniel Hawthorne, “The New Adam and Eve.” Mosses from an Old Manse (Boston: Ticknor and 
Fields, 1863), 5-29. 
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beauty emerge through an aesthetic that is free from the “iron fetters” of scientific 
discourses of classification:  
The idea of the modern Faun…loses all the poetry and beauty which the author 
fancied into it, and becomes nothing more than a grotesque absurdity, if we 
bring it into the actual light of day. He had hoped to mystify this anomalous 
creature between the Real and the Fantastic, in such a manner that the reader’s 
sympathies might be excited to a certain pleasurable degree, without impelling 
him to ask how Cuvier would have classified poor Donatello.227  
By suggesting that the affective and imaginary components of his aesthetic emerges 
through an interruption of the worldly effort of scientific classification, Hawthorne 
poses the grotesque as an aesthetic that shuts down feelings of aesthetic transport, 
bringing us back to the snares of a world. He also implicitly acknowledges that romance 
quickly turns grotesque when these lights are turned on.228 
                                                          
227 Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Marble Faun; or, the Romance of Monte Beni (Boston: James R. Osgood and 
Company, 1876), V.2 284. 
228 Acting in the capacity of a physician-confidante, Holmes treated Hawthorne, and upon his death, he 
aimed to share Hawthorne’s fear of going insane. Hawthorne’s wife, Sophia, prevented him from 
publishing these lines. Peter Gibian, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Culture of Conversation (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 290). It has also been speculated that Holmes’s visit to Herman 
Melville at Arrowhead, purportedly to examine Melville’s sciatica, may have been a mental health check-
up prompted by Melville’s wife (Gibian, 304). Though it is perhaps impossible to determine whether 
Holmes was an inspiration for Hiram Scribe, the interloper in “I and My Chimney” who collaborates with 
the obsessive narrator’s wife to deconstruct the gigantic chimney that captivates the narrator’s 
imagination, Holmes’s constant argument that theological logics ossify and break down with the passing 
of time and need to be reconstructed to the needs of the day seems to suggest that the narrator, if not 
Melville himself, offers a paranoiac counterpoint to Holmes’s pragmatism. 
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Similar to the “fairy-land, where the Actual and Imaginary may meet, and each 
imbue itself with the nature of the other,”229 which Hawthorne uses to describe his 
aesthetic in The Scarlet Letter, Elsie’s case seems to belong “to that middle region 
between science and poetry which sensible men, as they are called, are very shy of 
meddling with” (EV V.1 274).  Holmes’s narrator insists that viewing Elsie in purely 
romantic terms fails to account for her true nature. Observing Elsie’s collection of items 
from the forbidden Mountain, including nests and eggs of rare birds and “quaint 
monstrosities of vegetable growth,” he acknowledges that she “had her tastes and 
fancies like any naturalist or poet.” But then the narrator suggests that to read Elsie 
without scientific understanding is to disregard her otherness:  
Nature, when left to her own freaks in the forest, is grotesque and fanciful to 
the verge of license, and beyond it. The foliage of trees does not always require 
clipping to make it look like an image of life…. There is a perpetual reminiscence 
of animal life in her rude caricatures, which sometimes actually reach the point 
of imitating a complete human figure, as in that extraordinary specimen which 
nobody will believe to be genuine, except the men of science, and of which the 
discreet reader may have a glimpse by application in the proper quarter. (EV V.2 
45) 
                                                          
229 Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, a Romance (Boston: Ticknor, Reed, and Fields, 1850), 40. 
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In order to understand Elsie, in other words, it is necessary to meddle with and 
reconsider the relationship between science and poetry. Moreover, as we shall see, 
humans who don’t interrogate their relationship with nature will misunderstand Elsie as 
well as themselves.  In scenes which turn on the scientific “lights” which Hawthorne 
dims, Holmes exposes relationships among cultural artifice, human instinct, and nature.   
         Mid-way through describing a debutante party held at the home of Rockland’s 
Colonel Sprowle, Holmes’s professor turns to the reader—a hypothetical guest—and 
disabuses him or her of the notion that courtship rituals can be taken at face value: 
“Deluded little wretch, male or female, in town or country, how little you know the 
nature of the ceremony in which you are to bear the part of victim” (EV V.1 122). 
Elaborating upon this “ceremony,” Holmes likens the dance hall to “the burning room” 
of the ancien régime’s halls of judgment and a savage encampments, where nothing but 
“strict justice” will be applied to the “White Captive” under evaluation.230 “Why have 
they hung a chandelier above you, flickering all over with flames, so that it searches you 
like the noonday sun, and your deepest dimple cannot hold a shade? To give brilliancy 
to the gay scene, no doubt!—No, my dear! Society is inspecting you, and it finds 
undisguised surfaces and strong lights a convenience in the process.” The scrutinizing 
                                                          
230 Knowledgeable of the literature and medical practice of Fancois Rabelais, whom he cited in his medical 
works, Holmes may have known that the author escaped France in fear of the tribunal which had earned 
this dubious denomination during the publication of Pantagruel, one of the major contributions to 
grotesque literary form. Annie Lemp Konta, The History of French Literature from the Oath of Strasburg to 
Chantieler (New York: D Appleton and Company, 1910), 121. 
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conventions of the ballroom, in fact, mediate a universal biological imperative that 
entails a form of duty: “You have got to learn that the ‘struggle for life’ Mr. Charles 
Darwin talks about reaches to vertebrates clad in crinoline, as well as mollusks in shells, 
or articulates in jointed scales, or anything that fights for breathing-room and food and 
love in any coat of fur or feather” (EV V.1 122-123, Holmes’s italics). 
Referring to the recently-published On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural 
Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859), Holmes 
portrays social convention as an expression of humanity’s condition as an evolutionary 
creature.231 As Jane Thrailkill points out, Holmes’s depiction of this scene draws 
attention to the agency invested in the ritual’s “design” and therefore gives evidence to 
society’s contact with and mediation of instinct.232 In this way, Holmes anticipates 
neuroscientific philosopher Daniel Dennet’s claim that the web of discourses which 
constitute selfhood are inherent in humanity’s biological makeup; without them, “an 
individual human being is as incomplete as a bird without feathers, a turtle without its 
shell.”233   
                                                          
231 Since the beginning of Elsie Venner’s publication cycle as The Professor’s Story followed this event by a 
matter of months, Holmes’s reference to Darwin make Elsie Venner one of the first, if not the very first, 
pieces of American literature specifically to invoke Darwin’s theory of natural selection. It is likely that 
Holmes was acquainted with the substance of Darwin’s arguments a year or two earlier, however, for his 
colleague at Harvard, Asa Gray, received an abstract of Origins from Darwin two years before its 
publication, and Gray conversed with Darwin about its significance. Charles Darwin, On Evolution. Ed. 
Thomas F. Glick and David Kohn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996), 152. 
232 Thrailkill, 72. 
233 Daniel C. Dennet, Consciousness Explained (New York: Back Bay Books, 1991), 416. 
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The analogy of the dance hall to a barbarous ritual, then, points to technologies 
that shelter humanity from its own animalism and implicitly distance civilization from 
“savage” and premodern culture. The contrast between the elegant ballroom and the 
ancien régime tribunal or barbarous ceremony suggests that human progress can be 
measured by the beauty of its illusions.  
But in closing this episode by interjecting “Thank Heaven” that “no young girl 
ever did, or ever will” have such reflections, Holmes’s narrator turns the screw once 
more (EV V. 123). By shifting from a second person address—which puts the reader in 
the position of recognizing his or her potential position as a “deluded wretch”— back to 
third person description, Holmes poses the reader-writer relationship as a site for 
sharing secret, sacred knowledge. This invitation encourages the reader to inhabit a 
position from which one can observe and affirm the sacred value of the mystification 
process which unifies nature and culture.234 Though it implies a hierarchical relationship 
between the person who recognizes the value of illusion and the person who lives 
within it, it poses the reader as both a product and observer of nature.  
Elsie steps into the ballroom a moment later as Bernard is dancing with one of 
                                                          
234 By drawing attention to a certain need for illusion, particularly as it pertains to the case of this young 
woman, Holmes’s professor projects an role for the physician-as-demystifier that anticipates the advice 
that Dr. Mandelet shares with Edna Pontellier of Kate Chopin’s The Awakening: “[Y]outh is given up to 
illusions. It seems to be a provision of Nature; a decoy to secure mothers for the race. And Nature takes 
no account of moral consequences, of arbitrary conditions which we create, and which we feel obliged to 
maintain at any cost.” Kate Chopin, The Awakening (Chicago: Herbert S. Stone & Company, 1899), 291-
292. 
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his beautiful pupils. While he initially is “bewitched” by the “revelation” of his dancing 
partner’s beauty, Elsie’s piercing gaze “disenchants the air.” By thus propelling the 
young woman away from Bernard, Elsie effectively strips away culture’s encoding 
protocols. She frightens not because she is evil, but rather because she disturbs the 
smooth functioning of the cultivated systems of tradition and confronts everyone on the 
level of instinct—providing an uncomfortable reminder that everyone in Rockland is an 
animal (EV V.1 136). 
In light of this dinner party scene, Holmes suggests that peering at the 
relationship between the artificial and the natural is not to be feared, but rather 
regarded as an ethical obligation. Holmes argued that Jonathan Edwards’s “barbaric, 
mechanical, materialistic, pessimistic” system was a reflection of a pre-American 
imaginary that placed moral and legal authority in a noumenal realm outside of citizens’ 
understanding.235 In a “free” society, where the people who make the laws are also 
subjects of the law, it was necessary to understand and tend the instincts that mediate 
human relationships.  By cultivating this administrative gaze, he implies a necessity for 
recognizing how civilization enables biological imperatives, and the need for an elite to 
                                                          
235 “If [Edwards] had lived a hundred years later, and breathed the air of freedom, he could not have 
written with such old-world barbarism as we find in his volcanic sermons,” Holmes speculated.  Quoting 
Montesquieu, Holmes adds that if the punishments of despots horrify humanity, it is because they take on 
an authority that is above the laws that they wage, but “It is not so in republics, wherein the laws are 
always mild, because he who makes them is himself a subject.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Jonathan 
Edwards,” Pages from an Old Volume of Life (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1895), 395. 
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tend these pivotal functions.    
 
Automatic Action in the Moral World 
Holmes’s attention to the links between human institutions and natural forces 
appeals to a tradition of rhetoric that presented republican America as a “natural” and 
implicitly “egalitarian” system; however, it also reinforces the need for expert 
knowledge.236  This was in keeping with his hierarchical understanding of society and 
protracted interest in critiquing the professions of law, medicine, and religion. As 
George Frederickson argues, Unionist intellectuals of the North such as Holmes put “a 
greater stress on the value of institutions, and in some instances, for the 
acknowledgment of an intellectual elite which would provide conservative leadership in 
thought and opinion by being in some way ‘established,’ like the clergy of the past.”237  
Elsie Venner introduces the standard bearers of Boston’s professional culture, 
                                                          
236 Joan Burbick, Healing the Republic: The Language of Health and the Culture of Nationalism in 
Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2-3. Differentiating America’s 
from European order, Holmes stated in The Professor at the Breakfast-Table, “The old-world order of 
things is an arrangement of locks and canals, where everything depends on keeping the gates shut, and so 
holding the upper waters at their level, the system under which the young republican American is born 
trusts the whole unimpeded tide of life to the great elemental influences, as the vast rivers of the 
continent settle their own level in obedience to the laws that govern the planet and the spheres that 
surround it.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Professor at the Breakfast-Table (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1892), 295. 
237 George Frederickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1965), 23. Quoted by John Evelev, “Picturesque Reform in the New England Village 
Novel, 1845-1867.” ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance. V.53 No. 2 (2007), 160. 
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“The Brahmin Caste of New England,” in terms that merge the sacred, the hierarchical, 
and the physiological.  This caste, which is the origin of the colloquial term “Boston 
Brahmin,” is also inherently American. Affirming that “there is nothing in New England 
corresponding to the feudal aristocracies of the Old World,” which are formed by titles 
designated by old feudal leaders and systems of privilege, the professor who narrates 
Elsie Venner tells us that this “harmless, inoffensive, untitled aristocracy” has emerged 
without coercion. Rather, these “races of scholars,” such as the famous theological 
family lines of the “Edwardses, Chaunceys, and Ellerys,” have naturally inherited a bodily 
“organization and physiognomy” that gives them an intellectual tendency. Not to 
recognize these features, the professor states, would be “mere stupidity” and an insult 
to the “goodwill and intelligence of his readers” (EV V.1 13-17).  
These men of privileged stock have animal instincts that let them take to books 
“as a pointer or setter to field-work.”238  While there are miraculous cases where a 
farmer’s son might join the scholarly culture, these exceptions prove the rule about 
heredity: when “a series of felicitous crosses develops an improved strain of blood, and 
reaches its maximum perfection,” a scholar “from an unworn stock” can be gifted by 
“Nature’s grace.” This anomalous felicity is “nature’s republicanism;” “thank God for it, 
but do not let it make you illogical” (EV V.1 16-19).  
                                                          
238 Using a horticultural metaphor, the professor states that the Brahmin “come chiefly from a privileged 
order, just as the best fruits come from well-known grafts” (EV V.1 16). 
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Though this portrait of New England’s professional culture is undoubtedly 
chauvinistic, its emphasis upon physiognomy and heredity also foregrounds the novel’s 
discussion of Elsie’s condition by placing her within a continuum of identities organized 
by forces beyond individual control. Elsie Venner affirms the values and mental 
propensities of this dominant culture while examining blind spots that emerge in a 
world of contingent identities. 
By presenting Elsie’s condition a matter of “moral poisoning”—as a disorder 
which produces a deranged state of moral functioning—Holmes asks us to read Elsie’s 
malady using theories of moral insanity that were frequently linked with racial and 
hereditary discourses during the 1840s and ‘50s.239 Theorists of moral insanity, such as 
Isaac Ray and Amariah Brigham, two of the foremost figures in American medical 
jurisprudence and asylum management, did not adhere religiously to many of 
phrenology’s conclusions, but they nonetheless believed that it demonstrated 
correspondences among the brain, body, and mind in ways which meant that some 
subjects had innate propensities to deviate from the law—and thus deserved mitigated 
                                                          
239 Though as I briefly described earlier in this inquiry, the understanding of moral insanity was always 
contested, the starting point for many mid-nineteenth century physicians was J.C. Pritchard’s definition of 
moral insanity as a “morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits, 
moral dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or defect of the intellect or 
knowing and reasoning faculties, and particularly without any insane illusion or hallucination.” Unlike the 
kind of clear case that could be made for madness due to, say, a blow on the head, moral insanity could 
conceivably occur without a clear injury, through either strong emotions aroused by a strange event, or 
properties within one’s mental organization.  For example, Elsie Venner is described as an intelligent 
student, but she is also prone to violent impulses.  Hanna Franziska Augstein, “J. C. Prichard’s Concept of 
Moral Insanity—a Medical Theory of the Corruption of Human Nature,” Medical History 40 (1996). 
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sentences in the court or mental health treatment rather than criminal punishment. 
Moreover, they believed that phrenology was taking the scope of mental inquiry in the 
right direction by making physical, rather than metaphysical, paths of inquiry.240 Such 
theories also potentially pointed the way toward focusing on educational strategies for 
mental development. Because patterns in behavior could be tracked across generations, 
heredity became an increasingly important factor in moral insanity’s theorization.241   
In several extended conversations in Elsie Venner, Holmes’s professor and Dr. 
Kittredge advance the argument that “the great doctrine of moral insanity” has “done 
more to make men charitable than any one doctrine that I can think of since the 
message of peace and good-will to men” (EV V.1 281).  Moral insanity “melted the 
world’s conscience in its crucible, and cast it in a new mould, with features less like 
those of Moloch and more like those of humanity.” This evolution in charity was a 
consequence of its ability to link the “the limits of human responsibility” with “fixed 
relations between [the body/brain’s physiological] organization and mind and 
character” (EV V.1 281). 
                                                          
240 Imparting no small sense of science’s triumph over faith, Roger Cooter argues that the main 
disciplinary contribution of phrenology was to shift the domain of mental health study away from religion: 
“with the mind reposing in the brain, sin was displaced from its religious stronghold in the soul and given 
an entirely biological secular dimension,” and thus liberated the brain from “institutions of power that 
depended upon blind faith, superstition, and spontaneous irrational behavior.” Cooter, Roger. The 
Cultural Meaning of Popular Science: Phrenology and the Organization of Consent in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 111. 
241 Grob, Gerald. “Psychiatry’s Holy Grail: The Search for the Mechanisms of Mental Diseases.” Bulletin of 
the History of Medicine. 72.2 (1998). 
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Kittredge advances the idea that physicians have superseded religion in 
advancing charitable belief because religious doctrine puts too much stock in the ability 
to divine the moral nature of others; while “ministers talk about the human will as if it 
stood on a high look-out, with plenty of light, and elbow-room reaching to the horizon,” 
doctors “are constantly noticing how it is tied up and darkened by inferior organization, 
by disease and all sorts of crowding interferences, until they get to look upon Hottentots 
and Indians—and a good many of their own race—as a kind of self-conscious blood-
clocks with very limited power of self-determination” (EV V.2 114). These conversations 
also register concerns about the limited understanding white men have about their own 
freedom. “We feel that we can practically do this or that, and if we choose the wrong, 
we know we are responsible; but observation teaches us that this or that other race or 
individual has not the same practical freedom of choice” (EV V.2 108). 
Unsurprisingly, these views were being forcefully challenged, and, eventually, 
undermined by theorists of mind who saw the theory of moral insanity as a threat to 
law, order, and faith. The most prominent opponent to these theories was Dr. John P. 
Gray, the asylum director at Utica who achieved control over the publication organ of 
the American Association of Asylum Superintendents, The American Journal of Insanity. 
Throughout his career, he railed against phrenology and heredity, and preferred to 
consign all insanity pleas which were not based upon a concrete disease of the brain to 
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oblivion.242 For Gray, the rigidity of the mind/body duality needed to be maintained at 
all costs, for it provided the basis for distinguishing between moral choices for which a 
subject could be responsible and maladies that exculpated the will.243 Insanity, Gray 
argued, “is simply a bodily disease in which the mind is disturbed more or less 
profoundly, because the brain is involved in the sickness…. The mind is not, in itself, ever 
diseased. It is incapable of disease.”244 These concerns about medicine overreaching 
into a domain beyond disease were also a matter of maintaining traditional divisions 
between religious and social institutions.245 
Gray believed that moral insanity also threatened the credibility of the medical 
profession by making the distinction between sanity and insanity dependent upon 
                                                          
242 The byzantine nature of the debates within the AAAS is perhaps best described in Ruth B Caplan, 
Psychiatry and the Community in Nineteenth-Century America: The Recurring Concern with the 
Environment in the Prevention and Treatment of Mental Illness (New York: Basic Books, 1969). 
243 Dr. Henry Maudsley described the congenital theory of moral insanity thus: “To those who take the 
metaphysical view of mind, it will no doubt seem improbable that absence of moral sense should ever be 
a congenital fault of moral organization; but it may be witnessed even in young children, who, long before 
they have known what vice meant, have evinced an entire absence of moral feeling, with the active 
display of all sorts of immoral tendencies, a genuine moral imbecility or insanity. As there are persons 
who cannot distinguish certain colors, having what is called color-blindness, so there are some who are 
congenitally deprived of moral sense.” Samuel B. Worcester, Insanity and its Treatment (London: 
Homeopathic Publishers, 1882), 419. 
244Quoted in Nicole Rafter, The Criminal Brain: Understanding Biological Theories of Crime (New York: 
New York University Press, 2008), 31. 
245 Synthesizing the implications of Gray’s argument, Robert Waldinger writes that “As long as aberrant 
behavior could be defined as a willful departure from particular social norms, then variability of behavior 
among individuals was amenable to control by the church, the school, and the courts.” Moreover, it 
threatened disciplinary systems which predicated upon a default setting equal rights, responsibilities, and 
capabilities of reason: “As long as the power of reason guaranteed each person an equal capacity to act 
morally, reason might be the medium through which moralists could exert their leverage.” Robert J. 
Waldinger, “Sleep of Reason: John P. Gray and the Challenge of Moral Insanity,” Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences. 34 no.2 (April 1979), 175. 
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indeterminate variables and arbitrary judgments. Moreover, it invited legal chaos 
because, he felt, it led juries to determine guilt based on sympathy rather than science. 
When a judge instructed that a homicidal-hysterical woman could be deemed insane if 
she were found to be acting upon “insane impulse, produced either by a diseased 
physical condition, or by moral causes operating on a diseased state of her system, 
stinging her to madness and for a time displacing reason from its seat,” Gray disparaged 
these instructions as “an invitation to the jury to gratify their own ‘impulses’ in a verdict 
of acquittal.”246  
Whereas Gray believed that such theories of insanity would lead to arbitrary 
judgments, Holmes argued that the reality was precisely the opposite. In essays such as 
“Crime and Automatism,”247 and “Mechanism and Thought in Morals,”248 which 
expanded on the professor’s speeches on “automatic action in the moral world,” 
Holmes argued that conventional notions about punishment were based in erroneous 
assumptions about the nature of moral responsibility.  While the legal system makes an 
exception for subjects who meet “technical conditions of the state defined as insanity,” 
Holmes’s writings on criminality argued that the law ought to reconsider criminal 
punishment more broadly in light of the network of physiological and social 
                                                          
246 Carole Haver, The Trials of Laura Fair: Sex, Murder, and Insanity in the Victorian West (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 104 
247 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Crime and Automatism,” Pages from an Old Volume of Life (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1895). Subsequent in-text references will refer to this essay as “Crime.” 
248 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Mechanism and Thought in Morals,” Pages from an Old Volume of Life 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1895). 
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contingencies that led people to behave criminally (“Crime” 322-24).   
The presumption of free will, in Holmes’s view, perpetuated cruelty by holding 
individuals, each with their own physiological makeup, to arbitrary standards 
constructed by “instinct, tradition, and convenience.”  When jurists failed to 
acknowledge the role that physiology and development played in criminal activity, they 
were effectively policing instinct with instinct (“Crime” 324). For Holmes, the 
incarceration and punishment of a “fellow-creature at whose deeds a whole community 
shudders” did not correct behavior so much as it fulfilled a brute instinct to punish.  
It was bad enough that instinct was expressed in lawless desires for justice (such 
as “lynch-law”); it was worse that it was mediated through “the courtroom and even in 
the sanctuary” (“Crime” 323). The tendency to ascribe sin to physical maladies co-opted 
a process whereby an instinct to punish was given a divine sanction. While he 
acknowledged that such feelings were as “natural” as the desire to kill a serpent, and 
sometimes justifiable for the instruction of the populace, he believed that God would 
have more compassion.249  
Furthermore, isolating responsibility within the erring individual failed to 
                                                          
249 Distinguishing human and divine judgment in a letter to Harriet Beecher Stowe, Holmes wrote, “I 
believe much, I dare not say how much, of what we call ‘sin’ has no moral character whatever in the sight 
of the great Judge;” rather, “sin” was a term that either stood in for human judgments about behavior:  
“much of what we call ‘vice’ is not only an object of the profoundest compassion to good men and 
women, but that the tenderest of God’s mercies are in store for many whom the so-called justice of the 
world condemns.” Given the sequence of Stowe and Holmes’s correspondence, this letter likely was 
written in May of 1876. Quoted in Morse, V.2 252. 
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acknowledge the role that cultures and institutions played in fostering criminality. As 
the professor in Elsie Venner states, “Crime and sin” are “the great preserves of two 
organized interests”—religion and law— and by assigning too much responsibility to 
subjects who do ill, they fail to address society’s responsibilities toward individuals. “It is 
so easy to hang a troublesome fellow! It is so much simpler to consign a soul to 
perdition, or say masses, for money, to save it, than to take the blame on ourselves for 
letting it grow up in neglect and run to ruin for want of humanizing influences” (EV. V.1. 
280). However, he also suggests that the factors which shape moral character also limit 
who can be properly treated with “humanizing influences.” In a passage which was 
reprinted in Isaac Ray’s Mental Hygeine (1863), Holmes’s Dr. Kittredge argues that 
Anglo-Americans’ failure to “civilize” the Native American is symptomatic of the 
collective solipsism of a racially and culturally homogeneous (albeit superior) 
professional culture.250 Because “the thinking classes of the highest races,” are 
“conscious of a great degree of liberty of will,” they foolishly believed that they could 
assimilate non-Christians: “in the face of the fact that civilization with all it offers has 
proved a dead failure with the aboriginal races of this country,—on the whole, I say, a 
dead failure,—they talk as if they knew from their own will all about that of a Digger 
Indian!” (EV. V.2 115).251   
                                                          
250 Isaac Ray, Mental Hygeine (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1863), 64. 
251 Holmes made some efforts to alter the homegeneity of the “thinking classes” As the Dean of Harvard 
Medical School, for example, he attempted to admit a woman and three African Americans, including the 
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Holmes’s critique of postlapsarian notions of the inescapability of sin and the 
“crocodile crew that believe in election” became necessary, in part, because moral 
character became increasingly deterministic and differentiated.252 Whereas the doctrine 
of original sin transmitted Adamic guilt as well as responsibility, Holmes speaks of a 
more compassionate, and in his mind, more Christian response to the deterministic 
nature of moral tendencies: “We doctors see so much of families, how the tricks of 
blood keep breaking out, just as much as in character as they do in looks, that we can’t 
help feeling as if a great many people hadn’t a fair chance to be what is called ‘good,’ 
and there isn’t a text in the Bible worth keeping always in mind than that one, ‘Judge 
not, that ye be judged” (EV V.2 116).253  
 Because of the series of impasses that make it difficult to know the line between 
responsibility and “automatism,” much less the moral constitution of the other, the 
professor argues that society ought to “Treat bad men exactly as if they were insane. 
                                                          
author and activist Martin Delany. However, upon being criticized by faculty as well as students who 
threatened “mutiny,” he fell in line with the Harvard community’s wishes. As Peter Gibian writes, his 
positions on race in the university put him at the “progressive vanguard,” but he did not stand up for his 
ideals when “confronted by real-world political pressures”(Gibian, 176). 
252 “In place of the doctrine of predestination, in virtue of which certain individuals were to become or 
remain subjects of wrath, we are discussing organic tendencies, inborn idiosyncracies, which, so far as 
they go, are purely mechanical, and are the best excuse that can be pleaded for a human being, 
exempting him from all moral responsibility when they reach a certain extreme degree, and exculpating 
him just so far as they are uncontrollable, or unenlightened by any moral sense” (“Crime,” 327). 
253 “We hear comparatively little of that ‘original sin’ which made man an ex officio a culprit and a rebel, 
and liable to punishment as such. But we have whole volumes on hereditary instincts of all kinds, 
sometimes in the direction of the worst crimes, and the more of this kind of original sin we find in a man, 
the more we are disposed to excuse his evil deeds” (Ibid.). 
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They are in-sane, out of health, morally” (EV V.2 283 Holmes’s italics). 
A Charitable Virus 
While the medical discussions throughout Elsie Venner provide insight into the 
limited nature of moral responsibility, the most powerful scene of moral—and 
emotional—transformation in Elsie Venner culminates when Reverend Honeywood, the 
novel’s standard-bearer for Calvinism, revises his creed by reading Elsie’s condition 
through the lens of his heart. In the process, he revises a model of thinking which 
frames her behavior as a clue to the universal depravity of the human condition to one 
which accepts the contingencies of human responsibility and sympathies. 
Early in the novel, Honeywood stands out as a good-hearted heir to the “old 
faith of the Puritans.”  A man with the “Edwards blood in him,” he can recite all the 
technicalities of his ancestors’ doctrine and has a “logical basis laid down for the 
Millennium.”  While yoked, as it were, to the bridle of Calvinism, and “bred by a clerical 
father,” Honeywood “exercised his human faculties in the harness of his ancient faith 
with such freedom that the straps of it got so loose they did not interfere with the 
circulation of the warm blood through his system.” This warmed Edwards blood gives 
him a “very warm, open, and exceedingly human disposition” that makes him 
instinctively disposed to innovating upon the Calvinist ethos when he is charged with 
the task of reaffirming the most conservative notions of his doctrine (EV V. 1 84-85, 
Holmes’s emphasis).  
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Because he has tended toward “preaching plain, practical sermons about the 
duties of life, and showing his Christianity in abundant good works among his people,” 
the senior deacon, who plays the role of Holmes’s straw man, tells Honeywood that the 
parishioners need to be reminded of the “great fundamental doctrine of the 
worthlessness of all human efforts and motives” because they “were altogether too 
much pleased with the success of the Temperance Society and the Association for the 
Relief of the Poor.” Taking the deacon’s direction, Honeywood attempts to re-
emphasize his doctrinal authority by updating a “first-rate old sermon on ‘human 
nature.’”  As he does so, his mind is focused on the “logical side-track” of technical 
dogma and attempts to shut out the more humane “highway of common-sense.” He is 
thus following “the chain of reason without fairly perceiving where it would lead him, if 
he carried it into real life” (EV V.2 5-6). 
While Honeywood attempts to separate this logic from the workings of his heart 
and experience, these tracks intersect when he considers his affection for his 
granddaughter, Letty Forrester, who has visited from Boston. “Graceful,” “vivacious,” 
and “unselfish” to everyone, Letty has “life throbbing all over her.”  Reading elements of 
himself in Letty as he sees “his features opening into their pleasantest sunshine,” his 
heart tells him that “there was nothing so very monstrous and unnatural about the 
specimen of congenital perversion he was looking at” (EV V.2 7-8). So he reflexively 
turns his thoughts to Elsie to return to his doctrinal orthodoxy. 
168 
 
Considering how Elsie, the “daughter of one of the first families in the place, a 
very beautiful and noble creature to look at, for whose bringing up nothing had been 
spared,” remains morally intractable seems to confirm that “there were mysteries in 
human nature which pointed to some tremendous perversion of its tendencies,—to 
some profound, radical vice of moral constitution, native or transmitted, as you will 
have it; but positive, at any rate.”  Begging the question, theologically, Honeywood asks, 
“what was this but an instance of the total obliquity and degeneration of the moral 
principle? [A]nd to what could it be owing, but to an innate organic tendency?”  By 
reading his intuitions about Elsie’s “innate organic tendency” through the lens of the 
doctrine of total depravity, Honeywood makes Elsie a conspicuous pillar for his position 
on the universality of Adamic sin (EV V.2 9). 
But when Elsie’s African American caretaker, Sophy, who is a member of 
Honeywood’s congregation, interrupts his speculation to plead for help for Elsie, his 
opinions drastically change. Sophy, who has traveled on foot with more zeal than he 
supposes she would to “save the Union,” provides an exhaustive account of Elsie’s birth, 
childhood, and adolescence, expressing a fear that someone will either “kill her or shut 
her up her whole life” for circumstances that “a’n’t her fault.” Listening to Elsie’s story, 
which is paraphrased so that the reader will learn the “painful” truth about the 
snakebite in due course, in tandem with his observation that Sophy is virtuous in spite of 
the fact that her inner life also escapes his comprehension (EV V.2 12-19), Honeywood 
169 
 
escapes “from his old scholarly abstractions” and takes “the side of humanity 
instinctively” (EV V.2 21-22).254 
Accepting the fact that Elsie is morally diseased rather than sinful, he finds that 
“his theory of ingrained moral obliquity” is invalid: 
If by the visitation of God a person receives any injury which impairs the intellect 
or the moral perceptions, is it not monstrous to judge such a person by our 
common working standards of right and wrong? Certainly, everybody will 
answer, in cases where there is a palpable organic change brought about, as 
when a blow on the head produces insanity. Fools! How long will it be before we 
shall learn that for every wound which betrays itself to the sight by a scar, there 
are a thousand unseen mutilations that cripple, each of them, some one or more 
                                                          
254 Honeywood’s observations about Sophy also demonstrate the way in which Elsie Venner triangulates 
mental dysfunction and racial difference to chart the boundaries of “default” white perception. Sophy’s 
self-effacing demeanor also allows for a non-threatening parallel to Elsie’s mysterious interiority to be 
explored.  She appears like a living fossil: “Black women remain at a stationary age (to the eyes of white 
people, at least) for thirty years. They do not appear to change during this period any more than so many 
Trenton trilobites. Bent up, wrinkled, yellow-eyed, with long upper-lip, projecting jaws, retreating chin, 
still meek features, long arms, large flat hands with uncolored palms and slightly webbed fingers, it was 
impossible not to see in this old creature a hint of the gradations by which life climbs up through the 
lower natures to the highest human developments.” Even though he can analyze her features as a 
specimen of evolutionary history, racial difference makes her interiority inaccessible: “We cannot tell such 
old women’s ages because we do not understand the physiognomy of a race so unlike our own. No doubt 
they see a great deal in each other’s faces that we cannot,--changes of color and expression as real as our 
own, blushes and sudden betrayals of feeling,--just as these two canaries know what their single notes 
and short sentences and full song with this or that variation mean, though it is a mystery to us unplumed 
mortals.” As a precursor to the kind of feeling he will show for Elsie, Honeywood gets his fellow deacons 
to “tolerate” Sophy in the “communion of fellow-sinners,” in spite of the fact that her cannibal lineage 
imparts a “heathen flavor in her Christianity” (EV V.2 11-13). 
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of our highest faculties? (EV V.2 21, my italics) 
Honeywood’s shift in thinking is subtle, yet decisive. If the doctrine of original sin 
presumed the universal presence of a malignant “innate organic tendency,” he now sees 
God directing humanity through an equally inscrutable network of organic variables. The 
potential for invisible mental “mutilations” thus renders the “common working 
standards of right and wrong” contingent. Honeywood finds “monstrosity” in 
universalizing these “working standards” as a reflection of God’s will, for God’s 
operations are beyond the observer’s ken.    
 Revising his sermon entirely, he writes “On the Obligations of an Infinite Creator 
to a Finite Creature” (EV V.2 22). The sermon ultimately takes on elements of Christian 
humanism. As he expresses a new logic that unites theological belief with human 
realities, he, like the professor and Dr. Kittredge, now sees moral and physical illness as 
one and the same: “a man with a crooked spine would never be called to account for 
not walking erect…. If the crook was in his brain, instead of his back, he could not fairly 
be blamed for any natural defect, whatever lawyers or divines might call it” (EV V.2 22). 
However, this perspective is no less deterministic than the one he originally believed: 
if a person inherited a perfect mind, body, and disposition, that person could do 
nothing more than keep the moral law perfectly. But supposing that the Creator 
allows a person to be born with an hereditary or ingrafted organic tendency, and 
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then puts this person into the hands of teachers incompetent or positively bad, 
is not what is called sin or transgression of the law necessarily involved in the 
premises? (EV V.2 23)255 
The truth of Elsie’s condition thus “vaccinates” Honeywood with a “charitable virus” 
that makes him “a true, open-souled Christian of the mildest type” (EV V.2 297).  This is 
the non-judgmental expression of a heart capable of all-encompassing compassion, 
which achieves a universality that, at least theoretically, exceeds racial particularity: “A 
man’s love is the measure of his fitness for good or bad company here or elsewhere. 
Men are tattooed with their special beliefs like so many South-Sea Islanders; but a real 
human heart, with Divine love in it, beats with the same glow under all the patterns of 
all earth’s thousand tribes!” (EV V.2 10). This religiously attuned heart realizes a broader 
extension of the “great breadth of true Christian love and charity”— precisely because it 
extends beyond the limits of his ability to understand Elsie.  
This transformation is key to the novel’s sentimental ethics. Holmes’s affirmation 
of sympathy’s boundaries allows for a recognition of difference in ways that were 
sometimes occluded by sentimental literatures and rhetorics that enabled the virtual 
crossing of boundaries of class, race, and creed at the expense of recognizing sources of 
inequality. Along these lines, Lauren Berlant has argued that one of the failings of 
                                                          
255 As with many cases in Holmes’s writing about moral malignity, he piles on all of the negative influences 
to an extent that produces ambiguity about the relative significance of ingrained and acquired traits. 
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sentimental politics is that “the ideology of true feeling cannot admit the 
nonuniversality of pain.” The consequence of this is a “passive ideal of empathy” that is 
“impersonal and depersonalizing.”256 Whereas Holmes pointed to the failure of the 
“thinking men of the highest classes” who solipsized the wills, desires, and cultures of 
the other, Honeywood’s recognition of Elsie’s difference at least potentially opens up 
the possibility that compassion and tolerance can emerge through the recognition that 
empathy for Elsie is impossible.  
But it also raises a problem. Honeywood’s tolerance provides no clear antidote 
to Elsie’s marginalization. Just as Elsie is not “responsible” for her behavior, her suffering 
is private, irreparable, and outside the domain of his responsibility: “What prayers could 
be agonizing enough, what tenderness could be deep enough…for this poor…blameless 
child of misfortune…struck by such a doom as perhaps no living creature in all the 
sisterhood of humanity shared with her?” (EV V.2. 21). The impossibility of actual 
communion between these souls essentially leads to an acceptance that he can do 
nothing to help her.  In this way, Holmes’s novel expresses the virtue of broad and all-
encompassing tolerance, but this tolerance reinforces the irreducibility of difference.  
 Meanwhile, this theological shift revitalizes the emotional bonds that 
Honeywood does feel. As the penumbra of inherent vice lifts, Honeywood’s love for his 
                                                          
256 Lauren Berlant, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature 70 no.3 (September 1998), 641. 
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broodling, Letty, which is no less based in instinct than Elsie’s behavior, becomes 
justified by his faith that her innocence, beauty, and their mutual “pleasantest 
sunshine” hide no dark secrets. As it inevitably comes to pass, however, both Letty and 
Elsie have affection for Bernard Langdon. In our next section we will explore the 
implications of the ethical bind that emerges from the tension between Holmes’s 
advocacy of a compassionate “universal heart” that extends beyond racial and cultural 
boundaries and Rockland’s revitalized sympathies and communal instincts. 
 
A Compassionate Quarantine 
While Elsie Venner works against a heremenutic that reads human nature 
through sin, and suggests that humans make a grave error when they confuse human 
standards of “right and wrong” with God’s judgment, the basis for this compassionate 
realization is that human instinct sets firm limits to sympathy, reformability, and the 
scope of moral judgment. After Honeywood expresses the feeling of compassion that an 
infinite entity might have for finite creatures, the rest of Elsie Venner deals with the 
tension between this “infinite” compassion and the obligations of finite creatures 
toward one another. In particular, the novel grapples with the problem of what happens 
when a concept of a divine compassion that transcends boundaries runs into conflict 
with the white community’s instinctive, and arguably no less divine, compulsions for 
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survival. 
Elsie Venner presents the underlying physiological basis for Rockland’s 
inhabitants’ adverse reactions to Elsie when Bernard hires a “dark, gipsy looking” 
woman to bring rattlesnakes from the Mountain. She nonchalantly arrives with a bundle 
of perfectly docile serpents in her apron. In spite of the serpents’ “peaceable” 
demeanor, Bernard is seized with a feeling of “antipathy,” which the professor explains 
as a feeling that is not quite fear nor disgust, but which shows “itself in paleness, and 
even faintness,” when one encounters “objects perfectly harmless and not in 
themselves offensive in any sense.” When Bernard calls the gypsy-woman “crazy” for 
being cavalier about carrying fatal snakes, she replies that “rattlers never touches our 
folks. I’d jest ‘z lieves handle them creaturs as so many stripéd snakes” (EV V2. 258). 
These reactions triangulate a racial component to antipathy while expressing how the 
instinct to annihilate arises from biological drives that do not have a moral reference.    
As Holmes’s professor suggests in The Professor at the Breakfast-
Table, antipathy registers unsettling realities about human nature. In a scene where an 
aggressive member of a breakfast-table discussion berates a deformed, harmless, and 
shriveled fellow diner, the professor in turn berates the antagonist. But he also 
recognizes that the man’s prejudice arises from an imperative of racial preservation: this 
animus “has reference to the race, and not to the individual. Infirmity must be kicked 
out, or the stock run down. Wholesale moral arrangements are so different from retail! I 
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understand the instinct, my friend,--it is cosmic,--it is planetary,--it is a conservative 
principle in creation” (16). Whereas the professor can rebuke the aggressive man’s 
morality in the “retail,” the wholesale drive of racial instinct tends toward violent 
impulses. 
The challenge that this antipathy poses to norms of civic inclusion is first 
described when Helen Darley, Elsie’s school teacher, reads Elsie’s descriptive essay 
about The Mountain. Helen, who applies her conscientious zeal to the point of 
exhaustion (and to the benefit of the school’s exploitive owner), becomes horribly 
distraught by the writing in Elsie’s “singular,” “sharp-pointed,” “slender hand.” The 
narrator states that it is unclear whether the problem here originates in something 
inherent in Elsie’s writing or Helen’s overworked psyche, but in any case, Helen has a 
neuralgic reaction that verges upon hysteria. Helen’s conscientiousness furthers her 
anxiety because she feels her labor is responsible for correcting and improving the lives 
of all her students.  
Deferential woman that she is, Helen asks Bernard whether there are limits to 
her capacity as an instructor. Bernard, admitting that he sounds like the professor, 
provides a comforting answer that reifies natural limits to Elsie’s correctability: “No 
doubt there are people born with impulses at every possible angle to the parallels of 
nature.” While people with “slight obliquities” can be corrected through education, 
those who “happen to cut at right angles,” are “beyond the reach of common 
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influences.” While education may be able to assist those with minor perversions, 
“penitentiaries and asylums take care of most of the right angle cases” (EV V1. 99).  
Saved from the maddening anxieties of responsibility by Bernard’s authoritative 
words, Helen feels relief as the limits of her responsibility are contained: “I am glad you 
believe in the force of transmitted tendencies. It would break my heart, if I did not think 
that there are faults beyond the reach of everything but God’s special grace. I should 
die, if I thought that my negligence or incapacity was alone responsible for the errors 
and sins of those I have charge of” (EV V.1. 101).  
As Bernard offers comforting boundaries to Darley’s condition, their eyes 
communicate an intimacy which is to be contrasted with the antipathy which divides 
Elsie from others.  This bond, which is rooted in their shared lineage of downtrodden 
New England intellectuals, is called the “the natural law of elective affinity.”257 By 
describing this feeling as “elective,” the professor effectively reinscribes the Calvinist 
notion of election onto the structures of feeling and exclusionary practices of this 
biologically organized community. Moreover, Bernard the Brahmin’s invocation of the 
                                                          
257 “The meek teacher’s blue eyes met the luminous glance that came with the question. She, too, was of 
gentle blood,—not meaning by that that she was of any noted lineage, but that she came of a cultivated 
stock, never rich, but long trained to intellectual callings. A thousand decencies, amenities, reticences, 
graces, which no one thinks of until he misses them, are the traditional right of those who spring from 
such families. And when two persons of this exceptional breeding meet in the midst of the common 
multitude, they seek each other’s company at once by the natural law of elective affinity. It is wonderful 
how men and women know their peers. If two stranger queens, sole survivors of two shipwrecked vessels, 
were cast, half-naked, on a rock together, each would at once address the other as ‘Our Royal Sister’” (EV 
V.1 100). 
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asylum and prison as sites outside the domain of correction also suggest that the limits 
of the professionals’ efforts, and the systems of exclusion that reach beyond them, feel 
divinely ordained, and their denizens a kind of preterite class. The ethnopsychological 
boundaries marked by feelings of antipathy and affinity are thus—as far as this 
community, blind moles that they are, can see—the same as boundaries which organize 
and limit the scope moral judgment, law, and reform.258 
While Elsie’s potential for violence is never actualized in the novel, her cousin, 
Dick Venner raises a more emergent problem. In keeping with the novel’s portrayal of 
the hereditary nature of morality, Dick’s moral sense is damned by his blood.  As the son 
of a member of the Venner family line and a woman of Spanish descent from Buenos 
Aires, Dick possesses a dangerous “double consciousness” which is divided along ethnic 
lines. “On his New England side he was cunning and calculating, always cautious,” while 
his southern blood makes him “liable to intercurrent fits of jealousy and rage, such as 
the light-hued races are hardly capable of conceiving.” These “blinding paroxysms of 
passion,” feed “into the more dangerous forces that worked through the instrumentality 
of his cool craftiness” (EV V.2 155). And as the plot of the novel bears out, every 
intention he expresses bends toward immorality.  
                                                          
258 As Holmes writes in “Mechanism and Thought in Morals: “The moral universe includes nothing but the 
exercise of choice: all else is machinery. What we can help and what we cannot help are two sides of a 
line which separates the sphere of human responsibility from that of the being who has arranged and 
controls the order of things” (“Mechanism,” 302). In other words, where the limits of choice end, God 
begins. This raises the problem: to what extent can society can play a mediate role in organizing the 
conditions of choice, and how does one draw the line between choice and machinery? 
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While many of Dick’s disturbing features are innate, they are also developed 
through his tyrannical management of his horse: “The absolute tyranny of the human 
will over a noble and powerful beast develops the instinct of personal prevalence and 
dominion; so that the horse-subduer and hero were almost synonymous” (EV V.1 190). 
In this respect, Dick Venner’s villainy may also grotesquely refract the character of a 
slaveholder. Realizing that Elsie is attracted to Bernard, Dick aims to kill the young 
Brahmin so that he may marry Elsie and obtain the Venner family fortune through 
further subterfuge.  
Dick’s behavior forces a need for some form of response; however, in light of the 
novel’s advocacy of compassion, his malignity raises a problem.  As the professor puts it, 
“I suppose we must punish evil-doers as we extirpate vermin; but I don’t know that we 
have any more right to judge them than we have to judge rats and mice, which are just 
as good as cats and weasels, though we think it necessary to treat them as criminals” 
(EV V.1 281). In a heated moment, Bernard likewise feels the push and pull between the 
“impulse of extermination,—a divine instinct, intended to keep down vermin of all 
classes to their working averages in the economy of Nature” and “a cheerful 
tolerance,—a feeling, that, if the Deity could bear with rats and sharpers, he could.” 
Along these lines, Elsie Venner navigates a dilemma that puts the “divine instinct” to 
commit violence against the ethical obligation of divine compassion. 
 It is clear from the start that the entire community has a natural prejudice 
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against Dick: at first glance, he appears like a demon from Puritan lore: looking like 
“Mephistopheles galloping hard to be in season at the witches’ Sabbath-gathering” (EV 
V.1 220).  Though Elsie’s bizarre serpentine eyes escape the town judge’s categorization, 
he boasts of his ability to spot moral decay in Dick: “we old law doctors know just as 
well as the medical counselors know the marks of disease in a man’s face. Dr. Kittredge 
looks at a man and says he’s going to die; I look at a man and say he is going to be 
hanged.”259  As the narrator describes the books that sit in his library “staring blindly” 
and embodying “the ghosts of dead attorneys fixed motionless and speechless, each 
with a thin, golden film over his unwinking eyes” (EV V.1 225), he also portrays the 
jurist’s advocacy of capital punishment as a construct of a serpentine tradition.260  
Doctor Kittredge is no exception to the community’s prejudice.261  However, he 
is also conscious of the fact that acting otherwise lies outside of the domain of Dick’s 
moral control. In a series of melodramatic scenes, Dick makes good on his predictably 
evil ways by attempting to noose Bernard with a lasso. Though he almost succeeds in his 
task, Doctor Kittredge’s hired man, Abel, interferes and Dick is apprehended. Given the 
novel’s emphasis upon the inborn prejudices of the people against this biologically 
                                                          
259 “I have had to face many sharp eyes and hard ones,--murderers’ eyes and pirates’,--men who had to be 
watched in the bar, where they stood on trial, for fear they should spring on the prosecuting officers like 
tigers,--but I never saw such eyes as Elsie’s; and yet they have a kind of drawing virtue or power about 
them,--I don’t know what else to call it” (Ibid.). 
260 This analogy is established through Holmes’s long description the fixed, unwinking stare of the 
rattlesnake (EV V.2 60). 
261 “He had been suspicious of Dick from the first. He did not like his mixed blood, nor his looks, nor his 
ways” (EV V.2. 141). 
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incompatible man, it is hinted that Dick will likely be lynched without trial the next 
morning (EV V2. 180).  In response to these warring natures, Doctor Kittredge halts the 
machinery of rural justice; he seizes the reigns of judge, jury, and executioner of justice 
by grabbing Dick and hustling him to the Massachusetts border, exiling him from the 
state forever. “I can’t judge men’s souls,” the Doctor states, “but I can judge their acts, 
and hold them responsible for those—but I don’t know much about their souls. If you or 
I had found our soul in a half-breed body, and been turned loose to run among the 
Indians, we might have been playing just such tricks as this fellow had been trying. What 
if you or I had inherited all the tendencies that were born with his cousin Elsie?” (EV V.2 
210). 
 In other words, compassion dictates that Dick must be expelled, for the 
community is as incapable of judging him by its terms as he is incapable of following the 
law. Just as Dr. Kittredge’s decision to keep Elsie out of the asylum enables people like 
Reverend Honeywood to arrive at a larger conception of moral judgment, his decision 
about handling Dick also interrupts the automatic processes which would otherwise 
leave Dick at the mercy of divine retribution. By exiling Dick from the state, he succeeds 
in protecting the community from the danger Dick poses, and he also effectively halts 
the barbaric urges the town would have otherwise expressed through an unfair trial or 
lynching.  
There is also potentially another element at work in the physician’s intervention 
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and Elsie Venner’s pleas of compassion. For, by linking the limits of this community’s 
psychological jurisdiction with the border of Massachusetts, rather than, say, exiling 
Dick from the nation by taking him to the port of Boston, Holmes maps the limits of 
moral judgment upon state boundaries in a manner that is in step with Holmes’s 
political leanings on state moral and legal jurisdictions throughout the 1850’s. As a 
stalwart Whig Unionist, he signed a controversial petition in favor of Daniel Webster’s 
Compromise of 1850 and the Fugitive Slave Act.262 Moreover, while he did not speak 
much about the wrongs of slavery before the war, he declared to Charles Sumner and 
Ralph Waldo Emerson that he would have fought with the abolitionists in Bleeding 
Kansas had he been an inhabitant of the state.263  
Whether or not we read Kittredge’s attempt to quarantine the community from 
the threat of violence which Dick Venner poses as a reflection upon emerging hostilities, 
at the back end of this compassionate medical intervention is an acknowledgment that 
without such an intercession, violence between warring natures is natural and 
inevitable.264 
                                                          
262 Eleanor Marguerite Tilton, Amiable Autocrat: A Biography of Doctor Oliver Wendell Holmes (New York: 
Schuman, 1947), 224. 
263 Ibid., 227. 
264 In the January 1861 issue of Atlantic Monthly, the first month of southern secession conventions, 
James Russell Lowell’s essay about the imminent threat of disunion, “The Question of the Hour,” 
appeared alongside the chapter in which Dick is exiled, entitled “Moment of Peril.” Lowell, James Russell. 
“The Question of the Hour.” Atlantic Monthly 7 (January 1861). Likewise, in a March 1861 letter to John 
Lothrop Motley, Holmes was still holding out for the possibility of compromise. He expressed frustration 
with abolitionists as well as southern advocates of the confederacy as parties mutually interested in 
secession (qtd in Morse, V.2 154-155). 
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Mercy Killing 
 After the novel’s depiction of successful efforts at quarantining Dick from the 
New England community without resorting to violence, the plot rapidly hurtles through 
a course of events leading to further exposure of the nature of Elsie’ condition and to 
her eventual death. Perhaps due to her recognition of the community’s compassion, 
Elsie becomes increasingly aware of her isolation from Rockland’s sphere of sentiment. 
More conscious of her loneliness because of this, and desirous of being within the fold, 
she desperately seeks to be loved by someone besides the always officious, but racially 
other Sophy, who remains her one true companion.  
For most of the novel, Doctor Kittredge’s treatment of Elsie is in line with 
Holmes’s views on the self-limiting nature of disease and “moral treatment,” a 
procedure which involved humoring the delusions of patients and allowing them to 
recognize the absurdity of their behavior and thereby to self-correct.265 He waits for 
Elsie’s malady to run its course without interfering in any way: “encouraging all her 
harmless fantasies, and rarely reminding her that he was a professional adviser.” The 
hope is that Elsie might outgrow her snake-like tendencies.  Her father has a parallel 
                                                          
265 Literary descriptions of the moral treatment are discussed in Justine Murison’s The Politics of Anxiety in 
American Literature, and appear prominently in the final chapters of Robert Montgomery Bird’s Sheppard 
Lee as well as Nathaniel Hawthorne’s “Egotism; or, the Bosom Serpent.” 
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hope: “Are there not rough buds that open into sweet flowers? ...In God’s good time she 
would come to her true nature; her eyes would lose that frightful, cold glitter.”266 The 
doctor speculates that love will ultimately cure the “cold circle of isolation” she carries 
with her: “she will not love any one easily, perhaps not at all; yet love would be more 
like to bring her right than anything else” (EV V.1 244).   
On this front, the doctor seems correct: while knowledge of Elsie’s inner life is 
always indirect, she seems desirous of sympathy yet constitutionally incapable of having 
it.267 But her only resource for self-knowledge is a literature that reaffirms her 
marginalization: Keats’s “Lamia,” Coleridge’s “Christabel,” and, of course, the story of 
Eve in the garden of Eden. Perhaps most tellingly of her condition, she bookmarks a line 
from the Aeneid for Bernard that that reads: “Incipit effari, mediaque in voce resistit,” 
which may be translated to mean: “She’d speak her heart, but her voice chokes, mid-
word.”268 
But he also gives advice that produces a paradox when Elsie’s health is 
concerned: he warns the man she loves, Bernard, that reciprocating that love would be 
dangerous—even fatal: “Keep your eyes open and your heart shut. If, through pitying 
                                                          
266 These two men also share an elective affinity: Elsie’s father, Dudley, and Dr. Kittredge share a common 
feeling when they discuss their hope that Elsie will grow out of her “illness”: “There are states of mind 
which may be shared by two persons in the presence of each other, which remain not only unworded, but 
unthoughted…. Such a mutually interpenetrative consciousness there was between the father and the old 
physician” (EV V.1 243). 
267 She has “nothing in common” with the other girls and is constantly described as making a “circle of 
isolation round herself” (EV V. 1 128). 
268EV V.1 220;  Virgil. The Aeneid. Translated by Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 2008), 130. 
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that girl, you ever come to love her, you are lost” (EV V.1 267).  The latent sexuality in 
Elsie’s depiction broaches the unmentionable possibility that she might reproduce and 
transmit her tendency to future generations.269  Thus, while compassion for Elsie is a 
virtue, it has to be expressed without sympathy or love, but rather a form of stoic pity.  
This medically sanctioned pity is given religious sanction when Helen Darley 
learns the truth about the snakebite that killed Elsie’s mother from Sophy.270 She affirms 
that a cure to Elsie’s malady is more important than her life. Helen realizes that it’s now 
“cruel” to call the look in Elsie’s eye’s malice, for she understands that Elsie is merely a 
                                                          
269 Additionally, her death is in keeping with views Holmes expressed in the year of Elsie Venner’s 
publication that fatal diseases of a congenital nature may be “vital to the well-being of society.” 
Expressing the principles of natural selection, Holmes argues that congenital diseases “are natural 
agencies which cut off the children of races that are sinking below the decent minimum which nature has 
established as the condition of viability, before they reach the age of reproduction. They are really not so 
much diseases, as manifestations of congenital incapacity for life; the race would be ruined if art could 
ever learn always to preserve the individuals subject to them. We must do the best we can for them, but 
we ought also to know what these ‘diseases’ mean.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Currents and Counter-
Currents in Medical Science,” Medical Essays 1842-1882 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company), 200. 
Just as the professor of Elsie Venner states that observing three generations is enough to triangulate the 
scope of a person’s moral capabilities, his son, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote 
the following when affirming the sterilization of a woman in his majority opinion in Buck V. Bell 1927: 
“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” Paul Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, 
the Supreme Court, and Buck V. Bell (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2008). 
270 Helen remarks on Elsie’s condition thus: “She knew the significance of the strange repulsion which she 
felt in her own intimate consciousness underlying the inexplicable attraction which drew her towards the 
young girl in spite of this repugnance. She began to look with new feelings on the contradictions in her 
moral nature,—the longing for sympathy, as shown by her wishing for Helen’s company, and the 
impossibility of passing beyond the cold circle of isolation within which she had her being. The fearful 
truth of that instinctive feeling of hers, that there was something not human looking out of Elsie’s eyes, 
came upon her with a sudden flash of penetrating conviction. There were two warring principles in that 
superb organization and proud soul. One made her a woman, with all a woman’s powers and longings. 
The other chilled all the currents of outlet for her emotions. It made her tearless and mute, when another 
woman would have wept and pleaded. And it infused into her soul something—it was cruel now to call it 
malice—which was still and watchful and dangerous, which waited its opportunity, and then shot like an 
arrow from its bow out of the coil of brooding premeditation.” (EV V2. 252). 
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sick soul. But she does not pray for Elsie to live, for “what could life be to her but a 
perpetual anguish, and to those about her but an ever-present terror?” She wishes 
instead that Elsie be “so influenced by divine grace, that what in her was most truly 
human, most purely woman-like, should overcome the dark, cold, unmentionable 
instinct which had pervaded her being like a subtle poison.” Viewing this cure as more 
important than Elsie’s life, Helen believes that Elsie’s ultimate fate is “left to a higher 
wisdom and tenderer love than her own” (EV V2. 252).  
In what amounts to a procedure of sentimental euthanasia, Dr. Kittredge’s 
advice becomes a mechanism of grace and higher wisdom: with these principles, Elsie is 
quickly killed without anyone’s guilt entering into the equation. In light of an impasse 
that pits Elsie’s interests against those of the “human” race, she is killed when Bernard 
and Elsie follow the doctor’s prescription.  
When Elsie approaches Bernard and exclaims “Love me!” he refuses her request 
for a romantic connection but instead tells her he will love her as if they were “born 
from the same mother.” Bernard’s offer of fraternal love rests upon an impossibility, for 
maternal affliction is the source of her difference (EV V.2 234). She swoons into a 
sickness which leaves her bedridden. Her condition worsens when Bernard gives her a 
“white ash” flower; a sympathy gift that, unbeknownst to him, was antipathetic with 
snakes. These forms of misunderstanding, in spite of Bernard’s best intentions, reflect 
the fact that the emotional disconnect between Elsie and every other white subject in 
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the novel is mutual and tragic, but also blameless.   
As the sickness that Bernard imparts courses through her system, it blanches out 
the dark “foreign” element and gives the impression of racial and moral purification and 
her grotesquerie is evacuated: “there was a change in her whole expression and her 
manner. The shadows ceased over her features” and she begins to resemble her mother 
as her blood-curse is lifted, “the likeness she bore to her mother coming forth more and 
more, as the cold glitter died out of the diamond eyes, and the stormy scowl 
disappeared from the dark brows and low forehead.” Against the doctor’s orders that 
she must remain still or die, the girl gives her father a fatal embrace and utters her last 
words: “Good night, my dear father!” (EV V2. 272). 
Because Elsie’s death comes with her assent to the structures of feeling which 
have kept her at a distance throughout the novel, Elsie’s death-cure universalizes the 
sacred bonds of the community with a sense of spiritual affirmation reminiscent of the 
famous death of Uncle Tom’s Cabin’s Little Eva. The whole town, including her father, 
joins in mourning—and only Sophy does so without relief.   
Elsie’s purification-through-death is further punctuated by the vanishing of the 
serpentine birthmark which she has been hiding beneath her golden necklace. This 
event bears no small resemblance to the finale of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s “The Birth-
Mark”—the tale of a man of science who rids his wife of a hand-shaped birthmark that 
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represents a “visible mark of earthly imperfection,” and, in the process, kills her.271 But 
whereas Hawthorne’s tale implicates the mad scientist’s puritanical drive for perfection, 
the communal instincts of Elsie Venner and its physician’s restraint diffuses guilt into the 
ether.  
In a postscript to the narrative, the professor departs from his wry detachment 
and joins in this tearful ceremony. Witnessing Bernard Langdon and Letty Forrester, the 
granddaughter of Reverend Honeywood together in Boston, he anticipates that they will 
marry. Upon closer inspection, he sees that Letty is now wearing Elsie’s necklace. “My 
eyes filled with tears as I read upon the clasp, in sharp-cut italic letters, E.V. They were 
tears at once of sad remembrance and of joyous anticipation; for the ornament on 
which I looked was the double pledge of dead sorrow and living affection” (EV V.2 312).  
In observing the scenes that lead to Elsie’s death as a formal departure from the 
professor’s stoic, clinical and de-romanticizing gaze, Cynthia Davis reads the conclusion’s 
dripping sentimentalism and the professor’s tearful participation as a radical departure 
from the aesthetic and ethical stances posed earlier in the novel. Evincing a “weakness” 
for sentimentalism, “Holmes’s efforts to craft a clinical tale and legitimize a clinical 
perspective are ultimately hampered by the mandates of residual, more emphatic forms 
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1851), V.1. 32-51. 
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of narrative” that he “could not finally resist.”272 
Yet this sentimentality marks the revitalization of structures of feeling within a 
newly drawn ethnopsychological jurisdiction—a space where the workings of the law, 
morality, and grace are made possible through the inscription of physiologically 
inscribed boundaries. These tears bear witness to the triumphal destiny of revitalized 
medicine and religion, embodied by the “living affection” between Bernard and Letty. 
The scene of community and narrator joining the ritual of mourning puts the narrative 
totality of Elsie Venner in the position of the girl in the ballroom scene—protected from 
the harsh truths of biological destiny with a faith redefined by the physician’s powers: 
an authority that is “limited,” as the professor says, but “absolute in its range” (EV V.1 
36).  
 
Coda: A Conservative Revolution and the Surgery of War 
        In the wake of Elsie’s death, a further machinery of destiny intervenes. Rockland’s 
Mountain partially collapses over the Venner home, burying the mourning Sophy on top 
of Elsie and her mother’s grave. Though the scene is described with enough geological 
information to confirm for us that this collapse is a natural event, it is, as Joan Burbick 
argues, “given a providential status,” which befits the conclusion of Holmes’s romance 
                                                          
272 Davis, 16. 
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of destiny.273 Such an event conjures up the kind of cultural theodicy which followed the 
Lisbon earthquake—the event that inspired the anxious Calvinist of Holmes’s “Deacon’s 
Masterpiece” to develop a logical and aesthetic system that could hold together in the 
wake of nature’s violence.274  
For much of the narrative, the ominous Mountain has been known to be 
unstable and thus the source of a legion of real and imagined fears—communal 
destruction, serpents, Elsie’s grotesquerie, the Native American presence—all threats 
that haunted the corner of the American imaginary I have been investigating throughout 
this inquiry. Instead of cataclysm, however, this avalanche winds up becoming “one of 
nature’s conservative revolutions.” The collapse destroys the The Rattlesnake Ledge 
which looms over the region and kills all the serpents.   
Twenty-four hours after the falling of the cliff, it seemed that it happened ages 
ago. The new fact had fitted itself in with the old predictions, forebodings, fears, 
and acquired the solidarity belonging to all events which have slipped out of 
                                                          
273 Burbick, 246.  
274 In the context of the Lisbon earthquake and General Braddock’s defeat, the Deacon of 
Holmes’s 1858 poem develops a shay according to a “perfect” logical system that keeps the shay 
whole for a hundred years. However, the total collapse of the shay is a consequence of the 
logical system that made it strong—it is built so that the weakest part of the shay is as strong as 
the rest—and thus it goes to pieces in an instant. While the poem certainly operates as a critique 
of the rigidity of doctrine, and, in turn, the tendency for such doctrinal logics to be undermined 
by developments in culture and the sciences, the poem nonetheless expresses the town’s 
widespread reverence for the fact that it was nonetheless strong enough to last exactly a 
hundred years. Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Deacon’s Masterpiece, or the Wonderful ‘One-Hoss 
Shay’: A Logical Story.” Humorous Poems (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1867), 58-62. 
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Time and dissolved in the antecedent eternity. (EV V2. 287) 
It is as if, once the community has stayed its internal barbarities, the savage threat will 
evaporate and its symbolic importance will cease to haunt the community’s historical 
imaginary. As the novel’s wisest members have overcome their instincts, and 
reconsidered the Adamic genealogy of sin, they have witnessed the evacuation of 
everything aligned with the “lawless” and “savage” without a hint of anger or animosity. 
Of comparatively less poetic interest in these passages is the death of Sophy—
the only woman in the novel who doesn’t look upon Elsie’s death with relief.  Having 
ignored Elsie’s father’s order that all of his servants evacuate, Sophy states she would 
rather be buried with her “Masse” and Elsie. In a way that echoes the vindication of 
white normativity implied by Elsie’s fatal embrace of her death-cure, she prefers to die 
with the white woman she loved and served. 
For all of its emphasis upon arresting the annihilation imperatives expressed 
through instinct, theology, and law, this conclusion evinces an imagination that is just as 
violent as the slaughter expressed in Edgar Huntly and Nick of the Woods. Moreover, it 
demonstrates a continuation, indeed an evolution, of a cultural disavowal of complicity 
in such violence through the diagnosis and sequestration of the insane. For, if Edgar 
Huntly’s Sarsefield and Edgar legitimized violence through silencing the personal  
investments in it that Clithero Edny showed, and Nick of the Woods turned to federal 
violence as the answer to the impossibility of restraining such investments, but left us 
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with the problem of the continuation of lawlessness within the post-frontier legal 
institution, Holmes’s narrative disclaims institutional investments in violence by moving 
them into the cosmos: as force that can only be reacted to and managed. In each case, 
avatars of society’s destiny have been absolved of responsibility for complicity in 
exclusionary practices by disentangling affiliation with the mad and following a duty 
aligned with providence. In Holmes’s case, the metaphor of medical authority as a 
mechanism for restraining violence was closely linked with one which would soon 
authorize violence on a scale that was perhaps unimaginable before April of 1861. 
In the month that the final chapter of Elsie Venner was published, the simmering 
crisis of slavery and sectional conflict turned to a boil as the first shots of the Civil War 
were fired at Fort Sumter. Though Holmes had spent considerable effort supporting 
causes that aimed to prevent the catastrophe of war, and to treat internal conflicts like 
self-limiting disease, his Fourth of July oration of 1863 offered a rallying call in support 
of the Union, declaring the conflict “The Inevitable Trial.” 
Amidst the feeling of collective loss, uncertainty, and confusion, he 
acknowledges that some of the “quiet burghers and farmers” of places like Elsie 
Venner’s Rockland were experiencing doubts about the typhoon-like violence engulfing 
the nation: “if their trust in their fellow men, and in the course of Divine Providence, 
seems well-nigh shipwrecked, we must remember that they were taken unawares, and 
without the preparation which could fit them to struggle with these tempestuous 
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elements.” Amidst this atmosphere of collective violence and doubt in America’s sacred 
destiny, Holmes states that it may seem like the Union is only “madly persisting” in the 
conflict between North and South. 
In reply to the possibility of national insanity, he encourages those in his 
audience with “vacillating minds” to view the war like a traditional illness—“an 
inevitable result of long incubating causes” rooted in the history of sectional unrest. As a 
malady with an etiology that could be traced across generations, the consequence of a 
chain of symptoms that had coursed through the body politic, it could be regarded as an 
infection that threatened the nation’s self-government. Departing from his usual 
distaste for “artful” medical and institutional intervention and, additionally, the fantasy 
of regional containment of conflict put forth in Elsie Venner, he tells his listeners that 
the body politic may only be saved through the cleaving of flesh: “the disease of the 
nation was organic, and not functional, and the rough chirurgery of war was its only 
remedy.”  With this purpose, “we may join without madness in this day’s festivities.”275 
Whereas Elsie Venner imagines a medical ethics that protects citizens from 
violence by establishing psycho-jurisdictional boundaries, this speech demonstrates how 
quickly the logic of communal preservation could jump to a national level. The 
invocation of medically administrated violence has become a structuring metaphor for 
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Mifflin and Company, 1891), 81-83. 
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sustaining a telos that purifies violence by imbuing it with an objective necessity. As with 
Edgar Huntly and Nick of the Woods, national violence passes its sanity test through its 
methodization in the name of a higher power. 
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